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ABSTRACT 
 
The increasing dependence of modern societies, industries, and individuals on 
information technology and computer networks renders them ever more vulnerable to 
attacks on critical IT infrastructures. While the societal threat posed by hackers and oth-
er types of cyber-criminals has been growing significantly in the last decade, main-
stream criminology has only recently begun to realize the significance of this threat. Cy-
ber-criminology is slowly emerging as a subfield of criminological study and has yet to 
overcome many of the problems other areas of criminological research have already 
mastered. Aside from substantial methodological and theoretical problems, cyber-
criminology currently also suffers from the scarcity of available data. As a result, scien-
tific answers to crucial questions, such as who exactly the attackers are and why they 
engage in hacking activities, remain largely fragmentary. 
The present study begins to fill this remaining gap in the literature. It examines 
survey data about hackers, their involvement in hacking, their motivations to hack, and 
their hacking careers. The data for this study was collected during a large hacking con-
vention in Washington D.C. in February 2008. The theoretical framework guiding the 
analyses is the rational choice perspective (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). Several hypothes-
es about hackers are derived from the theory and some of its models are transposed 
into the context of hackers. Results suggest that the rational choice perspective is a vi-
able theory when applied to cyber-criminals. Findings also demonstrate that the creation 
of more effective countermeasures requires adjustments to our understanding of who 
hackers really are and why they hack.  
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New technologies do not determine the particulars of human fates;  
they alter the spectrum of potentialities within which  
people may act (McClintock, 1999, p. 3) 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Estonia, April 26, 2007. In retaliation for the removal of a World War II-era statue 
of a Soviet soldier, pro-Russian hackers launched a month-long campaign that has be-
come known as the first war in cyberspace. Using a technique known as distributed 
denial-of-service attack (DDoS) on a hitherto-unprecedented scale, the attackers ma-
naged to effectively shut down vital parts of Estonia’s digital infrastructures. In a coordi-
nated effort, an estimated one million remote-controlled computers from around the 
world were used to bombard the Web sites of the president, the prime minister, Parlia-
ment and other government agencies, Estonia’s biggest bank, and several national 
newspapers with requests. The attacks were so massive that NATO rushed a cyber-
warfare team of international security experts to assist the Estonian government, and 
the country’s defense minister, Jaak Aaviksoo, who described the attack as a national 
security situation, requested that the European Union classify it as an act of terrorism 
(Landler & Markoff, 2007). In reference to the events in Estonia, Suleyman Anil, the 
head of NATO’s incident response center, later warned attendees of the 2008 E-Crime 
Congress in London that “cyber defense is now mentioned at the highest level along 
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with missile defense and energy security.” According to Anil, “we have seen more of 
these attacks and we don’t think this problem will disappear soon. Unless globally sup-
ported measures are taken, it can become a global problem” (Johnson, 2008, p. 1). 
Turkey, May 18, 2006. A Turkish hacker who calls himself ‘iSKORPiTX’ commits 
the biggest hacking incident in web-hosting history. He successfully hacked and de-
faced at least 21,549 websites simultaneously and another 17,000 websites a few hours 
later (Lemos, 2006). For the time being, this incident marks the largest single deface-
ment attack in the fast growing area of website hackings, but it is merely one of many 
cases. According to Zone-H, the Internet’s watchdog on website defacements, iSKOR-
PiTX alone has defaced close to 189,000 websites, and the top 50 attackers hacked a 
total of approximately 2.5 million websites across the globe (Zone-H, 2007). These 
numbers are supported by the exponential increase in website defacements found in 
the CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey (2005). In 2004, 5% of the respon-
dents experienced 10 or more website incidents, while in 2005 that figure went up to 
95% (L. A. Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Richardson, 2005).  
The above examples are merely two incidents of what have become a long se-
ries of high-profile hacking attacks (Aguila, 2008). Although warnings of the societal 
threat posed by cyber-attacks on critical network infrastructures have been heralded 
since the 1980s, it is only in recent years that the problem has made it onto the radar of 
governments. Partly due to the experiences of Estonia, countries around the globe are 
now reassessing the security situation of their key information systems. They are enact-
ing new security measures to better protect their critical network infrastructures, and 
they are increasing their readiness to respond to large-scale computer incidents 
3 
 
(NCIRC, 2008). In Britain, for example, Conservatives have recently proposed the crea-
tion of a new position for a cyber-security minister and a national hi-tech crimes police 
squad to better combat the “growing and serious threat to individuals, business and 
government […] that will continue to escalate as technology changes” (Johnston, 2008, 
p. 1).  
The implementation of effective countermeasures against hacking attacks is ex-
ceedingly facilitated by the vast amount of knowledge that has already been accumu-
lated in numerous computer science research projects (cf. Chirillo, 2001; Curran et al., 
2005; J. Erickson, 2008). Several studies conducted by computer scientists and com-
puter engineers have closely examined the technical details of the various attack me-
thods and have produced a significant body of information that can now be applied to 
help protect network infrastructures (Casey, 2004). Unfortunately, the guidance pro-
vided by these studies is limited to only the technical aspects of hacking attacks and, 
sharply contrasting from the substantial amount of knowledge already gathered about 
how the attacks are performed, answers to the questions of who exactly the attackers 
are and why they engage in hacking activities continue to remain largely speculative. 
Today, the persons committing the attacks remain mysterious for the most part, and 
scientific information about them continues to be only fragmentary. 
The present lack of information concerning the sociodemographic characteristics 
and the motives of cybercrime offenders can be attributed to a number of causes. One 
of the main reasons can be traced back to the unfortunate circumstance that, until re-
cently, mainstream criminology has underestimated the potentially devastating societal 
impacts of cybercrimes and has diverted only limited attention to this relatively new type 
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of criminal behavior (Jaishankar, 2007; Jewkes, 2006; Mann & Sutton, 1998). Cyber-
criminology is only now beginning to evolve as a distinct field of criminological research, 
and it has yet to overcome many methodological and theoretical problems that other 
areas of criminological research have already solved (Yar, 2005b, 2006).  
A particular challenge for researchers in this young field of study arises from the 
various methodological obstacles entailed in the sampling of cyber-criminals. As a result 
of these difficulties, available data sources are scarce, and quantitative studies are li-
mited to surveys of cybercrime victims. At this point, only a few qualitative case studies 
(eg. Mitnick & Simon, 2005; Schell, Dodge, & Moutsatsos, 2002; Taylor, 1999, 2000) 
and biographies (eg. Mitnick, Simon, & Wozniak, 2002; Nuwere & Chanoff, 2003) exist 
that examine individual hackers, their motivations, preferences, and their hacking ca-
reers. While such studies are well suited to provide in-depth insights into the lives of a 
few individuals, they are unfit for generating generalizable information about the popula-
tion of hackers at large. Yet, just “like in traditional crimes, it’s important to try to under-
stand what motivates these people to get involved in computer crimes in the first place, 
how they choose their targets and what keeps them in this deviant behavior after the 
first initial thrill” (Bednarz, 2004, p. 1). This comment, stated by Marcus Rogers, an as-
sociate professor at Purdue University and head of the cyber-forensics research in the 
department of computer technology, accurately describes the task cyber-criminologists 
have to accomplish. The aim of the present study is to undertake this task and to begin 
filling the remaining gap in the criminological literature on hackers and the hacking 
community by providing the first quantifiable insights into the hacking underground. 
Such insights are needed to create a more profound understanding of the nature of the 
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threat and a more complete assessment of the problem and its solutions. The identifica-
tion of the reasons and motives for an attack helps to better identify the actors’ beha-
viors, to develop better countermeasures, and to ultimately make systems safer. To ac-
complish this goal, the study is structured as followed. 
First, a detailed introduction into the fiercely contested dispute over the defini-
tions of the terms “hacker” and “hacking” is provided, and the exact usage of both terms 
in the study is specified. Second, the typical perceptions of hackers in the general public 
are discussed. Most people do not have direct contacts with hackers, but derive their 
knowledge of the hacking scene and the digital underground from mass media or ste-
reotype-laden, personal prejudices. Unveiling the common (mis)perceptions about 
hackers is an important part of the present study because a clear, scientific vision of the 
characteristics of the hacking community has to be established against the context of 
the predominant perceptions of who hackers are and why they hack.  
Third, the present study is located within the current state of cyber-criminology. 
The developments that have led to the establishment of cyber-criminology as a distinct 
field within criminological research are traced, and the justifications for this establish-
ment are discussed. Then, detailed descriptions are provided of the current methodo-
logical and theoretical challenges with which cyber-criminologists are confronted. When 
studying hacking activities, it is important to bear in mind that hacking is a form of cy-
bercriminal activity, and, as such, it is subjected to the various obstacles challenging all 
studies of criminal activities that are taking place in the virtual worlds of interconnected 
computer networks.   
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Fourth, the theoretical framework guiding the study is introduced. The study fol-
lows the rational choice perspective (Clarke & Cornish, 1985), a popular criminological 
version of rational choice theory. A rationale for the selection of this particular theoreti-
cal framework is provided and its core components are discussed. The central hypo-
theses of the study are derived from the main propositions of the rational choice pers-
pective, and Clarke and Cornish’s (1985) central models of the decision-making 
processes are modified to fit the context of hackers.   
Following the introduction of the theoretical framework, the details of the re-
search design are specified. A rationale for the selection of a particular sampling strate-
gy is provided, and the steps involved in the processes of creating the survey instru-
ment and collecting the data are elaborated. The discussion of the various aspects of 
the research design is concluded by a separate chapter on the different sections and 
individual items of the survey instrument.   
The last two chapters of this study present and discuss the findings of the re-
search project. The results paint a detailed picture of distributions of a range of soci-
odemographic characteristics within the hacking community. They further specify the 
relative importance of various motivations, and they assess several components of the 
suggested theoretical frameworks. The study concludes with a discussion of the impli-
cations these findings hold for our understanding of who hackers are and why they 
hack, for the design of more effective countermeasures, and for the appropriateness of 
the rational choice perspective as a theoretical framework for the study of computer 
hackers. The limitations of the current project are considered and suggestions for future 
research are given.  
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CHAPTER TWO:  
THE MEANINGS OF HACKING AND HACKERS 
 
An indispensable step in every scientific research project is the explicit operatio-
nalization of the main study concepts. The first important step within this process is the 
specification of central terms and core concepts with precise definitions. In the context 
of hackers, this step is of crucial importance. Devising exact definitions of the terms 
hacker and hacking is particularly problematic because both terms are fiercely con-
tested within the hacking community itself and between hackers and the general public. 
Thus, a description of the various meanings ascribed to both terms is necessary for a 
complete understanding of the various definitions and the disputes between them. 
The Controversial Meanings of Hacker and Hacking 
Applied to the context of computer technology, the two terms “hacker” and “hack-
ing” were originally used only in small circles of computer experts, and familiarity with 
both terms was limited to a few specialized computer scene insiders. The popularity of 
the two terms slowly began to increase during the late 1980s and 1990s, when they be-
came more commonly adopted in mainstream media reports of several high-profile cy-
ber-trespasses that sometimes involved shocking exploitations of computer and tele-
communication technologies (cf. Aguila, 2008). In recent years, the more frequent me-
dia coverage of such computer abuses has turned these formerly uncommon terms into 
the everyday vernacular of the mainstream public discourse (K. Erickson & Howard, 
2007; Schell & Martin, 2004).  
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Today, the vast majority of the general population has at least some vague idea 
about what hackers are and what they do. The typical understanding of a hacker is that 
of a perpetrator who illegally invades other people’s computer systems with the intent to 
destroy, disrupt, or carry out illegal activities on that system. As Taylor notes in his 
prominent study on hackers and the hacking community, the public perceives hacking 
as “the unauthorized access and subsequent use of other people’s computer systems” 
(Taylor, 1999, p. xi). Unfamiliar with the specific details of hacking, many members of 
the general public even tend to imprecisely subsume any illegal abuse of a computer 
system or network under the term hacking. This inaccurate perception of hackers is 
hardly surprising because hackers and hacking have become the center of present-day 
public debates about cybercrimes. In fact, mainstream media reports oftentimes use the 
terms hacker and hacking synonymously with cyber-criminals and cybercrimes (K. 
Erickson & Howard, 2007; Yar, 2005a). Moreover, most media coverage of hackers 
tends to reinforce their stereotypical perception as prototypes of mysterious and dan-
gerous cyber-criminals. As a result, hackers are commonly seen as personified repre-
sentations of the threat cybercrimes pose to society (K. Erickson & Howard, 2007).  
This common conceptualization of hackers and their activities, while unanimously 
accepted and unchallenged within the public discourse, is actually deceptive because it 
oversimplifies the meaning of hackers and hacking in a twofold way: It overlooks the vi-
cissitudinous etymological history of the two terms, and it ignores that both terms re-
main deeply contested today. To familiarize the reader with the historical and contempo-
rary controversies surrounding the meanings and connotations of hackers and hacking, 
both aspects are discussed in the following section.  
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The Etymological History of the Term Hacker 
Since its first appearance in Yiddish language, where it was used to denote 
someone as inept as to make furniture with an axe (Schell & Martin, 2004), the term 
“hacker” has undergone many changes. According to the Oxford English Dictionary 
(2008), the first emergence of the term in English language dates back to 1480, when it 
was used to signify a tool used for hacking, chopping wood, or breaking up the earth. A 
century later, the first reference to a “hacker” as a person was recorded in English lan-
guage. Back then, the word was used to identify someone as a cutter, a cut-throat, a 
notorious thief, or generally as a bully or a rogue. This meaning was again slightly 
changed about 30 years later, when Thomas Cartwright (1618) used the term as a cha-
racterization of somebody who mangles words, senses, and meanings. Around the 
same time this shift in meaning took place, a second, completely different connotation of 
the word “hacker” emerged. This new version signified a farm laborer who hacks or cuts 
more than half an acre of ground in a day with a hack (Oxford English Dictionary, 2008). 
The etymological history of the term “hacker,” especially the double entendre that ex-
isted during the 17th century where it referred to both malevolent outlaws and persons 
who excelled in their legitimate profession, is particularly interesting because both con-
notations have again resurfaced in the contemporary debate surrounding the meaning 
of the word. 
After it had almost fallen into oblivion in intervening years, the term “hacker” re-
surfaced again in the context of computer technology during the 1960s. It was reintro-
duced as a neologism into the specialized and confined language of computer techni-
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cians and programming experts, who used it as a positive label for somebody who was 
particularly skilled in developing highly efficient, creative, and compact programs and 
algorithms. Rather than simply using existing computer technology, “hacker” enthusiasts 
were united in their passion for technological innovations and by their playful and indivi-
dualistic quest to satisfy their intellectual curiosity. “Hacker” in this understanding de-
notes someone who is obsessed with designing computer software and hardware, a 
superb technician who possesses a substantial degree of skill and competence and 
spends much of his time writing computer programs. Respectively, “hacking” originally 
referred to the continuous improvement of computer program codes and algorithms, of 
software applications and hardware components.  
It was hackers who first realized the true potential behind the steel facades of 
computing machines which—as a side note—were originally developed to better calcu-
late the trajectories of ballistic projectiles. Among the many inventions attributed to 
hackers are, for example, the first computer chess applications and even the Apple 
computer, one of the first personal computers (Schrutzki, 1989, p. 166). All early contri-
butors to the advancement and expansion of computer technology, all innovators who 
developed new computer-based solutions to a multitude of problems, all entrepreneurs 
who pioneered and fostered the “computer revolution” (Naughton, 2000, p. 313), and all 
those who paved the way for today’s superhighways of the Internet, were considered 
prototypical hackers in this original understanding of the term (Levy, 1984).  
The original hacker community formed a subculture shaped by the ideals and 
moral concepts of the zeitgeist. As did many other sub- and counterculture movements 
at the time, the early hacking community was characterized by a fundamental distrust 
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against governmental and military monopolies, power, and authority. Early hackers de-
fied corporate domination of culture and rejected traditional and conservative values, 
norms, and lifestyles. Instead, they genuinely adhered to the enlightenment ideals of 
human emancipation and self-fulfillment through rational thought. They advocated the 
freedom of information, knowledge, and intellectual thought, and promoted the idea that 
information and knowledge should be accessible for everyone without restrictions 
(Thomas, 2002). Many members of the hacking community were idealists who adver-
tised the usage of computer technology for the higher goals of intellectual discovery, for 
creating art, beauty, and for improving the overall quality of life (Schrutzki, 1989). Still 
today, programming and other activities that support these views are oftentimes referred 
to as “hacktivism” within the hacking subculture to emphasize their political nature (Tay-
lor, 2004). 
While their exploratory quests for new information and data frequently included 
unauthorized accesses to remote computer systems, traditional hackers undertook such 
accesses without criminal intent. Instead, they were carried out to investigate and better 
understand the intricacies of different system setups, to utilize existing computing re-
sources (which at the time were very costly), to detect security breaches and weak-
nesses, and to ultimately enhance the security of computer protections. The vast majori-
ty of members of the original hacker community adhered to a “Hacker Ethic,” a set of 
rules that was introduced by Steven Levy (1984) to describe the values of the hackers 
at the MIT Artificial Intelligence Laboratory. The main principles of this Hacker Ethic are 
that: 1) access to computers and anything which might teach something about how the 
world works should be unlimited and total; 2) all information should be free; 3) authority 
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should be mistrusted and decentralization promoted; 4) hackers should be judged solely 
by their hacking, not ascribed criteria such as degrees, age, race, or position; 5) art and 
beauty can be created on a computer; and 6) computers can change life for the better 
(Levy, 1984). One important implication of this Ethic is that any form of damage to re-
mote computer systems, be it intentional or as a result of incompetence, is principally 
objectionable and contemptible.  
The Current Controversy Over the Meaning of Hacker 
As was mentioned earlier, the original positive meanings of the terms hackers 
and hacking became gradually substituted with negative connotations in the 1980s and 
1990s. The increasingly mission-critical nature of computer networks for many indus-
tries and the expanding popularity of electronic financial transactions began to interest 
many people in breaking into computer systems, not in an attempt to understand them 
or make them more secure, but to abuse, disrupt, sabotage, and exploit them. Angered 
by what from their perspective appeared to be a misrepresentation and a denunciation 
of the hacking community, traditional hackers reacted to this development by introduc-
ing the new label “crackers” for unethical and menacing hackers, from whom they at-
tempted to distinguish themselves. It is important to note that in the context of the de-
bate about hackers, the term “crackers” has no racist connotation. Rather, it is derived 
from the activity of cracking, or breaking into, a safe and it refers to people who breach 
(or crack) security measures on a computer system, a network, or an application with 
the intent to damage or exploit the target or to steal information from it. Hackers who 
engage in these kind of malicious activities and for whom the label “cracker” was in-
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tended, on the other hand, largely reject it because cracking typically involves pro-
gramming software applications specifically designed to discover and exploit weak-
nesses. In their logic, the ability to create programs that are able to circumvent or 
breach defensive security measures is proof of their ability to write superior code. 
Hence, they prefer to refer to themselves as hackers.  
The fiercely contested battle over these two labels created considerable linguistic 
confusion. Making matters even worse, however, is the circumstance that the distinction 
between hackers and crackers is not the only controversial differentiation. Similar to the 
distinction that exists between “hackers” and “crackers,” and just as contested, is the 
differentiation between “white hat” and “black hat” hackers. Again, these two terms do 
not have a racist background, but are derived from old black-and-white western movies, 
in which the sinister villain typically wore a black hat, and his law-abiding or law-
enforcing counterpart a white hat. Applied within the context of computer technology, 
“white hat” denotes hackers who abide by the Hacker Ethic and hold its rules in highest 
regard, whereas “black hat” hackers do not commit themselves to the same ethical 
standards.  
Today, white hat hackers are oftentimes employed or contracted by computer 
companies, governments, and financial institutions. Their job is to identify security 
weaknesses and holes in computer systems, networks, or newly-developed software 
applications and hardware components. Ethical hacking, or “penetration testing,” 
emerged as a byproduct of the increasing need for all corporations, organizations, and 
social institutions to be permanently connected to the Internet. In an attempt to avoid 
being victimized by black hat hackers, many corporations and agencies decided to hire 
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or contract white hat hackers, who secure their networks by legally attempting to break 
into them (Damsell, 2003). 
Whereas many penetration testers practice ethical hacking as a legal profession, 
the term “ethical hacker” remains an oxymoron for many black hat hackers. For them, 
true hacking implies compromising the security of a system without permission from an 
authorized party. Although there continues to be a controversy over when the term 
black hat was coined and to whom it was first applied, many reports identify John Dra-
per (a.k.a. Captain Crunch) as the first cracker to whom the label black hat hacker was 
applied, even though he was de facto a phreaker, a person who hacks telephone sys-
tems (Schlegel & Cohen, 2007). Draper used a plastic whistle from a cereal box to gen-
erate the exact 2,600 Hz tone American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) and other 
telephone providers used at the time to indicate the availability of long-distance phone 
lines. By mimicking the whistling of a dial tone, Draper tricked the controlling connection 
switch into stopping all billing because the switch assumed the call had ended. With the 
help of their cereal box whistles, Draper and his friends could call each other for free—
at least until irregularities in the account billing were discovered and Draper was sen-
tenced to prison (Schell & Martin, 2004).  
Draper and his friends are just one example of the countless young, creative 
crackers who experiment with security mechanisms in an attempt to break them and 
who learn from each other in the computer underground. While the majority of hackers, 
especially the masses of unskilled “script kiddies,” who merely download and execute 
preconfigured attack applications and routines, can adequately be subsumed under the 
label of black hat hackers (Twist, 2003), the contested nature of the terms “hacker” and 
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“hacking” within the scene is important to bear in mind when studying hackers. Studies 
that do not distinguish between white hat penetration testers and criminal black hat 
hackers will inevitably introduce a bias that produces distorted and inaccurate results. 
Notwithstanding the resistance to the criminal label within the traditional hacker 
community, large parts of the general public are either unaware or ignorant of the dis-
tinctions between hackers and crackers, white hats and black hats. Similarly, the main-
stream media as well as law enforcement agencies and computer security industries 
generally do not subscribe to these distinctions. Instead, they subsume any type of 
hacking activity under the currently predominant definition as an inherently negative, 
criminal activity. They usually also equate hackers with cyber-criminals, merely because 
this is how the vast majority of people outside of the community understand hacking and 
hackers (Twist, 2003). Thus, the definitions of what constitutes a hacker and hacking 
activities are not only deeply contested within the hacking underground, but also be-
tween the general public and the members of the hacking community, to whom the 
criminal label is universally applied. While many black hat hackers accept or embrace 
this label, self-proclaimed white hat hackers consider themselves misrepresented by it 
and continue to challenge and reject the label.  
Although the above section shows that awareness of the different meanings as-
sociated with the two terms “hacker” and “hacking” and of their contested nature is im-
portant for the study of hackers, subsequent uses of both terms will refer to the under-
standing shared in the general public. This usage is not intended to discriminate against 
traditional hackers or penetration testers, but has a twofold reason. First, the focus of 
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this study lies solely on illegal hacking activities. The second reason is simply pragmatic 
brevity.  
The (Mis)representations of Hackers in the General Media  
While hacking as the unauthorized intrusion into computer systems with the in-
tent to abuse or exploit them is undoubtedly at the center of commonly held stereotypes 
about hackers, their conventional representations are far more complex. They involve 
several additional assumptions, many of which are problematic because they are ste-
reotypical misrepresentations (Thomas, 2002). The distorted picture of hackers is partly 
a result of the circumstance that only very few people have direct personal contacts to 
actual hackers in their social networks. Without direct personal experience, the vast ma-
jority of people derive their knowledge about hackers from representations in popular 
fiction and the media. Thus, an examination of popular hacker representations has to 
proceed from reviewing their depiction in mainstream media and culture.  
The representation of hackers in the general media can be best understood 
against the wider context of societal responses to technological innovations and trans-
formations (Taylor, 1999, 2000). In the past, many such transformations have provoked 
both technophobic fears and technophilic fascinations in equal measures. Historically, 
the introduction of any new technology with the potential to transform social structures 
and interactions has routinely created a tension between an anticipation of desirable 
improvements in everyday life and an anxiety that revolves around unintentional or un-
foreseeable negative consequences (Simon, 2004). Numerous examples of such so-
cietal reactions exist in modern history, be it after the introduction of steam engines, 
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trains, electricity, telephones, automobiles, airplanes, television, nuclear bombs, com-
puters, or the Internet (cf. Simon, 2004). Many famous novels and fictional stories owe 
their success to their effective play on such technophobic fears. In Mary Shelley’s Fran-
kenstein, a classic within this body of literature, the fictional scientist Dr. Victor Fran-
kenstein uses electricity to revive a monster he composed of dead body parts. Despite 
his good intentions, his ignorance exceeds his knowledge and he ultimately pays for his 
attempt to play God with his life (Shelley, 1995). The tale of Dr. Frankenstein exempli-
fies more than just the fears technological transgressions of unseen boundaries often-
times evoke. It also hints at the religious dimension of technophobic fears. Several clas-
sic tales, such as the Greek tale of Prometheus, indicate that the misgiving that man-
kind as the creator of fundamental accomplishments interferes with the prerogatives of 
the gods and ultimately must pay the price for this sacrilege exists since ancient times. 
Throughout the long history of this fear, its prominence appears to be highly correlated 
to the significance of technological inventions (Edgerton, 1995). The multitude of tre-
mendous inventions during the last century and the fundamental societal changes they 
have wrought have turned the peoples’ fears of mad scientists, who unintentionally un-
leash their destructive and monstrous technological creations on us, into a dominant 
theme in contemporary culture (Tourney, 1992; Tudor, 1989).  
Since their invention in the mid-20th century, computers, in particular, have 
changed almost all aspects of society and human life in unprecedented ways (Negro-
ponte, 1996). This tremendous societal influence has turned them into today’s primary 
projection screen for technophobic fears and anxieties surrounding technological inno-
vations. Exacerbating societal fears of computers is the rapidity of their continuously 
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advancing technology. The exponential growth of computerized calculating capacities 
(Kurzweil, 2005) is daunting to many people who are afraid that mankind, as creation’s 
crowning glory, will eventually be challenged by a superior artificial intelligence. The 
contemporary prominence of fears that mankind will be rivaled by new forms of compu-
terized artificial intelligence is visibly reflected in the popularity of this recurring theme in 
popular fiction. In Stanley Kubrick’s masterpiece 2001: A Space Odyssey (1969), for 
example, the initially philanthropic spaceship computer HAL 9000 begins killing the crew 
members when faced with the prospect of disconnection. The artificial intelligence sys-
tem Proteus IV in Donald Cammell’s Demon Seed (1977) even rapes its creator’s wife 
in an attempt to conceive a human-machine hybrid successor who is no longer sub-
jected to any of its boundaries (Kozlovic, 2003). Since Demon Seed, attempts of artifi-
cial computer intelligence to subdue and enslave mankind have been a recurring theme 
in numerous blockbuster movies, such as the Terminator and its accompanying sequels 
and The Matrix trilogy (Dinello, 2005).  
Against this background, many hacker movies and stories can be characterized 
by their distinctive play on the fear of unleashed and uncontrollable technological catas-
trophes. In the classic hacker movie War Games (Badham, 1983), a young hacker ex-
ploits a back door into a central military computer. Not realizing that he is actually 
logged into a computer system that has control over the United States’ nuclear arsenal, 
he starts playing a game of global thermonuclear war and unknowingly brings the world 
to the brink of nuclear annihilation. Such blurring of the line between simulation and re-
ality is a common theme in hacker movies. In many such films, the fate of real persons, 
organizations, countries, or even the world is decided by actions that take place in a 
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contested virtual space. In eXistenZ (Cronenberg, 1999), the line between video game 
and reality becomes blurred in a shocking and gruesome way when a video game de-
signer creates an artificial reality game that is played directly in peoples’ minds. Similar-
ly, the data trafficker Johnny Mnemonic (Longo, 1995) stores sensitive information di-
rectly in a cybernetic storage system within his brain and is forced to hack his own brain 
when parts of the secret message become lost. Already in the classic movie Tron (Lis-
berger, 1982), a hacker is transported into the digital universe inside a computer, where 
he must survive combat as a cyber-gladiator in order to stop the artificial intelligence 
that has taken over his computer company. The implicit suggestion of these and many 
other fictional and non-fictional hacker stories is that the preoccupancy of hackers with 
computer technology and cyberspace dehumanizes them.  
Such dehumanizing depictions further reinforce the common stereotype of hack-
ers as antisocial, reclusive, introverted, and dysfunctional hermits, whose computer-
centered escapism from the social worlds of interpersonal interaction eventually endows 
them with superior technological skills. Similar stereotypical portraits of hackers charac-
terize them as young male misfits and fledgling teenagers who, rather than being intimi-
dated by the latest computer technology, embrace this technology instead. They are 
seen as “geeks,” juvenile technophiles to whom computer technology provides an op-
portunity for self-realization in an environment that is not laden with the complexity and 
unpredictability of human interactions. By excelling in their mastery of this technology, 
hackers supposedly compensate for their alleged social shortcomings. Along these 
lines, the negative stereotype of hackers displays them as teenagers who are initially 
driven to their computers by social deficits and who, through their preoccupation with 
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computer technology, become even further detached from reality. In some instances, 
hackers are even seen as juveniles who are being driven by feelings of contempt and 
disdain toward a social environment that excludes them and who use their hacking skills 
as a resource for taking revenge against the persons or institutions they scorn. As one 
commentator notes, “the fact that hackers are also invariably young in popular percep-
tions is also not a coincidence – the apparent ease with which a ‘younger generation’ is 
able to engage with the realm of computer technology, a technology that many older 
people continue to see as mysteriously daunting, merely serves to sharpen the sense 
that all manner of extravagant things may be possible for those with the know-how” 
(Yar, 2006, p. 25). Thus, the portrayal of hackers as exclusively young seemingly mir-
rors technophobic fears that are particularly prevalent among older generations. Many 
members of older generations feel disconnected, left behind, and disadvantaged by the 
spreading of a technology that provides younger generations with the advantage of in-
stantly accessible and virtually limitless information (Dowland, Furnell, Illingworth, & 
Reynolds, 1999; Negroponte, 1996). Hackers, in particular, stand out due to their mas-
tery in manipulating and utilizing this seemingly incomprehensible computer technology, 
an ability that in the perception of many borders on wizardry. It is this uncertainty and 
weariness about the ominous capabilities of hackers that provokes technophobic fears 
and paints the hacker image negative.  
Notwithstanding the many unfavorable components of commonly held beliefs 
about hackers, their public representations are not unanimously negative, but can best 
be described as intrinsically ambivalent. Just as technological inventions cause anxiety 
and fascination in equal measures, persons who master these inventions also evoke a 
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particular fascination and admiration. This admiration is also reflected in many movie 
portrayals of hackers, in which they are displayed as socially maladjusted yet brilliant 
heroes who use their extraordinary computer expertise to save the world from evil vi-
ruses, rampaging corporations, nuclear Armageddon, or even invading aliens. Con-
trasted with classic action heroes, they are no longer muscular one-man armies, but 
technologically sophisticated protagonists, “keyboard cowboys” (Softley, 1995), who 
solve the world’s problems with keystrokes rather than guns.  
Even though many fictional hacker characters might have had some trouble with 
the law in the past, they are typically displayed as essentially good-natured characters 
with whom viewers can identify. As Thomas (2002) points out, the criminality of hackers 
is oftentimes contextualized, negotiated, and relativized by the narratives themselves. In 
many storylines, their illegal actions are justified as being forced by others, accidents, 
or—most commonly—unavoidable means to expose horrible secrets, injustices, or to 
fight a greater evil. Thus, while seen as principally threatening because of their self-
immersion into abstract, virtual, and dehumanized worlds, they are also portrayed as 
“freedom fighters of the 21st century” (Kovacich, 1999), heroes who either reclaim hu-
man authority over rivaling technological entities (Taylor, 2000) or fight against unjust 
domination by corrupt governments and megalomaniac corporations. Particularly the 
latter is a dominant theme in many fictional hacker stories. In Hackers (Softley, 1995), 
for example, a clique of juvenile hackers accidently discovers and prevents a large-
scale corporate conspiracy that would have otherwise led to an ecological disaster. Si-
milarly, a computer hacker becomes suspicious of his corrupt employer, a multinational 
computer company CEO that is loosely based on Bill Gates, in the movie AntiTrust 
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(Howitt, 2001). His investigation into company procedures confirms his suspicion and he 
eventually unveils a ruthless and murderous plot to dispatch the company’s anti-trust 
problems.  
Summarizing, fictional accounts and portrayals of hackers can be characterized 
as being inherently ambivalent in their reflection of technophobic fears and technophilic 
fascinations. This cultural ambivalence is not only mirrored in the positive and negative 
associations evoked by the terms “hacker” and “hacking,” but also in surveys that ex-
amine public opinions about hackers (Dowland et al., 1999; Voiskounsky, Babeva, & 
Smyslova, 2000). Dowland et al. (1999) found principally ambivalent attitudes toward 
hackers. The study also demonstrated that the division between rather positive and ra-
ther negative opinions runs alongside generational lines. Whereas members of older 
generations expressed primarily anxious and negative attitudes, younger respondents 
tended to see hackers in an overall positive light (Dowland et al., 1999). One year later, 
Voiskounsky and his colleagues again found the same patterns expressed in a study 
conducted in Russia. In Voiskounsky’s survey, young Russians expressed a particular 
admiration for the intriguing cleverness and intelligence they ascribed to hackers 
(Voiskounsky et al., 2000, p. 72-3).  
Thus, the ambivalence between fears and admirations in the perception of hack-
ers as “a schizophrenic blend of dangerous criminal and geeky Robin Hood” (Taylor, 
2000, p. xii) appears to be a universal pattern in mainstream culture as well as public 
opinions. Yet, this ambivalence is not the only one in the common perception of hack-
ers. While both fears and admirations are sparked by the ingenious computer skills typi-
cally ascribed to hackers, such skills are commonly seen as having been developed as 
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means for compensating social isolation and underdeveloped social skills. The admira-
tion for hackers is undoubtedly caused by the inability of most people to comprehend 
the techniques hackers employ to manipulate computers. The explanation of such supe-
rior computer skills as a compensation for deficient social skills, however, presents an 
unvalidated and questionable assumption in the representation of hackers and should 
be scrutinized. 
Both the various contested meanings of the terms “hacker” and “hacking” and the 
perceptions of hackers in the general public are important elements that have to be 
considered in a scientific study of hackers. The disputed nature of the two terms implies 
that researchers have to be explicit when informing study subjects about what exactly 
they mean by hacking. The common perception of hackers, on the other hand, has to 
be considered because it likely exerts an influence on the self-perception of hackers. 
More importantly, it is also the broader background against which a scientific under-
standing of hackers has to be established. 
Both considerations about the meaning of hacking and hackers, while presenting 
contextual aspects that are necessary for an accurate understanding of hackers, are 
only two elements of a more complex operationalization process. Hacking as a form of 
cybercriminal activity is carried out in a unique environment—cyberspace. This envi-
ronment exhibits several criminogenically relevant features that render it distinctively 
different from any other environment and need to be addressed in cybercrime studies. 
Thus, the next section outlines the development of the societal threat posed by cyber-
crimes and the distinct challenges the cyberspace environment holds for cybercrime re-
searchers.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  
THE GROWING THREAT OF CYBERCRIME 
 
Riyadh, November 28, 2005. During a conference on information security in the 
banking sector, Valerie McNiven, a former e-finance and e-security specialist for the 
World Bank and current U.S. Treasury advisor on cybercrime, estimated that in 2004, 
financial harm from global cybercrime eclipsed the revenue generated from drug traf-
ficking in the U.S. for the first time. According to her estimates, the revenue gained from 
illegal cybercrime activities was over $105 billion. 
Even though from a scientific standpoint, McNiven’s statement that global cyber-
crimes are becoming more profitable than drug trafficking, which is currently the high-
est-grossing illicit activity in the U.S., simply cannot be substantiated, it nevertheless 
hints at substantial developments in the evolution of cyber-criminality. The statement 
cannot be sustained because McNiven, aside from including illicit activities such as cor-
porate espionage, child pornography, stock manipulation, phishing fraud, and copyright 
offenses in her estimate of total losses, also failed to recognize cross-national differenc-
es in the legal definition of what constitutes a cybercrime. Moreover, consider the fact 
that the estimates for many of the activities included in McNiven’s definition are pro-
vided by interest groups who gladly inflate statistics to the limits of credibility. For exam-
ple, the recording industry, whose estimated losses comprise a large portion of McNi-
ven’s $105 billion estimate, equates every illegally obtained copy with a direct loss of 
unsold merchandise, a calculation whose inflation is inherently obvious (Leyshon, 
Webb, French, Thrift, & Crewe, 2005; Marshall, 2004). Gauging the financial harm of 
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the crimes included in McNiven’s cybercrime definition is fraught with problems, and the 
empirical evidence upon which McNiven’s claim is based is clearly preliminary, thus 
rendering its validity questionable.  
In spite of the methodological flaws of the estimate, McNiven‘s statement is nev-
ertheless important because it points to significant developments in the area of cyber-
crimes. FBI statistics from recent years suggest that the financial damage caused by 
cybercrimes increases between 20% to 35% each year (L. A. Gordon et al., 2005; L. A. 
Gordon, Loeb, Lucyshyn, & Richardson, 2006), thereby likely surpassing the drug trade 
in terms of growth rate. The prolific growth of the Internet in terms of the number of us-
ers, functionality, and efficiency of electronic business procedures has convinced many 
industries to move their operations, and most importantly their money, online. Online 
shopping, online banking, online stock broking, credit card gateways for wire transfers, 
and e-commerce all provide opportunities to make business processes more efficient. 
On the other hand, the use of the Internet for the transfer of financial resources has 
drawn many criminals to this new medium (Newman & Clarke, 2003). The temptation 
toward the profit that can now be gained online has completely changed the face of cy-
bercrime (Schell et al., 2002). In order to provide a better understanding of cybercrime 
phenomena as they exist today, the following section provides a brief summary of the 
co-evolution of the Internet and cybercrimes.  
The Co-Evolution of the Internet and Cybercrimes 
Misuse of computer systems is not a new phenomenon. In fact, the abuse of 
computer systems is as old as the technology itself, but cybercrime was a phenomenon 
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of no significance before computer networks were developed. The reason is a practical 
one: When information is stored locally without being networked, it is much more difficult 
to gain access to than it is to intercept information that is transferred across physical 
distances within a network. Another advantage is that access to one element in the 
network can possibly provide access to other vulnerable computers in the same net-
work. However, even in the early days of computer networks, cybercrime was still in its 
infancy and of little societal significance. In these times, computers were rare, very ex-
pensive, and required specialized knowledge to be operated successfully. All these fac-
tors inhibited widespread use and misuse.  
The importance of the Internet, and with it, the significance of cybercrime began 
to slowly grow as computing became easier and less expensive. In the 1970s, the first 
affordable personal computers appeared and ARPAnet, the predecessor of our current 
TCP/IP based Internet, was created (Hafner & Lyon, 1998, p. 40-41). Nevertheless, 
even as Internet use became more widespread, connecting computers to it was quite a 
difficult undertaking. Existing operating systems provided no software to connect to In-
ternet Service Providers, which at the time were few and very expensive. Access to the 
Internet was a privilege reserved for a few researchers, military personnel, government 
agencies, and technology experts who used it primarily to exchange highly specialized 
information (Vallee, 2003). Computer crime first drew the attention of legislators after 
ISPs such as AOL, CompuServe, and Prodigy began to provide software that made it 
much easier to connect to their services (Naughton, 2000). In 1986, alarmed by the ris-
ing number of cyber-trespasses, the U.S. government passed the Computer Fraud and 
Abuse Act (U.S.C., 1986), the first legislative act that made breaking into computer net-
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works illegal. It is worth mentioning that this first legislative effort did not apply to juve-
niles, a circumstance that is inconceivable today. Hackers at the time were skilled com-
puter experts motivated primarily by curiosity to explore other systems’ weaknesses, to 
reveal their configurations and operations, and to take advantage of the technical possi-
bilities of networked computing (Graham, 2004). Many of them followed an ethical code 
that disallowed them to inflict damage on the hacked system. Early hackers who fol-
lowed this code distinguished themselves from so-called “crackers,” hackers motivated 
by malevolent intentions aimed at exploiting the hacked system (Schell & Martin, 2004).  
In the 1990s, Internet prices dropped dramatically and the Internet began to grow 
exponentially. Today, computers are omnipresent in our daily lives. A modern society 
without computers or the Internet has become unthinkable. The Internet has developed 
into an essential, mission-critical infrastructure for government agencies and organiza-
tions, almost all private business industries, and financial institutions (Li, 2006). Among 
many other aspects, manufacturing routines and processes, water supplies, electric 
power grids, air traffic, and stock markets are essentially operated, managed, and con-
trolled through computer networks (Painter, 2004). E-commerce is growing with yearly 
increase rates of 20%, reaching a total volume of $116 billion today (Richtel & Tedeschi, 
2007). Today, 44 million citizens in the U.S. have online bank accounts and the online 
banking population in the U.S. grew by 9.5% in 2006 (Warner, 2007). Also, a third of the 
U.S. workforce is online, an important factor since more than half of all e-commerce 
transactions are work-related (Alaganandam, Mittal, Singh, & Fleizach, 2005). The fi-
nancial value of Internet activities and the wealth stored on computer systems has 
reached unprecedented dimensions and attracts criminals that are no longer motivated 
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by technical curiosity, but rather by financial motives. Today’s societal dependence on 
the Internet, and particularly the use of the Internet for banking and commercial transac-
tions, has fundamentally changed the face of cybercrime. The early hacker population 
of highly skilled computer experts motivated primarily by technical curiosity has given 
way to a wide array of criminals with varied skills, knowledge, resources, authority, and 
motives. Profiles of today’s offenders range from teenagers to disenchanted employees, 
traditional criminals, organized racketeers, or even foreign intelligence agents. The 
present-day dimensions of the term ‘cybercrime’ encompasses a vast scale of multi-
faceted phenomena ranging from small-time pranksters to organized crime circles as 
well as nationally funded spies (Bednarz, 2004). 
The many dimensions and different methods of today’s cybercrimes and the mul-
titude of offender profiles, in combination with modern society’s dependency on com-
puter technology, necessitates an accurate assessment of the risks and threats in order 
to answer the question of how to combat computer criminals effectively. Protection 
against the various methods of cyber-criminals and the ability to trace, capture, and 
prosecute them require research in order to provide an accurate assessment of the cur-
rent landscape of cybercrimes and the threat they pose. Empirical research is vital for 
the design of effective countermeasures to combat not only hackers, but also other 
newly emerging types of cyber-criminals. Only then is it possible to minimize the poten-
tial for harm in the online environment. The salience of cybercrime stems from its in-
creasing societal relevance, and mainstream criminology is slowly starting to grasp the 
extent of the problem.  
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The Novelty of Cyber-Criminology 
Researchers have observed the emergence of cyberspace as a new realm for 
criminal activity since the 1990s (Littlewood, 2003; Thomas & Loader, 2000; Yar, 
2005b), yet mainstream criminology has long been negligent towards the problem of 
cybercrime and has failed to recognize its societal relevance (Jaishankar, 2007; 
Jewkes, 2006; Mann & Sutton, 1998). The study of cybercrime has only recently gained 
widespread attention among criminologists. Several indicators demonstrate that the 
study of cybercrimes is only now catching up with the developments and methods of 
cyber-criminals. The first conference devoted entirely to cybercrime, the “Cyber Crimi-
nology and Digital Forensics Initiative Conference”, took place in Spokane Valley, WA, 
USA in October 2006 (Jaishankar, 2007). Probably the strongest indicator of the recent 
establishment of cyber-criminology as a distinct subsection within criminology is that the 
first interdisciplinary research journal dealing exclusively with cybercrime, the Interna-
tional Journal of Cyber Criminology (IJCC), was first published in January 2007 (Jai-
shankar, 2007). Another indicator that the field is just now gaining popularity is the 
growing number of scholarly publications addressing the various aspects of cybercrime 
(Furnell, 2002; Yar, 2006). Empirical publications require data to analyze and explain 
cybercrime phenomena. The small number of publications is partly attributable to the 
small number of surveys and datasets available to researchers. For example, the first 
nationally representative survey, the National Computer Security Survey (NCSS), which 
was sponsored by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), Bureau of Justice Statistics 
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(BJS), and the U.S. Department of Homeland Security National Cyber Security Division 
(NCSD), was fielded in 2006.  
Taken together, these indicators suggest that criminological studies of cyber-
crime are in their early stages and that more attention must be devoted to this pressing 
new form of crime. In other words, “A new, radical discipline named cyber- criminology 
is the need of the hour to explain and analyze the crimes in the Internet” (Jaishankar, 
2007, p. 1). In addition to the relative lack of publications and empirical data, this new 
discipline faces a range of problems and difficulties. Some researchers even question 
whether cybercrime is a qualitatively new form of crime justifying the establishment of a 
distinct subsection within criminology. Thus, the headmost question is whether cyber-
crimes constitute a unique type of crime.  
The Novelty of Cybercrime 
Some researchers argue that from a legal standpoint, cybercrimes are largely the 
same as ‘old-fashioned’ non-virtual crimes committed with new tools and nothing else 
than the “same old wine in new bottles” (Grabosky, 2001, p. 243). However, there is 
broad consensus among the majority of researchers within this newly-developing sub-
section of criminology that society is confronted with a new type of crime that has dis-
tinctly different qualities from ‘terrestrial’ crimes. Most cybercrime researchers, particu-
larly criminologists with a sociological background who examine the social-structural 
conditions of the environment in which the crimes are committed, insist that it presents a 
radically new and distinguishable form of crime. Social interactions, in large part, are 
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determined by the possibilities imposed upon or restricted by the structures of the envi-
ronment they are taking place in.  
Cyberspace, a term coined by William Gibson in his famous science-fiction novel 
Neuromancer (1984) and later defined as “there’s no there, there” (Gibson, 1988, p. 40), 
presents an electronic universe of information resources available through computer 
networks. Social interactions taking place within this world of connected computers are 
markedly different than in the ‘meatspace’ (Pease, 2001, p. 23). The Internet, as the 
largest of these electronic information networks, “variously ‘transcends’, ‘explodes’, 
‘compresses’, or ‘collapses’ the constraints of space and time that limit interactions in 
the ‘real world’” (Yar, 2006, p. 11). It represents the most important element for the 
‘time-space compression’ of globalization (Harvey, 1989), in that it allows nearly instan-
taneous interactions between spatially distant actors.  
Furthermore, the Internet offers various degrees of automatization in interaction, 
thereby creating ever-new forms and possibilities of social exchange (Shields, 1996). 
Among various other aspects, automatized interactions within computer-mediated 
communication (CMC) networks extend both the scope and scale of offending, as the 
aforementioned examples of the Turkish hacker and the attacks on Estonia’s digital in-
frastructure demonstrate. Many-to-many communications inexorably alter the relation-
ships between offenders and victims, as well as the possibilities of criminal justice sys-
tems to counteract or resolve such crimes (Capeller, 2001). Internet users are instanta-
neously targetable by the largest known pool of potential offenders from all over the 
world. Hackers are not bound by the limits of physical proximity and can strike by 
launching highly automated attack routines. A wide variety of specialized software ap-
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plications such as network crawlers, sniffers, and scanners exist that can be used to 
execute such attack routines. These programs perform automatic scans of wide ranges 
of IP addresses for vulnerabilities. CMC allows individual users to reach, interact, and 
affect thousands of other users simultaneously. Thus, the possibility for potential of-
fenders to target large quantities of other users and their property is multiplied to an un-
precedented degree. Electronic communication networks are unique ‘force multipliers’ 
that can be abused to create enormous negative effects with only very limited resources 
and efforts. One example of the misuse of the Internet as a force multiplier is the distri-
bution of viruses, worms, trojan horses, root kits, and other malicious code; another is 
the daily flood of mass-distributed ‘spam’ emails. The research institute IDC estimates 
that in 2007, 40 billion of the nearly 97 billion emails sent daily will be spam messages 
(Levitt, 2007). According to their report, the worldwide volume of spam email sent is ex-
pected to exceed the volume of person-to-person emails sent for the first time in 2007.  
Another criminogenically relevant feature of CMC networks is that they allow for 
easy creation, alteration, and reinvention of the social identity. Internet users can create 
arbitrary virtual avatars, electronic representations and identities that are not required to 
be analogous to their ‘real world’ identities (Turkle, 1995). The ability to disguise social 
identity is of high criminological relevance because it allows potential offenders to re-
main anonymous (Snyder, 2001). The increased anonymity in electronic communication 
networks lowers the offender’s perception of the risks involved in the commission of cy-
bercrimes. As with terrestrial crimes, anonymity in cyberspace ultimately raises the like-
lihood that a cybercrime is committed (Joseph, 2003).  
33 
 
From the above, it can be concluded that three features of these electronic net-
works create new forms, patterns, and structures of illegal behavior: the irrelevance of 
tempo-spatial distances, the unlimited potentiality of many-to-many connectivity, and the 
possibility to disguise oneself behind arbitrary, anonymity-granting identities. These fea-
tures of the cyberspace environment render all interaction taking place within it, includ-
ing cybercrimes, original and distinctly different from interactions in any other social en-
vironment known before.  
The above characteristics of digital crimes justify the establishment of cyber-
criminology as a distinct subsection within criminology. They also pose new challenges 
for both researchers and law enforcement alike which require innovative responses. 
The challenges for the criminal justice system arise in particular from the global dimen-
sions and the borderless nature of the environment. Disparate criminal laws and geo-
graphical boundaries of jurisdictions pose important limitations for law enforcement ef-
forts because they have no direct equivalent in cyberspace (Koops & Brenner, 2006). 
Many hackers take advantage of this fact by deliberately exploiting sovereignty limits 
and cross-jurisdictional differences. Though internationally cooperative efforts to har-
monize Internet laws, such as the groundbreaking Council of Europe’s Convention on 
Cyber Crime, are being undertaken, large gaps remain in the realm of international cy-
bercrime legislation.  
In addition to the legal complexities resulting from the global nature of the prob-
lem, there are challenging technical intricacies. These complications include the volatili-
ty and intangibility of evidence owing to the lack of traditional forensic artifacts such as 
fingerprints, DNA, or eye-witness accounts associated with these types of offenses 
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(Shinder & Tittel, 2002). Hackers enjoy a high level of anonymity stemming from ano-
nymizing services, encryption algorithms, ‘spoofing’ tools, and the increasingly wide-
spread availability of Internet cafés and public wireless networks (Computer Crime and 
Intellectual Property Section, 2002). To make matters worse, legislative efforts to force 
ISPs to keep log files documenting user data long enough to conduct criminal investiga-
tions have not yet been successful. Each of these technical obstacles and time con-
straints raises the cost of cybercrime investigations far above the cost of traditional 
crime investigations. Presently, law enforcement does not have the required resources 
and experts with specialized technical knowledge necessary to track and apprehend a 
large portion of online offenders. One indication for this lack of resources is the estimate 
that the chance for being prosecuted for hacking in the US is one in 10,000 (Bequai, 
1999). Hence, even in jurisdictions with appropriate laws to counteract digital crimes, 
the implementation of sanctions remains restricted by logistical and financial limitations.  
The preceding discussion delineated the problems that the new features of cy-
bercrimes pose for law enforcement. Central to this study, however, are the unique 
challenges that arise in cybercrime research. The qualitatively new features complicate 
the research endeavor in several ways. These complications are addressed in the fol-
lowing chapter.  
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CHAPTER FOUR:  
THE CHALLENGES IN RESEARCHING CYBERCRIME 
 
The valuable information gatherable only through criminological research on cy-
bercrimes is required for addressing and counteracting this growing societal threat, but 
the developing field of cyber-criminology has yet to overcome a series of distinct me-
thodological and theoretical problems other research areas have already mastered. The 
foremost methodological problem is that, currently, no universally agreed on criminolog-
ical definition of the term cybercrime exists. This problem is fundamental because of its 
implications for the operationalization of the concept and is, therefore, discussed at the 
beginning of the current chapter.  
 
Methodological Problems 
The Problem of Defining and Classifying Cybercrimes 
The investigation of cybercrimes is a relatively new field in criminology and, as 
such, it is confronted with several methodological problems that other areas have al-
ready overcome. One main problem in the operationalization of the concept is the ab-
sence of an widely agreed on criminological definition of what constitutes a cybercrime. 
The problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the complex concept cybercrime en-
compasses multiple dimensions and various manifestations. The term cybercrime de-
notes a wide range of phenomena ranging from an attack against essential national in-
frastructure systems, such as the National Grid, to fraudulent manipulations of penny 
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stocks in chat rooms and bulletin boards. This vast variety of phenomena subsumed 
under the term makes it difficult to provide a precise definition in terms of aggregate in-
cidence and impact. Wall also reminds us that even though the term cybercrime has 
considerable currency in discourses within the media, politics, academics, and the pub-
lic, it still has “no specific referent in law” (Wall, 2001, p. 2). The term is often unders-
tood as signifying an array of illegal acts whose commonality is that they are conducted 
through electronic information and communication networks. An example of such a 
general definition is the one proposed by Thomas and Loader, who summarize all 
“computer-mediated activities which are either illegal or considered illicit by certain par-
ties and which can be conducted through global electronic networks” (Thomas & Load-
er, 2000, p. 3) under the term cybercrime. Under this definition, the novelty of cyber-
crime is that it is conducted in the ‘virtual space’ of worldwide networks of information 
exchange through interconnected computers, particularly the Internet (Castells, 2002). 
The term ‘conducted’, in this context, can refer to computers and networks functioning 
as the agent, facilitator, or the target of criminal activity.  
 Within this broad conception of cybercrime, certain types of activities in-
cluded in the term are commonly distinguished. Typically, types of cybercrimes are ca-
tegorized by the function technology has in their commission. Furnell  differentiates be-
tween ‘computer-assisted crimes’, such as fraud, theft, sexual harassment or pornogra-
phy, in which “the computer is used in a supporting capacity, but the underlying crime or 
offense either predates the emergence of computers or could be committed without 
them,” and ‘computer-focused crimes’, such as hacking, website defacing, spamming, 
or launching of virus/worm attacks, “cases in which the category of crime has emerged 
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as a direct result of computer technology and there is no direct parallel in other sectors” 
(Furnell, 2002, p. 22). A similar distinction is proposed by S. Gordon and Ford (2006), 
who isolate three main dimensions of the term cybercrime: (1) The computer and hard-
ware device dimension, i.e. the role technology plays in the conduct; (2) the technology 
– human element continuum, a dimension that ranges from cybercrimes that are primar-
ily technological in nature to those that have pronounced human elements, like for ex-
ample cyber-stalking; and (3) the ‘crimeware’ focus, a term S. Gordon and Ford use to 
denote software whose primary application is the commission of cybercrimes. Unfortu-
nately, Furnell’s as well as S. Gordon and Ford’s classifications, while being useful in 
analyzing interdependency processes in social and technological developments, are of 
limited criminological value.  
One alternative is suggested by Wall (2001, pp. 3-7), who translates four existing 
criminal law classifications into their cybercrime equivalents. He distinguishes between: 
(1) ‘(cyber)-trespass’, the unauthorized crossing of the boundaries of computer systems 
and/or the causation of damage to those systems or their possessors; (2) ‘(cyber)-
deceptions/theft’, stealing of money or property, e.g. credit card fraud, identity theft, or 
violations of intellectual property a.k.a. ‘piracy’; (3) ‘(cyber)-pornography/obscenity’, all 
pornographic, violent, hate-filled, racist, or generally offensive activities breaking ob-
scenity and decency laws; and (4) ‘(cyber)-violence’, the infliction of psychological harm, 
or the incitement of physical harm, e.g. hate speech, ‘flaming’, harassment, stalking, or 
the distribution of information assisting in dangerous activities such as bomb-building. 
By emphasizing the origins of cybercrimes in traditional crime categories, Wall pursues 
a conservative approach. Each of his four categories subsumes rather broad and di-
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verse ranges of phenomena, a circumstance that calls the validity of his typology into 
question. 
A practical solution to the challenge of defining cybercrimes is offered by Ralph 
D. Clifford (2006). Instead of continuing the debate with just another proposed definition, 
Clifford and the team of legal experts he assembled question the practicality of attempt-
ing to subsume the vast scale of multifaceted phenomena that is encompassed by the 
term cybercrime under one legal definition. In this regard, Clifford’s approach presents 
an important conceptual break that calls into question the appropriateness of the very 
debate surrounding the legal definition of the term cybercrime. Instead of continuing the 
academic search for one overarching legal definition, the approach taken in this second 
edition is to examine the practical implications for investigators, prosecutors, and de-
fense attorneys of the various cybercrime-related statutes (Bachmann, 2008). Despite 
Clifford’s suggestion to end the debate about an overarching definition this debate will 
likely continue, and eventually, a sound criminological definition will be proposed. Until 
then, Clifford’s approach seems to be the most practical solution because it is best fitted 
to address the vast variety of criminal activities subsumed under the term cybercrime.   
The Problem of Measuring the Scale of Cybercrimes 
Obtaining an accurate assessment of the scope and severity of cybercrimes is a 
difficult undertaking. Unfortunately, this is true for many of the types of offenses studied 
by criminologists. Official crime statistics, for instance, do not objectively measure inci-
dent trends and distributions, but are socially constructed. Official datasets include only 
crimes that have been reported, and there are several reasons why crime victims can 
39 
 
be reluctant to report offenses. These reasons range from perceptions of the offense as 
a private matter or as trivial to fears of retaliation, unawareness of the victimization, em-
barrassment due to the victimization, or lack of faith in an effective response. Especially 
corporate actors oftentimes also fear the potential damage the reporting of their victimi-
zation can have for their public reputation. Another major problem is that even when of-
fenses are reported, they may be excluded from the Uniform Crime Report (UCR) be-
cause only the primary charges in each incident are recorded. Fortunately, this problem 
has been resolved in the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which in-
cludes all charges in the incident report as well as several situational variables. A re-
lated under-reporting problem that remains unresolved in both national datasets arises 
from the circumstance that they rely on police reports which are submitted on a volunta-
ry basis. In addition to the many obstacles challenging cross-sectional measurements, 
longitudinal datasets oftentimes also have to resolve issues resulting from changing le-
gal classifications.  
While the aforementioned problems are faced by all quantitative criminological 
studies, they are magnified with respect to hacking attacks and, to varying degrees, to 
all other forms of cybercrimes. As was stated previously, the intangibility of evidence 
and the lack of traditional forensic artifacts make online offenses more difficult to detect 
than terrestrial crimes. Complicating matters further is the remaining lack of knowledge 
of many as to what exactly constitutes a cybercrime, and consequently, whether report-
ing of a particular incident is appropriate (Howell, 2007). Moreover, the global nature of 
cybercrimes and the high level of offender anonymity in the online environment are two 
additional aspects that discourage both victims and law enforcement from reporting 
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such crimes because they decrease the perceived chance of apprehending the offend-
er. As a result, many police stations prioritize reporting of local problems (Wall, 2001) 
occurring on their “patch” (Lenk, 1997, p. 129). Taken together, the above factors justify 
the conclusion that cybercrimes are greatly under-reported in official statistics. In 2000, 
Detective Sergeant Clive Blake from the Metropolitan Police Fraud Squad estimated 
that as few as 5% of computer crimes are actually reported (Blake, 2000). 
Crime and victimization surveys offer an alternate assessment of crime levels. 
Victimization surveys are often used by criminologists because of their ability to encom-
pass offenses that are typically under-reported in official statistics. Despite their advan-
tages, crime and victimization surveys cannot completely eliminate all of the difficulties 
faced by official measurements. To begin with, it is self-evident that an undetected 
crime cannot be reported. Of higher importance for the quality of survey data, however, 
are systematic errors and the bias they introduce. Systematic errors can result from 
many different sources, such as incongruities in the definition of what constitutes a 
crime between interviewer and interviewee, various other interviewer effects, the pres-
ence of third persons, sponsorship-biases, or the so-called response set of the partici-
pant to name but a few. Survey researchers have long recognized that even the highest 
possible optimization of survey instruments will never completely eliminate survey errors 
(cf. Groves et al., 2004). Despite their shortcomings, victimization surveys are especially 
relevant for cybercrime studies because official data on computer offenses remains 
scarce. Unfortunately, survey-related problems are again exacerbated when measuring 
cybercrimes. Cybercrime victimization surveys typically have decidedly selective popu-
lations and study samples. The majority of surveys, including the annual CSI/FBI Com-
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puter Crime and Security Survey, measure only corporate or organizational victimization 
and exclude private computer users. Wall (2001) also hints at the various existing inter-
survey inconsistencies with regard to methodologies and classifications. These incon-
sistencies complicate meaningful comparative analyses and aggregations. Yar lists 
three more reasons for under-reporting by corporations and organizations that are sub-
ject to public scrutiny. He states that public actors “may prefer not to acknowledge vic-
timization because of (1) fear of embarrassment: (2) loss of public or customer confi-
dence (as in the case of breaches relating to supposedly secure e-shopping and e-
banking facilities): and (3) because of potential legal liabilities” relating to their violation 
of data protection responsibilities (Yar, 2006, p. 14).  
All the above mentioned difficulties suggest that more studies and improved 
measurement techniques are needed, and they should lead cybercrime researchers to 
be cautious about the validity of their data. However, they do not imply that researchers 
should refrain from using all available data. To the contrary, more current data are 
needed for a greater understanding of the limitations and for the refining of methodolog-
ical techniques to better address them.  
Eventually, meta-studies of official data and victimization surveys will be able to 
provide a reasonably adequate picture of the threats Internet connected computer users 
are facing. When pursuing this approach, however, one has to be cautious in drawing 
conclusions about the offenders because the high degree of anonymity and inaccessi-
bility granted by the Internet environment conceals many relevant offender characteris-
tics to the victims, and the low apprehension rate prevents accurate estimates of syste-
matic differences between offenders who get caught and those who do not. In addition 
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to these measurement issues, cyber-criminologists face certain theoretical problems 
that are addressed in the following section.  
Theoretical Problems 
Attempts of criminology to uncover the underlying causes of criminal behavior in 
cyberspace are inevitably based on data and theories relating to terrestrial crimes. Dif-
ferences in the cyberspace environment with regard to structural and social features call 
into question the transferability of traditional criminological theories to cybercrimes. Pre-
sently, the applicability of mainstream criminological theories is yet to be determined. 
Two particular problems arise from questions relating to who commits cybercrimes and 
where are they committed. 
The Problem of Isolating Structural Correlates 
The first problem arises from the circumstance that many criminological theories, 
in varying degrees, rely on ecological and environmental propositions. These theories 
explain crimes as phenomena that occur within particular settings exhibiting specific so-
cial, cultural, and economic characteristics. For example, routine activities theories fo-
cus on the time-space convergence of motivated offenders with suitable targets and the 
absence of capable guardians, thereby implying certain environmental settings in which 
offenses can occur (Cohen & Felson, 1979; Felson, 2000).  
Disorganization and other theories that focus on ecological factors have initiated 
crime mapping projects as well as several measurement and prevention programs 
aimed at the removal of criminogenic factors from the environment (Akers & Sellers, 
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2004). Nonetheless, such approaches are problematic when transposed to the context 
of cybercrimes. The virtual cyberspace environment within which cybercrimes are com-
mitted has no equivalent to easily distinguishable terrestrial locations. Rather, cyber-
space has to be understood as “fundamentally and profoundly anti-spatial” (Mitchell, 
1995, p. 8), an environment in which there is no physical distance between locations. 
The irrelevance of spatial distances within cyberspace renders all criminological theo-
ries relying on assumptions specific to terrestrial environments handicapped for the ex-
planation of cybercrimes.  
The Problem of Isolating Offender Characteristics 
A different group of criminological theories examines the reasons why some indi-
viduals repeatedly involve themselves in criminal activity while others abstain. These 
theories correlate specific categories of crimes with certain social characteristics of the 
offender. An example of these corresponding characteristics can be illustrated using 
property crimes and violent crimes. Such offenses are primarily committed by persons 
at the lower end of the income distribution. Other social characteristics predisposing in-
dividuals to commit property or violent crimes might include lack of educational attain-
ment or involvement in deviant subcultures. There is a significant amount of empirical 
evidence within the criminological literature substantiating this correlation between eco-
nomic disadvantage and engagement in these types of crimes. The same correlation, 
however, cannot be established in the case of cybercrimes.  
To the contrary, the aforementioned correlation is reversed with regard to compu-
ting skills and Internet access, in that the more disadvantaged segments of the econom-
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ic and educational distribution possess them the least (Yar, 2006). At the same time, 
individuals with the economic and intellectual resources necessary for the commission 
of cybercrimes usually come from more socially advantaged backgrounds. Internet of-
fenders typically exhibit characteristics that are substantially different from the attributes 
of the majority of other criminals (Wall, 2001).  
The two theoretical problems associated with the identification of ecological and 
individual characteristics of cyber-offenders render many traditional criminological theo-
ries that focus on environmental and individual factors unable to explain of Internet 
crimes. This circumstance has led some cyber-criminologists to suggest that the ap-
pearance of cybercrimes and the inability to simply transpose traditional empirical as-
sumptions and explanatory concepts to them may require considerable theoretical inno-
vation. Criminology may need to develop new analytical tools to adequately assess 
these qualitatively new crimes (Yar, 2006).  
Recognizing these new conceptual challenges, Ronald Clarke suggested a ra-
ther radical solution. His memorable and highly controversial suggestion is to complete-
ly suspend criminological inquiries into the motivations of cyber-offenders, and instead 
focus solely on the crime reduction strategies provided by the ‘crime science’ approach 
(Clarke, 2004). Diverting from the attempts of criminology to unveil causational crime 
factors, crime science merely attempts to reduce it through suitable prevention and de-
tection solutions. Crime science utilizes computer science, engineering, and the physi-
cal sciences as much as the social sciences, and resorts to the fields of statistics, envi-
ronmental design, psychology, forensics, policing, economics and geography to exclu-
sively study the characteristics of crime incidents, while ignoring the traits and motiva-
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tions of criminal actors. Crime scientists substitute the analytical tools of traditional cri-
minology such as cohort studies, criminal career studies, and regression analyses with 
methods that include crime patterning, hot spot analyses, and crime mapping studies. 
Clarke demands that criminologists focus on concrete and manipulable factors of crime 
events and accept the remainder as immutable facts. This suggestion is in line with his 
prior work in the area of situational crime prevention and rational choice approaches 
(Clarke, 1992; Clarke & Cornish, 1985, 2001; Clarke & Felson, 1993; Cornish, 1994; 
Cornish & Clarke, 1986), because these theories consider criminal behavior to be indif-
ferent from any other behavior place, and their central focus is on the reduction of op-
portunities inducing criminal activities.  
 
The Proposed Theoretical Approach 
 The approach taken in this research project is based on the argument that first, 
crime science and the attempts of traditional criminological theories to explain crime 
causation are not mutually exclusive. To the contrary, they can be reciprocally benefi-
cial. Crime science models striving to reduce crime are necessarily based on at least 
implicit assumptions of causational factors and characteristics of criminals. Thus, the 
knowledge and insights gathered through traditional criminological theories can in-
crease the validity of crime science models and make them more accurate. Crime 
science models, on the other hand, have the potential to reveal insights that allow infe-
rences and conclusions about crime causation factors, and can thereby contribute to 
advancing criminological theories.  
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Second, it is argued here that, given the current absence of a criminological 
theory specifically designed to meet the characteristics of the online environment and 
the challenges arising from them, modeling decision-making processes which lead to 
the commission of criminal acts seems to be a promising approach. Such models are 
developed mainly in the context of rational choice approaches which attempt to recon-
struct decision making processes of criminals in order to isolate manipulable factors 
with the potential to reduce crime. A few examples already exist in the criminological 
literature that demonstrate how rational choice and situational crime prevention models 
can be successfully applied to the area of cybercrimes (D'Arcy, 2007; Newman & 
Clarke, 2003).  
For a number of reasons, rational choice and situational crime prevention models 
appear to be well suited to the application of cybercrimes. Unlike many other criminolog-
ical theories, they do not rely on the particular assumptions of disadvantaged social en-
vironments or individuals, and thus are not affected by the associated problems men-
tioned earlier. The only assumption they make about the offending persons is that they 
deliberately choose to commit the criminal act because they consider it beneficial. The 
sole proposition of rational choice models with regard to human actors is that they use 
their cognitive resources to weigh the potential benefits of an action against its potential 
costs, and that this calculation can be manipulated through changes in the parameters 
of estimated risks and costs.  
In the case of cyber-criminals, it is reasonable to assume that offenders premedi-
tate their actions before they decide to commit a criminal act. All different types of cy-
bercrimes require detailed planning in different stages of their commission and have to 
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be committed in a decidedly rational and deliberate manner in order to be successful. 
Carrying out cyber-trespasses, cyber-thefts, deceptions, or frauds, requires the offender 
to carefully consider and weigh alternative routes of action, select the techniques and 
tools appropriate for the attack, and identify exploitable weaknesses, to list but a few 
decisions. As was delineated in the first chapter, cyberspace exhibits several features 
that can lead a rationally-acting person to the conclusion that committing crimes in this 
environment is a viable option. Among them are the reduced risk of being apprehended, 
the multitude and instant accessibility of suitable, unprotected targets, and the high de-
gree of anonymity. Clearly, crimes in the digital worlds of information exchange are the 
result of reasoning processes of rational calculation, purposive self-interest, and low-
cost opportunities. All these aspects suggest that the engagement in cybercrime activi-
ties can appropriately be modeled as a series of decision-making processes, and that 
rational choice and situational crime prevention models are particularly well suited for 
application to cybercrimes.  
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CHAPTER FIVE:  
THE RATIONAL CHOICE PERSPECTIVE 
 
As a theoretical concept, rational choice revolves around the notion that crime is 
chosen because it appears as a promising and rewarding alternative to the offender. 
Although contemporary versions of this theory have appeared only relatively recently 
when compared to other mainstream criminological theories, the depiction of choices in 
terms of benefits and costs has a long tradition in economic as well as sociological and 
criminological thought. Within criminology, the description of offenders as rational deci-
sion makers weighing their alternatives for their pursuit of self-interest dates back to 
classical writers of the 18th century, such as Beccaria (1764) and Bentham (1789). To-
day, several different versions of rational choice theory exist, and rational choice theory 
has become one of the main theoretical concepts that is addressed in nearly every 
criminological textbook (Hechter & Kanazawa, 1997).  
The criminological rational choice model that has attracted by far the most scien-
tific attention, the so-called rational choice perspective, was developed by Cornish and 
Clarke in the 1980s (Clarke & Cornish, 1985). Since the theoretical underpinnings of 
this dissertation follow the rational choice perspective as outlined by Cornish and 
Clarke, a detailed description of this perspective is provided in the following section. 
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The Six Basic Propositions of the Rational Choice Perspective  
Essentially, Cornish and Clarke’s rational choice perspective model rests on six 
basic propositions, which are stated as below (Clarke & Cornish, 2001, p. 24): 
1. Crimes are purposive and deliberate acts, committed with the intention of 
benefitting the offender. 
2. In seeking to benefit themselves, offenders do not always succeed in making 
the best decisions because of the risks and uncertainty involved. 
3. Offender decision making varies considerably with the nature of the crime. 
4. Decisions about becoming involved in particular kinds of crime (involvement 
decisions) are quite different from those relating to the commission of a spe-
cific criminal act (event decisions). 
5. Involvement decisions can be divided into three stages – becoming involved 
for the first time (initiation), continued involvement (habituation), and ceasing 
to offend (desistance) – that must be separately studied because they are in-
fluenced by quite different sets of variables. 
6. Event decisions include a sequence of choices made at each stage of the 
criminal act (e.g., preparation, target selection, commission of the act, es-
cape, and aftermath). 
These six elements comprise the core of the rational choice perspective. Cornish 
and Clarke claim that the combination of these propositions provides a framework appli-
cable to all different types of crimes and therefore of the largest possible criminological 
scope (Clarke & Cornish, 2001). The wide scope of applicability is due in part to the 
50 
 
concise, yet abstract and all encompassing nature of the statements, which also ren-
ders the theory decidedly parsimonious and internally logically consistent. While all six 
propositions are essentially hypotheses themselves, only the second one lends itself to 
more explicit and better testable hypotheses when applied to the context of hackers. 
Thus, the hypotheses of this study are derived from the second proposition. The others, 
on the other hand, are statements of such general and abstract nature that they cannot 
be operationalized in the same way. Nevertheless, propositions four to six are important 
guidelines for the theoretical framework structuring the assessment of hackers, their 
hacking careers, motivations, and various decision-making processes in the present 
study. The six propositions, as well as the hypotheses and the models derived from 
them, are addressed in greater detail in the following section.  
The Rationality of Criminal Acts 
The starting point of the theory essentially states that crimes are never senseless 
or random acts. Rather, they are seen as purposive acts intended to benefit the of-
fender. Beneficial outcomes are most obvious in the case of money and material goods, 
but benefits can also include excitement, fun, prestige, sexual gratification, defiance or 
domination (Clarke & Cornish, 2001). This first assumption has sparked considerable 
criticism from numerous theoretical camps, who concede that certain crimes, particu-
larly pathological crimes or crimes committed by mentally ill persons cannot be ade-
quately conceptualized as rational acts. The dispute over whether all crimes are rational 
or not and whether the scientific reconstruction of all crimes as rational acts renders the 
concept of rationality universal, tautological, and thus deprived of its explanatory capa-
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bilities shall only be mentioned here (Akers, 1990; De Hann & Vos, 2003). However, it is 
not addressed in greater detail because, for the reasons listed earlier, it is reasonable to 
assume that hacking attacks (as well as probably all other forms of cybercrimes) are de-
liberately premeditated acts that involve substantial amounts of rational considerations. 
Consequently, these types of criminal acts fall well within the scope of the rational 
choice perspective and should be at least potentially explainable with this theoretical 
concept.  
The Limitations of Rationality in Decision Making Processes 
While hacking attacks are criminal acts that do require a considerable degree of 
premeditation, this circumstance does not automatically imply that all hackers always 
make the best decisions. This second proposition is one that separates the different 
models and versions of rational choice theory. All rational choice models have in com-
mon that they predicate crime as resulting from choices, but they vary considerably in 
what they define as a rational choice. Proposing a typology of rational choice models, 
Opp (1997) suggests distinguishing rational choice models along a continuum ranging 
from wide to narrow concepts of rationality. Wide concepts of rationality, such as the 
one employed by the rational choice perspective, conceptualize individual decision mak-
ing processes as being inevitably bounded or restricted. These models take into con-
sideration that decision-making processes are always limited by situational and cogni-
tive constraints. They are consistent with psychological theories depicting humans as 
‘cognitive misers’ who strive to conserve energy and reduce cognitive load (Fiske & 
Taylor, 1984). They also take into account that decision-making processes include un-
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certainties because they are hardly ever based on knowledge of all relevant facts and 
risks. Likewise, it is often impossible to gauge both the exact utility of action alternatives 
and the probability that this utility will indeed be the outcome of that action alternative.  
Such constraints of cognitive information-processing abilities lead human actors 
to employ heuristics and biases in the decision-making process. For example, instead of 
considering every single relevant detail, offenders often rely on general tactics and 
methods that they have had positive experiences with in the past. Once they decide to 
commit the crime, they tend to reinforce their decision by focusing on the potential re-
wards rather than the risks. This focus on rewards rather than risks prevents offenders 
from accumulating the cognitive strain that would result from focusing on the dissonant 
cognitions of engaging in criminal activity while potentially having to suffer the conse-
quences of punishment (Festinger, 1957). In cases where offenders take risk considera-
tions into account, they most often focus on the short term costs of getting caught as 
opposed to long term consequences, such as getting punished for their actions.   
‘Wide’ rational choice conceptualizations further acknowledge time constraints 
that are necessarily involved in decision-making situations. Time itself is a valuable re-
source, and a disproportionate time investment into considerations over low stakes de-
cisions would not be purposively rational. Since wide rational choice models recognize 
cognitive and situational imperfections, they can be considered more psychologically 
and sociologically plausible. They assume that offenders, like the rest of us, use “satis-
ficing rather than optimizing” (Clarke & Cornish, 2001: 25) decision-making efforts and 
strategies. Sometimes limitations of time, cognitive resources, and available information 
can lead to decisions that appear irrational.  
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Moreover, as Cacioppo and his colleagues have shown, individuals differ in their 
personal need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). Whereas some persons prefer 
analytic and rational approaches when processing information and making decisions, 
others tend to rely more on their faith in intuition (Cacioppo, Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 
1986). Individuals who rely on their faith in intuition are generally greater cognitive mi-
sers than persons with a strong need for cognition. They oftentimes use heuristics, base 
their decisions on similar prior experiences, tend to abbreviate decision-making proc-
esses, and terminate them earlier. Rational choice theorists, however, contend that, re-
gardless of the actual degree of rationality involved, to the offenders themselves the se-
lected action alternative appears as the most promising one at the moment it is se-
lected. Thus, while limited, the decision should nevertheless be considered rational.  
Several testable hypotheses can be derived from this second proposition for this 
study. Hacking is a complex and difficult undertaking, and successful hacking requires 
not only extensive knowledge and expertise, but also considerable cognitive efforts. 
Thus, compared to hackers with a preference for more heuristic, intuition-based thinking 
styles, hackers who prefer to think more analytically and rationally are expected to be 
more successful in their hacks because they weigh more alternatives, consider more 
factors, and operate more cautiously. It has to be noted that, in the context of hacking, 
success refers to the accomplishment of gaining access to the target, and the rating of a 
hack as successful is ultimately a subjective assessment by the hacker. The more de-
liberate preparation of hackers with a preference for rational thinking styles should fur-
ther result in longer preparation times for hacking attacks, and in a generally higher risk 
estimate, in a more risk-oriented focus. The same patterns can be expected for hackers 
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with a lower risk propensity because of their more careful consideration of the involved 
risks. Higher risk propensity, on the other hand, should lead hackers to engage in more 
hacking attacks because they are less concerned about the involved risks. Precisely 
stated, the following testable hypotheses can be formulated for the current study:  
H1: Hackers with a higher preference for analytic-rational information processing 
are more successful in their hacking activities. 
H2: Hackers with a lower risk propensity are more successful in their hacking ac-
tivities.  
H3: Hackers with a higher preference for analytic-rational information processing 
estimate the risks involved in hacking to be higher. 
H4: Hackers with a lower risk propensity estimate the risks involved in hacking to 
be higher. 
H5: Hackers with a higher preference for analytic-rational information processing 
take longer times to prepare for their hacking attacks. 
H6: Hackers with a lower risk propensity take longer times to prepare for their 
hacking attacks. 
H7: Hackers with a lower risk propensity engage in fewer hacks.  
All seven hypotheses are examined in the present study. The preference for ra-
tional thinking and the risk propensity of hackers are assessed and their influences on 
the overall hacking success, estimated risks, average preparation times, and the total 
amount of hacks are measured. 
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The Importance of Situational Adjustments 
Different offenses provide different benefits to offenders and are committed with 
specific motivations. Some hackers engage in hacking merely to satisfy their curiosity 
about how different computer systems and setups work and to find out about their vul-
nerabilities, while others hack for financial gain, peer recognition, or personal revenge. 
Still others deface websites to voice their political opinions or to express their general 
antipathy with the host or the content of the site. The variables weighed by offenders 
and the factors considered in their decision making vary accordingly. Decision-making 
processes are fundamentally influenced by varying situational variables and the situ-
ational factors involved in different crimes vary greatly. For example, the situational fac-
tors involved in the intrusion into a computer system are substantially different from 
those in a bank robbery or the snatching of a purse (De Hann & Vos, 2003). 
The above mentioned circumstance demands that situational choice decision 
models and flowcharts are not studied in abstract, general terms, but rather are devel-
oped specifically for the respective crimes that they are supposed to explain. This notion 
disqualifies wide legal categories such as cyber-trespass or cyber-theft as an appropri-
ate basis for event models because they encompass too much variation with regard to 
types of offenses, offenders, methods, and goals. Consequently, such categories have 
to be broken down into more specific categories that permit models with greater preci-
sion and validity.  
The increased validity of more specific event models, however, inescapably con-
fines the generalizability of such models. Creating separate models for hacks that are 
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committed with different network mapping tools, for example, is probably not a fruitful 
approach, unless the researcher wants to study exactly those differences. Narrow mod-
els based on situational assumptions so specific that their applicability becomes re-
stricted to only a very few situations are of limited scientific value. The challenge in the 
creation of event models then becomes finding the right balance in the pay-off between 
validity and generalizability. Clarke and Cornish suggest guiding the specificity of mod-
els along practical considerations, namely whether drawing finer distinctions results in 
large enough collections of offenses to justify separate interventions. If the answer to 
this question is yes, the distinction should be made. If it is no, they recommend finding 
solutions for addressing the variety of crimes subsumed under the broader category 
(Clarke & Cornish, 2001, p. 26).  
While this proposition does translate directly into testable hypotheses, it presents 
an important aspect to consider in the creation of theoretical models and flowcharts. In 
order to be able to better understand and predict behavior, researchers have to gain an 
understanding of the underlying decision-making processes, the motivations driving 
these processes, and the influential factors considered in them. They have to identify 
relevant motivations, desired outcomes, and situational variables. Once the influential 
variables are identified, researchers can then begin to examine their relative importance 
and their specific effects on the outcome of that decision-making process. Eventually, 
this line of research will produce path-dependency models that will help to explain and 
predict offender behavior and, in some cases, may even be able to prevent criminal be-
havior by proposing changes in the “choice-structuring properties” (Cornish & Clarke, 
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1987, 1989) of hackers that increase risks and efforts, reduce rewards, and remove ex-
cuses (Clarke, 1997; Piquero & Tibbets, 2002).   
The Differences between Involvement and Event Decisions 
The decisions to generally become involved in criminal activity and to commit a 
particular crime can and must be distinguished from each other. The decisions involved 
in the commission of a particular crime, referred to as event decisions, include consid-
erations such as the selection of specific targets and of methods to reduce the risk of 
apprehension. In order to avoid detection, hackers might, for example, launch their at-
tack from public Internet cafes, or through encrypted networks such as the I2P or the 
TOR networks. 
Involvement decisions, on the other hand, refer to the general decision of becom-
ing involved in criminal activity. The highly complex nature of such decision-making 
processes requires researchers to further subdivide the broad concept of involvement. 
Typically, rational choice theorists distinguish three different stages of involvement: (1) 
initiation, i.e. the onset of a criminal career when offenders begin to view criminal activ-
ity as a viable option to achieve their goals; (2) habituation, i.e. the procedural continua-
tion of a criminal career and; (3) desistance, i.e. the point when offenders decide to dis-
continue their criminal career and to desist from future offending (Clarke & Cornish, 
2001). 
While the requirement to specify event decisions models for different types of 
crime seems to be obvious, the creation of separate involvement decision models for 
different stages and different types of crime is just as important. Involvement decisions 
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at different stages and for different crimes include varying social background factors, 
current situational circumstances, available (il-)legitimate opportunities, and differing es-
timates of costs and risks. Not only are the skills and contacts required for certain types 
of crimes different, but it is also reasonable to assume that offenders distinguish the se-
verity and immorality of different crimes. The fact that a person attempts to gain unau-
thorized access to a computer system, for example, does not imply that this person has 
no moral objections against stealing or destroying information that is stored on it. 
Clearly, one model size does not fit them all. Instead, models need to be tailored to the 
type of crime and the stages of involvement in order to provide a more precise picture of 
relevant factors. 
The Three Different Stages of Involvement 
As was mentioned before, the broad concept of involvement requires further dis-
tinction between different phases because the stages of initiation, habituation, and de-
sistance are based on different variables and factors. According to the rational choice 
perspective, these variables and factors belong to three different groups: (1) back-
ground factors, e.g. bio-psychological factors, socialization, and learned experiences; 
(2) current life circumstances, e.g. routines and lifestyles; and (3) situational variables, 
e.g. momentary needs and motives and (il-)legitimate opportunities. 
The rational choice perspective hypothesizes these three groups of factors to be 
disparately influential for the three phases of involvement. Background factors are 
thought to exert the greatest influence in the initiation phase because they predetermine 
the person’s skills, experiences, morality, and friendships, as well as their socioeco-
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nomic statuses. During the habituation phase, the criminal activity and the gains and 
risks associated with it gain gradually higher relevance for the current life circum-
stances, and the immediate life circumstances, in turn, become the most influential fac-
tor for decision-making processes. As involvement in criminal activity continues and be-
comes more and more habitual, mounting negative experiences and increasing realiza-
tion of the potential costs involved, in combination with certain changes in the offender’s 
life circumstances, could eventually lead them to desist from offending. Regardless of 
the stage of involvement, however, the rational choice perspective puts great emphasis 
on the importance of contextual variables that are present in a specific decision situa-
tion. Situational variables such as opportunities and inducements or needs and motives 
ultimately tip the scales toward the commission of or abstention from a particular crime.  
In proposing different models of the factors likely to be involved in hacking-
related decision-making processes, Figures 1 – 3 show the three different involvement 
stages of a hacking career, while Figure 4 presents a model of the concrete event deci-
sion to launch a particular hacking attack. All four models are close modifications of the 
models proposed by Cornish and Clarke. They adjust Cornish and Clarke’s models by 
translating them into the context of hackers and by introducing some factors specific to 
hacking, but they assume the same general developments within and between the dif-
ferent phases as the original rational choice perspective models. In addition to crimino-
genically relevant factors, the models also list computer proficiency related factors be-
cause, unlike other types of cybercriminal activity, successful hacking requires the of-
fender to have extensive computer knowledge and skills. 
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Figure 1 displays the variables influencing the initial decision to become involved 
in this particular activity. The starting points of the model are the various background 
factors commonly identified by criminological theories as being influential to the decision 
to engage in criminal behavior. These factors shape the values, attitudes, and behaviors 
which predispose people to consider committing crimes. It is important to bear in mind, 
however, that some of these background variables have to be treated with caution be-
cause hackers (and cyber-criminals in general) exhibit some characteristics that are 
substantially different from the attributes of the majority of other criminals, as was stated 
in the previous chapter (Wall, 2001). While demanding caution, this problem is at least 
partially alleviated by the circumstance that, within the rational choice perspective, these 
factors are considered to be only indirectly influential. They exert their influence solely 
through their influences on judgments and perceptions in the decision-making process.  
The second box includes the various learning experiences the potential offender 
has had in his or her life with regard to the decision at hand. Accumulated prior learning 
experience is very important because the action alternatives evaluated in the decision-
making process are interpreted against the background of these experiences, and some 
alternatives are enabled only through specific prior learning experiences. Successful 
computer hacking, for example, requires substantial knowledge of computers, network-
ing structures, methods of attacks and attack tools, potential exploits, and programming 
skills. Without these prerequisites, hacking is probably not a fruitful course of action and 
will result in the mere execution of basic prewritten scripts, if it is considered as an ac-
tion alternative at all. 
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Figure 1: Model for the Initiation of Hacking 
1: BACKGROUND FACTORS 
Biopsychological: intelligence; temperament; thrill seeking 
Socialization: education; developed level of self-control 
Social: social exclusion; computer proficiency of peers 
2: EXPERIENCE & LEARNING 
1: Computer and programming skills  
2: Experience with attack methods 
3: Prior contact with law enforcement 
4: Foresight and planning 
5: Conscience and moral attitude 
6: Self-perception 
3: CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES,  
ROUTINES & LIFESTYLES 
Importance of computer and internet in pro-
fessional and leisure pursuits; marital sta-
tus; employment; friends  
5: OPPORTUNITIES & INDUCE-
MENTS 
Legitimate: job offer 
Illegitimate: access to illegal opportunity 
networks; access to hacking tools & ex-
ploits & to insecure (company) networks 
4: NEEDS AND MOTIVES 
Greed or need for money; need for ex-
citement, thrill; need for power, status 
and prestige; need for media attention; 
self-concept boost; revenge; curiosity, 
experimentation; political ideology 
 
 
 
 
 
6: PERCEIVED SOLUTIONS 
Legitimate: work position that allows application of skills 
and provides good income  
Illegitimate: hacking into a network; other cybercrimes; 
commission of other crimes 
 
7: SOLUTIONS EVALUATED 
1. Degree of effort; technical difficulties and challenges 
2. Amount and immediacy of reward / reputation 
3. Risk of trace, capture, and apprehension 
4. Likelihood and severity of punishment 
5. Moral Crisis 
8: READINESS 
to commit a hack 
Modification of Clarke & 
Cornish (1985)  
p. 168, Fig. 1 
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Box three lists the current life circumstances of the person. These circumstances 
are relevant to the decision-making process because they structure the needs and mo-
tives displayed in box four as well as the perceived opportunities and inducements to 
fulfill the needs and attain the desired goals shown in box five. The perceived solutions 
to reach the desired goals listed in box six differentiate between legitimate and illegiti-
mate alternatives. Each of the alternatives under consideration is then evaluated in 
terms of the valued utility they provide and the risks and types of potential costs they 
include. The actor further estimates the probability that either the benefits or the costs 
will be the actual outcome.  
Some versions of rational choice theory reconstruct this decision-making process 
in great detail and with mathematical equations. They assign expected utility values to 
benefits and costs and multiply these values with the probability assigned to them. The 
predominant and most attractive alternative, the one that yields the highest expected 
utility, is the one that is hypothesized to be invariably selected—otherwise the actor 
would not act in accordance with his or her own subjective rationality, and the primary 
proposition of rational choice theory would be violated. Cornish and Clarke’s rational 
choice perspective does not attempt to reconstruct the decision-making process with 
mathematical equations, but it shares the principal assumption of the more elaborate 
models that show that the most beneficial alternative is selected once the decision-
making process is concluded and the actor has selected the one alternative he or she 
deems most beneficial.  
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Figure 2: Model for the Habituation of Hacking 
Increasing frequency of computer hacking (due to success) until personal optimum is reached 
1st  
hack 2
nd 3rd Nth 5th 4th 
CHANGES IN PEER GROUP 
INCREASED PROFESSIONALISM 
CHANGES IN LIFE STYLES AND VALUES 
Becomes friendly with other hackers; internalizes and adopts self-conception as a hacker; changes friends 
Pride in improved hacking skills and knowledge; successfully reduces risk and increases efficiency through  
careful selection of targets and methods; commits higher profile attacks  
Recognition of dependency on hacking; chooses work to facilitate hacking; enjoys life in the fast lane; 
devalues legitimate work; justifies criminality 
Modification of Clarke & Cornish (1985) p. 168, Fig. 3 
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Figure 3: Model for the Desistance from Hacking 
Nth + 1 HACK 
 
Applies moral 
principals; has 
increased fear; 
loses intellectual 
curiosity or kick 
REEVALUATION OF READINESS 
 
CHANGES IN LIFE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Reaches maturity; 
gets married; gets 
job offer 
Nth + 2 HACK 
 
Gets (close to 
being) traced or 
tracked; gets ap-
prehended 
FURTHER REEVALUATION OF  
READINESS 
 
CHANGES IN LIFE 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
 
Gets job offer at 
cyber-security 
company allowing 
legal application of 
skills; ultimatum 
from loved ones 
DISTANCE FROM HACKING 
 
Young man’s game; too risky; too much 
effort; income too irregular 
 
LEGITIMATE AL-
TERNATIVES 
 
Accepts job offer; 
starts own business 
OTHER CRIME 
 
Rents out botnets or 
spam servers; credit 
card fraud;  
computer espionage 
REJECTED ALTER-
NATIVES 
 
Legitimate: no opportu-
nity to apply computer 
skills in job; pay too low 
Illegitimate: other 
crimes ruled out for  
various reasons 
Modification of Clarke & Cornish (1985) p. 172, Fig. 4 
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In the process of habituation, shown in Figure 2, the central influence on decision 
making gradually shifts from background variables to the rewards of successful en-
gagement in the criminal activity and the influences this engagement has on the current 
life circumstances. The offender often changes peer groups and becomes closely in-
volved with other persons sharing their interests, because these persons can provide 
him or her with valuable information and other resources. The self-perception as a 
hacker then becomes internalized and the person takes pride in his or her improved 
skills and knowledge. Throughout the successful habituation process, the methods of 
attack become increasingly sophisticated, which also reduces the perceived risk of ap-
prehension. Offsetting the risk reduction of increased professionalism, on the hand, is 
the probable selection of higher profile targets by more experienced hackers. Higher 
profile targets are more attractive to seasoned hackers because they promise more in-
teresting information, more reputation, higher financial gains, or just a greater challenge 
and thrill. However, higher profile targets also bear a higher risk and make activities 
riskier, not safer. Whether Cornish and Clarke’s theoretical assumption of a decrease in 
the subjectively estimated risk potential over the course of a criminal career is valid 
when applied to hackers is presently unclear and will be examined in this study.  
Cornish and Clarke’s model further predicts that over the course of a criminal ca-
reer, offenders justify their increasingly criminal and deviant behavior by employing 
“techniques of neutralization” (Sykes & Matza, 1957). Applied to hacking, such tech-
niques of neutralization could, for example, be the presentation of the behavior as an 
expression of the hacker’s commitment to the free flow of information, or as resistance 
to political authoritarianism and corporate domination.  
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Towards the end of the habituation phase, background factors play only a remote 
and unimportant role in the decision-making process. As shown in Figure 3, the offender 
begins to consider desistance once negative experiences have been made, life circum-
stances have changed, and/or new legitimate and promising opportunities have opened 
up.   
The Reconstruction of Crime Events as a Decision Sequence 
Figure 4: One Stage of the Crime Event: The Selection of a Target  
 
DECISION 
 
To commit hack  
(see the initial involvement model) 
 
SELECTED SERVER / NETWORK 
 
Easily accessible; has interesting or prof-
itable information; suitable for reputation 
gain; antipathy with ideas / opinions of 
host 
 
REJECTED SERVER / NETWORK 
 
Unfamiliar architecture; no interesting or 
profitable information; sympathy with 
ideas / opinions of host 
 
COMMITS HACK 
 
Interesting data, profitable information; 
incompetent or negligent administrator; 
missing security (wlan encryption, fire-
walls, virus scanner, updates, etc.); 
common vulnerabilities available 
REFRAINS FROM HACK 
 
Suspicious of ‘honey-pot’; security 
measures enacted and up-to-date 
 
Modification of Clarke & Cornish (1985) p. 196, Fig. 2 
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Many criminological theories reduce the actual crime event to the selection of a 
suitable target. Rational choice theories, on the other hand, view the crime event itself 
as a series of decision-making processes that merely begin with the selection of a tar-
get. This seems to be the more accurate perception because oftentimes, crime events 
unfold in unforeseen ways and the offender has to adjust accordingly.  
Figure 4 displays the hacker’s selection of a suitable target for the attack. How-
ever, this selection is only the first in a complex process towards the completion of a 
successful attack. In 1994, Cornish borrowed the concept of crime scripts (Cornish, 
1994) from cognitive psychology and introduced it into criminology. The crime scripts 
approach attempts to reconstruct the detailed procedures used by offenders in the 
commission of their crime step-by-step. It is a well-suited theoretical approach for the 
reconstruction of many different types of criminal behavior (Cornish & Smith, 2003). Its 
application to hacking, however, is a difficult undertaking because, unlike many crimes 
that are rather simple acts and similar to other mundane everyday activities (Gottfred-
son & Hirschi, 1990), hacking is an oftentimes highly complex and non-linear activity 
and a single hacking event can involve many different procedures and routes of action. 
Thus, the detailed reconstruction of the scripts involved in hacking presents not only a 
difficult theoretical challenge, but an even greater challenge for operationalizing and 
testing. Tests of such models can probably be best assessed through findings from 
crime science studies or with cognitive interviews of individual hackers. Cognitive inter-
viewing is based on a technique called protocol analysis (Ericsson & Simon, 1980, 
1984). During a protocol analysis, subjects are asked to verbalize their thoughts as they 
perform a particular action or solve a problem. These verbalizations are then recorded 
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and evaluated by the researcher. Repeated cognitive interviews during various types of 
hacking attacks will eventually produce theoretical models that accurately reflect the 
complexity involved in this activity. 
The primary goal that the present study seeks to achieve is not to conduct indi-
vidual case studies of hacking events, but to generate quantifiable insights into the 
hacking community and to assess the general importance of the various factors that, 
according to the rational choice perspective, are related to the involvement in hacking 
activities. Hence, the analysis focuses on testing the seven hypotheses that were stated 
earlier in this chapter. In addition to the influence of rationality and risk propensity on the 
conduct and outcomes of hacking activities, the analysis examines the relevance of 
several factors that the three involvement models consider to be important. It will be up 
to future crime science or protocol analyses to complement the insights that are gener-
ated by this study with more specific reconstructions of the crime scripts in hacking 
events.  
To accomplish the goal of producing generalizable results, the study utilized a 
survey as measurement instrument. A survey format was selected because surveys are 
the social research method that is best suited to produce quantifiable findings. This fea-
ture renders them the most appropriate method for obtaining information about the dis-
tributions of sociodemographic characteristics and motivations of hackers, and for ex-
amining the pertinence of main factors of the three models shown above. The details of 
the research design and process as well as the individual items that were included in 
the questionnaire are specified in the following chapters.  
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CHAPTER SIX: 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The goal of the present study is to test all of the hypotheses stated in the pre-
vious chapter and, given the exploratory nature of this project, to also generally examine 
the sociodemographic characteristics of the hacker community. To achieve these goals, 
the research project was designed to produce quantifiable results that are more repre-
sentative and can be generalized to a wider target population than previous qualitative 
case studies of hackers (Jordan & Taylor, 1998; Taylor, 1999). A survey was developed 
and used for data collection (Boudreau, Gefen, & Straub, 2001), because surveys are 
the one data-collection method particularly suited to produce quantitative results that 
can be generalized to other members of the population of interest and oftentimes even 
to other similar populations (Newsted, Chin, Ngwenyama, & Lee, 1996).  
Even though network administrators (D'Arcy, 2007), software developers (Lakha-
ni & Wolf, 2003), and victims of cybercrimes (L. A. Gordon et al., 2005, 2006), for ex-
ample, have all been the subject of several survey-based research projects in the past, 
no such survey-based study has been conducted on hackers so far. No study exists in 
the current cyber-criminological literature that allows scholars to draw conclusions about 
any larger population of hackers. Accordingly, the specific details and distributions of 
the hacking community continue to remain largely unknown. The aim of the present 
study is to undertake this task and to begin filling the remaining gap in the criminological 
literature on hackers and the hacking community by providing the first quantifiable in-
sights into the hacking underground.  
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The Difficulty of Sampling Hackers 
Although important to achieve, the realization of this study is challenged by a va-
riety of difficult methodological obstacles. Most importantly, the quantitative nature of 
this research project demands that the problem of obtaining a sample that is reasonably 
representative of any larger hacker population is resolved. Two main characteristics of 
the hacking community, in particular, make the process of gathering a representative 
sample of hackers a difficult undertaking. First, partly due to their oftentimes illegal ac-
tivity, hackers form a hard-to-reach and hard-to-identify, sealed off and mostly hidden 
underground community. Second, they present a rather rare population. Both of these 
circumstances present unique challenges for the sampling process. They require that 
researchers find a method for establishing contact with a representative sample of tar-
get subjects who are relatively small in number, decentralized, concerned about protect-
ing their real identity, and who interact primarily through specialized online communica-
tion channels.  
One potential solution to this problem is the utilization of some form of snowball 
sampling technique, in which a few active hackers who are known to the researcher re-
cruit other subjects from their acquaintances for the study. The drawback of utilizing 
snowball samples is that they are confronted with the crucial problem of study subjects 
not being selected from any larger sampling frame. Dependent on the underlying net-
work structures of the participating respondents, this circumstance subjects snowball 
samples to several uncontrollable biases (Groves et al., 2004). While some systematic 
snowball sampling techniques, such as respondent-driven sampling, are designed to 
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partially alleviate this problem (Heckathorn, 1997), no snowball sampling technique of-
fers any remedies capable of eliminating coverage error. Consequently, these tech-
niques do not permit accurate estimates of the representativeness of the population of 
interest.  
Overcoming the representativeness problems associated with snowball samples 
is a difficult challenge when studying underground target populations because for these 
populations, no lists of eligible subjects are available. Hence, the researcher has to se-
lect a sampling method that allows the construction of a sampling frame which simulta-
neously minimizes the systematic undercoverage of eligible subjects and the inclusion 
of ineligible subjects (Groves et al., 2004). The difficulty of this particular methodological 
challenge is probably part of the reason why no quantitative study of hackers has been 
conducted so far.  
In the case of hackers, two principle solutions are conceivable for this problem. 
One possible solution is to access the communication channels typically utilized by 
hackers. Such a study could attempt to advertise links to the survey on public hacker 
message boards and then draw its participants from members of the boards. Again, the 
problematic aspects of this method are evident. First, it would suffer from several short-
comings generally associated with Internet-based surveys. Unlike traditional methods of 
establishing contact with respondents, such as random-digit dialing in telephone sur-
veys or sending surveys via mail, researchers have no direct access to the population 
within an online environment. Consequently, the sampling frame of Internet surveys re-
mains a principal issue (Couper, 2000). The vagueness of the sampling frame entails 
other problems. For example, it severely limits the possibility to estimate nonresponse 
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rates (Couper, 2000), which, in the case of Internet-based surveys, are typically higher 
than those achieved with traditional recruiting methods (Matsuo, McIntyre, Taomazic, & 
Katz, 2004). Despite these problems, such an approach should not be generally dis-
carded solely because of its sampling-frame related issues. As Gosling and colleagues 
point out, their Internet study, although perhaps not exactly representative of the popu-
lation in general, nevertheless compared favorably to other publications with regard to 
all major sociodemographic characteristics (Gosling, Vazier, Srivastava, & John, 2004). 
An additional set of problems confronting this approach is related to the environ-
ment in which respondents fill out the survey. In the case of online surveys, this envi-
ronment is completely out of the researcher’s control or influence. Problems resulting 
from self-selection, multiple submissions, non-serious responses, and dropouts are 
more severe because Internet surveys are completely self-administered and do not 
permit any ad hoc interaction between participant and interviewer. Hence, it is more dif-
ficult for the interviewer to recognize and correct problems of comprehension or inten-
tional mischief (Porter & Whitcomb, 2003; Reips, 2002). This circumstance heightens 
the possibility of individual participants negatively impacting the quality of the results in 
online surveys (Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002).  
Particularly in the case of studies on hackers, the principal problems of Internet-
surveys are likely to be further exacerbated. Many hackers are generally suspicious 
about the authenticity and trustworthiness of information they retrieve online. For the 
researcher, this implies that the difficult task of establishing the necessary trust without 
personal contact becomes a crucial challenge. Failure to convince hackers to trust the 
research project will cause many potential participants to refuse taking the survey or to 
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intentionally provide false information. Combined, all of these problematic aspects se-
verely question the validity of the results yielded by this sampling approach. 
An additional set of sampling-related problems of Internet-based surveys arises 
from the circumstance that their samples include only members of particular message 
boards, not hackers in general. Two aspects of this limitation are particularly problemat-
ic. Many message boards serve as discussion forums for specialized topics and are in-
teresting only to fractions of the hacking community (e.g. http://sla.ckers.org/forum for 
web application security). Equally important is the circumstance that many of the more 
popular boards such as “The Phoenix Project” or “Hacker’s Den88” are typically con-
sulted by lesser skilled beginners who use them for basic advice and guidance. Both of 
these aspects are likely to introduce systematic sampling biases because they lead to 
an underrepresentation of higher skilled hacking experts.  
An alternative approach is to field the survey during an occasion when larger 
numbers of hackers meet in person. Each year, several hacker conventions take place 
in the United States (e.g. BlackHat, ShmooCon, DefCon, ToorCon, or PhreakNIC) and 
around the world (e.g. Chaos Communication Camp in Germany, CanSecWest in Can-
ada, PacSec, SysScAN, and Hack in the Box in Asia, or even PakCon in Pakistan). 
Fielding a survey at such a convention presents the researcher with the opportunity to 
contact more seasoned experts and hackers who are involved enough to undergo the 
efforts and costs involved in attending a convention. While eliminating many of the prob-
lems associated with Internet-based surveys, researchers following this methodological 
approach have to keep in mind that all main hacker conventions have a distinct profile. 
Like Internet-based message board samples, they also attract only parts of the hacking 
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community. Consequently, studies based on samples of attendees of hacking conven-
tions are also subjected to limitations regarding the generalizability of their results.  
This circumstance holds two implications for research projects following this ap-
proach. First, researchers have to carefully consider several sampling-related criteria 
when selecting a convention. The world’s largest annual convention DefCon, for exam-
ple, has a reputation of drawing a large crowd of predominantly young and generally 
less experienced hackers who mainly attend the convention to have a good time with 
like-minded people. In contrast, other conventions draw more experienced security ex-
perts who are interested in the latest security-exploit developments, while others, like 
the BlackHat convention, even charge several thousands of dollars for attending ad-
vanced seminars in what the BlackHat organizers term “offensive security.” In order for 
a convention to draw a sample of attendees who are most representative for the hacker 
community, it has to address a broad spectrum of topics and attract a wide variety of 
hackers with different security-related interests. 
Second, the interpretation of the results has to take this sampling-related limita-
tion into consideration. The fact that hacker conventions offer the most precise sampling 
frame for researchers does not imply that this convention-based sampling frame is 
equivalent to the target population of hackers in general. Strictly formulated, the findings 
of such a study can only be generalized to the greater population of hackers who would 
potentially attend the particular conference.  
Despite the inevitable restriction regarding the generalizability of the results, this 
methodological approach is nonetheless better suited than snowball or Internet samples 
because of the strengths it offers in managing the task of sampling hackers. Most im-
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portantly, it provides researchers with a delimited sampling frame. Surveys fielded at a 
particular convention can also serve as a point of reference to which future surveys that 
are fielded at different conventions can compare and contrast their results to. Eventual-
ly, such a comparison of results from different conventions will provide estimates that 
closely reflect the distributions within the diverse hacking community. For the present 
study, this approach presented a viable opportunity to gain the first general insights into 
an underground community that remains largely unknown. Because it is the least prob-
lematic sampling method and the one most likely to generate generalizable results, this 
methodological approach was chosen.  
The ShmooCon Convention 
The survey for the current research project was fielded during the 2008  
ShmooCon convention in Washington D.C. The ShmooCon convention was selected 
because its profile closely matches the selection criteria outlined above. Since its first 
convening in 2004, ShmooCon has developed into one of the largest annual conven-
tions worldwide. Today, it ranks among the most popular conventions, and it is attended 
by both U.S. and international hackers and security experts. In addition, it has one of 
the most diverse programs that is attractive to a wide variety of hackers (Grecs, 2008). 
The convention is commonly announced as an “annual East Coast hacker convention 
hell-bent on offering an interesting and new atmosphere for demonstrating technology 
exploitation, inventive software and hardware solutions, as well as open discussion of 
critical information security issues” (HackWire, 2004). 
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The 2008 convention was held over the weekend from Friday, February 15 to 
Sunday, February 17 in the Marriott Wardman Park Hotel in Washington D.C. After the 
official opening remarks on Friday afternoon, various speakers started the convention 
with presentations on a number of different topics ranging from “Intercepting Mobile 
Phone/GSM Traffic” to “Forensic Image Analysis for Password Recovery” and “Hacking 
the Samurai Spirit” to “New Countermeasures to the Bump Key Attack.” The main event 
on Friday was a keynote address given by Dr. Edward W. Felten, a highly renowned 
professor of Computer Science and Public Affairs at Princeton University and the found-
ing Director of Princeton’s Center for Information Technology Policy. 
The main program on Saturday and Sunday was divided into the three general 
sections “Build It!,” “Break It!,” and “Bring It On!.” In each of the three sections, expert 
speakers gave presentations on a broad variety of topics. The primary target audience 
of the “Build It!” section consisted of network administrators and other security experts. 
The section covered several topics of general interest to this audience, among them 
“They’re Hacking Our Clients! Why are We Focusing Only on the Servers?,” “Practical 
Hacker Crypto,” “Using Aspect Oriented Programming to Prevent Application Attacks,” 
“Hacking Windows Vista Security,” or “Path X: Explosive Security Testing Tools using 
XPath.”  
The “Break It!” section, on the other hand, included presentations covering a va-
riety of aspects related to the act of breaking into computer systems and networks. The 
section was geared towards black hat hackers and penetration testers alike and con-
tained presentations entitled “Virtual Worlds – Real Exploits,” “Smarter Password Crack-
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ing,” “VoIP Penetration Testing: Lessons Learned,” and “Malware Software Armoring 
Circumvention.”  
The third section “Bring It On!” covered topics generally related to the lives of 
hackers. The presentations in this section included titles such as “When Lawyers At-
tack! Dealing with the New Rules of Electronic Discovery,” “The Geek and the Gumshoe 
or Can Mathematics and Crimes?,” “You Must Be This Tall to Ride the Security Ride,” 
“Legal Issues for Bot-net Researchers and Mitigators,” or “How do I Pwn Thee? Let Me 
Count the Ways.” Before the final closing remarks on Sunday afternoon, the main 
agenda of the convention ended with a large panel discussion “On the Social Responsi-
bility of Hackers” that involved convention organizers and speakers from all three sec-
tions. Combined, the three main sections and the surrounding presentations and dis-
cussions addressed a broad variety of hacking and security-related topics that ranged 
from purely technical topics to sessions providing hackers with practical advice for cop-
ing with the problems and challenges in a hacker’s life. 
In addition to the expert speaker presentations in the three sections, the conven-
tion offered several other activities and competitions. Participants in the various hacking 
contests, for example, had to go on a virtual treasure hunt and gather clues and hints 
that were hidden all over the convention. Even the red laser engraved acrylic punch 
card badges that attendees received upon registration displayed different dot patterns of 
PDP-8 machine code that, if combined, led to other clues as part of one contest. The 
progress of the contestants in the hacking arcades was made public in real time by a 
projection of their advancement on one of the hallway walls. The winner of each contest 
was rewarded with prizes in the form of gaming consoles and, most importantly, the 
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recognition from peers. Prizes were also offered for the winners of the lock picking 
competition in the “Lock Picking Village” and the three first places in the “Hack or Halo” 
ego-shooter video gaming tournament. Other events during the convention involved 
several live-streamed online video feeds and interviews with prominent hackers as well 
as a Saturday night party in a nearby dance club.  
The unconventional name of the convention was explained during the opening 
remarks. The ShmooCon conference received its name from the concept of so-called 
“shmooballs.” As part of the registration package, each attendee received a soft rubber 
stress ball the size of a tennis ball. All participants were explicitly instructed to throw this 
ball at the speaker when, during a presentation, they felt that the speaker made a mis-
take or did not know the material of the presentation well enough. The act of throwing 
the shmooball then entitled the thrower to voice their objections or to correct the speak-
er. In making this concept a central aspect of the convention, the ShmooCon organizers 
attempted to break down the hierarchies between speaker and audience and to solicit 
input from all experts in the audience. By doing so, they also demonstrated their adhe-
rence to the democratic ideas of the original hacker community. In a humorous demon-
stration of how the shmooball concept is intended to work, some of the staff members 
assaulted the opening speaker during his explanation of the shmooball concept with a 
self-made shmooball canon that fired a large magazine of balls across the auditorium at 
him.  
Aside from the shmooball concept, several other organizational details imple-
mented the creeds and convictions of the traditional hacking community. The applica-
tion process, for example, was designed so as to give all interested persons the same 
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chance of obtaining an admission ticket. The tickets were sold exclusively online. The 
sales events took place on three different occasions on a first come, first serve basis. 
The sale of tickets was restricted to only three occasions because the number of admis-
sions was limited to 800 attendees and, according to the convention organizers, the 
demand for tickets vastly exceeded their available number. The structure of the organi-
zational team was itself organized in a strictly non-hierarchic, democratic fashion. All 
suggestions were due for approval and implemented only after they obtained a majority 
of the vote. Furthermore, the organizers underwent great effort to solicit detailed feed-
back from the attendees and, thereby, include them in the improvement process for fu-
ture conventions.  
Summarizing, it can be recapitulated that the conceptual layout of the 2008 
ShmooCon convention made it an ideal candidate for the present research project. Its 
main program was designed to be inclusive and to address the interests of a wide varie-
ty of hackers. Its agenda combined a mixture of serious discussions of latest security 
issues and several events to entertain attendees, thereby making the conference inter-
esting for hackers of all different backgrounds and skill levels. Before the survey was 
fielded during the conference, however, several steps were taken to ensure its appro-
priateness and its success as a scientific measuring instrument. 
The Pretest and IRB Approval 
Boudreau, Gefan, and Straub (2001) emphasize the need for every survey in-
strument to be pretested as a preliminary step that prevents unanticipated encounters 
during the fielding of the final version of the survey. Therefore, a pretest of the initial 
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draft of the survey instrument was conducted with a convenience sample comprised of 
six self-proclaimed hackers known to the researcher. Each of these testers volunteered 
to participate in the pretest. They received a copy of the initial draft along with some 
general instructions and information about the purpose of the study. The general in-
structions asked them to provide feedback about the design of the survey with regard to 
three aspects: (1) the suitability and appropriateness of the individual items and answer 
categories in general, (2) their estimate of the suitability of individual items to address 
the larger research questions, (3) the appropriateness of the content and structure of 
the instrument for the intended target population and measuring situation.  
The long geographical distances between the pretest participants, who are resid-
ing in different countries, did not permit the researcher to conduct personal debriefing 
sessions. Instead, the panel members were asked to provide detailed written feedback 
after their completion of the survey and to return their comments via email. The feed-
back received from this pretest focused primarily on revisions of the wording and was 
aimed at eliminating potential ambiguities in some of the hacking-related questions. It 
also included some suggestions for minor changes in the provided standard answer 
categories. While there was general agreement among the reviewers on the general 
suitability and appropriateness of the items included in the survey and on the exhaus-
tiveness of the provided standard answer categories, one particular item received nega-
tive feedback and was therefore excluded from the final survey. All six participants re-
ported that answering the item “What does the term hacking mean for you?” was dis-
proportionally time-consuming since it consumed almost as much time as the remainder 
of the survey. 
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 In a subsequent step, the revised version of the survey draft was reviewed by 
two experienced survey researchers on the sociology faculty at University of Central 
Florida. Aside from providing a second scrutiny of the appropriateness of the survey tool 
and the unambiguousness of the individual items, this expert assessment was also 
used to ensure the appropriateness of the survey as a scientific measurement instru-
ment and to examine the content validity of the items, many of which were developed 
specifically for the present study and had not yet been validated. Based on the recom-
mendations of these experts, some modifications and refinements were implemented in 
the final version of the questionnaire. In particular, the wording of a few individual items 
was revised and some items were rearranged. There was agreement among the re-
viewers on the importance of all main sections of the questionnaire, on the appropriate 
length of the measurement tool, and on the suitability of the included items to address 
the intended dimensions of the underlying concepts. Thus, the results of these pretests 
suggest that the questionnaire was well designed for the research project and pos-
sessed adequate validity. 
Following the pretest of the questionnaire, the research proposal was submitted 
to the University of Central Florida Institutional Review Board (IRB) for approval. The 
submitted proposal materials consisted of the study questionnaire, an informed consent 
document, and an online application that detailed the various aspects of the study to the 
IRB reviewer. The informed consent form (see Appendix B) served as an identification 
of the researcher. It also informed prospective participants about the details of the 
project they are going to participate in and granted confidentiality and anonymity. To 
ensure the highest possible degree of anonymity, the documentation of consent was 
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waived on the consent form. The study was exempt from a full board review because it 
recruited no vulnerable populations and posed only minimal risk for participants since it 
did not ask respondents to reveal any specific self-incriminating information. Only a few 
formal stipulations were requested by the IRB reviewer in the initial review, and the 
study received IRB approval after the requested changes had been implemented.   
The Data Collection Process 
Once IRB approval was obtained, a formal request for permission to field the 
questionnaire during the convention was submitted to the organizers of ShmooCon. Al-
though this request was received positively, the organizers expressed their main con-
cern as brokers for the community of protecting their attendees’ privacy, and they asked 
for the submission of additional identification materials. Among the requested identifica-
tion was the curriculum vita of the principal investigator, the contact information of a 
study supervisor, a detailed research proposal, the documentation of IRB approval, and 
a statement that the survey was for research purposes only and involved no commercial 
or governmental institutions or organizations.  
Once all these materials had been submitted and reviewed, the study was ap-
proved and the organizers of the convention even offered to announce the survey 
project as an integral part of the convention in the opening remarks to build trust among 
the attendees. The announcement of the study in the opening remarks included a Po-
werPoint slide that informed attendees about the research project and its IRB approval 
as well as a personal introduction of the principal investigator. This introduction by the 
organizers proved to be of invaluable help for the acceptance of the study. Many res-
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pondents immediately recognized the researcher from the opening remarks when they 
were asked to participate in the study.  
Furthermore, the organizers of the convention provided a table in the central 
hallway between conference rooms and several chairs for participants to take the sur-
vey. The survey table was in an ideal location next to the sponsor booths and between 
presentation rooms. Whenever attendees walked from one presentation section into 
another, they passed by the study table. Placed on the survey table were copies of the 
questionnaire, consent forms, large University of Central Florida printouts, poster-sized 
prints inviting attendees to “be part of the first survey on hackers,” business cards of the 
researcher, and Snickers candy bars as incentives to participate. Convention attendees 
passing by were verbally approached by the researcher and invited to participate in the 
study. They were told that the survey referred to hacking as the unauthorized intrusion 
into computer systems, networks, or website servers and they were asked to participate 
only if they had ever committed such an intrusion. Attendees who indicated that they 
worked as penetration testers were asked to only participate if they had ever invaded a 
computer system outside of a contractual agreement and instructed to only refer to 
these intrusions in their answers. Penetration testers and other attendees who reported 
to have never committed such a hack were told that the survey did not pertain to them 
and were dissuaded from taking the survey.  
Approximately one-third of the approached attendees were rejected because 
they had never committed an unauthorized computer intrusion. Most of the rejected at-
tendees were penetration testers who reported to have always followed a strict ethical 
code. A smaller fraction of the rejected attendees had simply never attempted a com-
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puter intrusion, either because they had just recently become interested in hacking or 
because they attended the conference with their significant other who is actively hack-
ing. A total of 164 questionnaires were distributed among qualified attendees. Most of 
the persons who agreed to participate in the study filled out the questionnaire on site. 
Some, however, asked to take it with them and fill it out at a more convenient situation. 
Of the 164 distributed surveys, 129 were returned to the researcher, 124 of which were 
filled out completely and included in the analysis of the study. Thus, the response rate 
of completed and returned surveys was 75 percent and an estimated 25 percent of all 
eligible attendees were included in the study. The large fraction of sampled units and 
the high response rate can be attributed to the personal interest many hackers dis-
played in the survey project and to the trust the official announcement of the study had 
helped to build.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
THE SURVEY INSTRUMENT 
 
The survey instrument of the current study was designed to test all of the hypo-
theses stated in the third chapter. In particular, it assessed the main phases in the ca-
reers of hackers as proposed by the rational choice perspective and examined the ex-
tent of rationality in their involvement and event decision making. In addition, it also 
measured the general distributions of sociodemographic characteristics within the hack-
ing community.  
At the beginning of the questionnaire, a small introductory section welcomed the 
respondents, thanked them again for their willingness to participate in the study, and 
provided a brief introduction of the researcher and the purpose of the study. It also 
reassured respondents that the survey is strictly noncommercial and for dissertation re-
search purposes only, that there are no institutions or organizations involved or affi-
liated, and that their participation in this project is voluntary, anonymous, and confiden-
tial. 
The measurement instrument itself consisted of a total of 72 items in three main 
sections. The first section gathered detailed information about the various phases of the 
respondents’ hacking careers. It embodied items pertaining to the initiation of the hack-
ing activity, its habituation, and the eventual desistance from hacking. It further as-
sessed several other details of the respondent’s hacking activity, including a variety of 
involved decisions and motivations. Given the exploratory nature of this research 
project, many items in this first section offered open-ended “Other” answer categories in 
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addition to the answer options provided. The answers recorded in these open “Other” 
categories were included as string variables in the dataset. Several of the items also 
permitted respondents to give multiple answers. All answer options listed for these 
items were coded as separate dichotomous variables.  
The second section of the survey instrument consisted of questions measuring 
the degree of risk propensity, rationality, and faith in intuition in the respondents’ deci-
sion-making processes. The main reason for the assessment of these three personality 
traits was to allow the survey instrument to test all of the hypotheses that were derived 
from the rational choice perspective in chapter three. The operationalization of theoreti-
cal hypotheses concerning the influence and degree of rationality in decision-making 
processes presented a principally difficult methodological challenge. Typically, such as-
sumptions are measured with either fictional scenarios of nearly real-life decision-
making situations (Clarke & Cornish, 2001; Finch, 1987; Harrington, 1996; Kerlinger, 
1986) or with social psychological scales (Clarke & Cornish, 2001; Kerlinger, 1986). The 
decision to operationalize the three personality traits with social psychological scales in 
the present study was made because this assessment format better fitted the setting in 
which the survey was fielded. It was less demanding to merely ask respondents to indi-
cate their agreement to some general statements than to have them read through sev-
eral fictional scenarios before answering questions. Moreover, this measurement tech-
nique also reduced the overall length of the survey and the time needed for its comple-
tion. Further lengthening the survey with scenarios might have decreased the atten-
dees’ willingness to participate, given that the survey was already eight pages long and 
took about 15 minutes of the time they spent at the convention. 
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All items in this second section were taken from well-established scales that were 
abbreviated to keep the overall length of the survey within reasonable limits. The deci-
sions about which items to include were based on statistical and conceptual considera-
tions. Items were selected according to their item-to-total correlations and their factor 
loads on the respective underlying dimension. To maintain construct validity despite the 
shortening of the scales, items were also selected based on their ability to measure dif-
ferent aspects of the underlying concept. All items were anchored on appropriately la-
beled seven-point Likert-type scales. Seven-point scales were chosen over five-point 
scales because they allow for finer distinctions in the measurement of the variables 
(Sommer & Sommer, 2002). Another advantage of seven-point scales is that increasing 
the scale end points from five to seven also tends to increase the ability to reach the 
upper limits of reliability (Krosnick & Fabrigar, 1997; Nunnally, 1978).  
The third section concluded the survey instrument with measures of basic soci-
odemographic information. The items included in the three parts of the survey instru-
ment, which can be found in Appendix A, are presented in greater detail in the following 
sections.   
The Measurements of General Hacking Activity 
The first item in the survey asked respondents to indicate whether they are cur-
rently actively hacking. Two dichotomous answer categories, “Yes” and “No,” were pro-
vided and respondents who answered with “No” were instructed to think back to when 
they were still hacking when answering the subsequent questions. The rationale behind 
the placement of this item at the beginning of the questionnaire was to differentiate be-
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tween active hackers and respondents who had been hacking at one point in their lives 
but had desisted from hacking in the meantime or had given up any illegal hacking ac-
tivities to become penetration testers.  
The items measuring the various aspects of the respondent’s hacking career 
were organized in chronological order. The first set of questions examined the onset of 
the hacking activity. Respondents were asked to indicate how old they were when they 
first became interested in hacking and to also provide the motivations that initially got 
them interested in this activity. The motivations listed as standard answer categories for 
this question were derived from the existing literature on hackers (Taylor, 2000, 2004; 
Thomas, 2002; Yar, 2005a) and arranged according to their assumed importance (Yar, 
2005a). The listed motivations were “Intellectual Curiosity,” “Excitement, thrill, fun,” “Ex-
perimentation,” “Status and prestige,” “Financial gain,” “Peer recognition,” “Political ide-
ology,” “Media attention,” “Protest against corporations,” “Self-concept boost,” “Feeling 
of power,” “Personal revenge,” and an open-answer category “Other (specify).”  A 
second item then asked participants to indicate which of these motivations had been 
their primary one.  
Further examining the onset phase, the following item then asked participants to 
indicate the length of the time frame between their initial interest in hacking and their 
first actual hack. The purpose of this item was to provide a frequency measure that 
permitted comparisons to later stages of the respondent’s hacking career and, thereby, 
allowed additional measures of whether the activity has indeed become more intensi-
fied. The answer categories for this item gave respondents the choice to enter their an-
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swers in days, weeks, months, and years. All answers were later recoded into days to 
provide a unified scale for the corresponding variable in the dataset. 
After the examination of the initial interest phase, the survey shifted to questions 
about the details of the first actual hack the respondents had ever committed. Again, 
participants were asked about their specific motivations to commit this first hack. The 
answer categories listed for this question were the same as for the previous question 
about the motivations that had sparked the initial interest in hacking. The motivations for 
the first hack were measured separately from the motivations that initially got respon-
dents interested in hacking because this separate measurement provided an indication 
of the consistency between the two. Thereby, it also allowed an assessment of the rela-
tive importance of situational factors in the decision to commit the first hack. For exam-
ple, a person could become interested in hacking out of intellectual curiosity but then 
decide to launch a hacking attack in an attempt to take personal revenge.  
The next question then asked respondents to specify the type of target they se-
lected for their first hacking attack. The set of answer categories for this item distin-
guished between single hosts, networks, and websites and between private, corporate, 
non-profit, and governmental entities. Again, the item also included an “Other” category 
that allowed respondents to specify any other type of target. Further detailing the as-
pects of the target, the subsequent item asked participants to report the criteria their 
target selection was based on. The answer options given for this item were “Easy 
access,” “Interesting information,” “Profitable information,” “Reputation gain,” “Antipa-
thy,” and again “Other.” 
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Two additional items were included in the questionnaire to explicitly assess the 
role financial motivations and considerations played during the onset of the hacking ca-
reer. The first asked participants whether they were employed at the time they commit-
ted their first hack. The answer options for this item were “Yes, full-time,” “Yes, part-
time,” and “No.” The second item directly asked respondents whether “economic profits 
[were] a motivation at all.” The answer categories for this item were “Yes, an important 
one,” “Yes, but not important,” and “No.” 
To provide a more detailed assessment of the first hack ever committed by the 
participants, the survey asked them to indicate the methods they used in their first tech-
nical intrusion. The item referred to the first hack as the first technical intrusion because 
it was intended to measure only the technical methods employed in the first hack. The 
term “technical intrusion” basically denotes all attempts to subvert exploitable system or 
network defaults, holes, bugs, or passwords. It excludes other methods that can be 
used in a hack, such as social engineering methods. Specifically, respondents were in-
structed to mark all technical methods they had used in their first hack from a list of 24 
of the most common technical intrusion methods (Kanellis, Kiountouzis, Kolokotronis, & 
Martakos, 2006). The methods listed as answer options for this item were arranged in a 
sequential order from reconnaissance tactics over different ways to gain access to a 
computer system to methods for covering up any potential traces. The reconnaissance 
tactics included in the list were “Footprinting,” “Ping sweeping,” “DNS zone transfer,” 
“Whois,” “Network mapping,” “Port scanning,” “Versatile scanning tools,” and “Vulnera-
bility scanning.” The methods of gaining access to computer systems contained were 
“RPC port/end-point dump,” “Packet sniffing,” “Session hijacking,” “Grinding pass-
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words,” “Password cracking,” “Password theft,” “Directory traversal/climbing,” “Buffer 
overflows,” “Format strings,” “Resource mismatches,” “CGI,” “Root shell/kits,” and “Key-
loggers.” The list ended with three common methods for covering up any potential trac-
es: “Spoofing,” “Bouncing,” and “Source routing.” Even though this list basically covered 
the methods most commonly used by hackers (Kanellis et al., 2006), the number of 
possible attack tactics is far greater. Thus, the answer categories were again comple-
mented by an open-ended “Other” category. Since it cannot be assumed that all readers 
are familiar with all different hacking techniques, the skill-level they require, and the type 
of target they are usually used against, the different methods are briefly introduced in 
the Glossary.  
The assessment of individual hacking methods was included for a twofold pur-
pose. The primary reason was to provide a measurement of the prevalence of several 
known hacking tactics and methods. Currently, no quantitative estimate of the popularity 
of different hacking methods exists in the literature, because the victimization surveys 
conducted on the issue thus far can assess the methods that are being used in hacking 
attacks only indirectly and incompletely. Some methods simply leave no traces on the 
target machine. Others can be rendered undetectable to victims or even cyber-forensics 
by several potential circumstances. For example, many reconnaissance methods leave 
no traces on the target computer and, oftentimes, efforts to cover up traces succeed in 
rendering the detection of intrusion methods impossible.  
The second purpose of the inclusion of item measuring the employed hacking 
methods was to also provide a potential assessment of the level of technical skills the 
respondent had when they launched their first hacking attack. Some hacking methods 
92 
 
require a much more advanced skill level, whereas others can be performed by merely 
executing common software tools. Thus, the item also provided an indirect proxy meas-
ure of the skill-level during the onset of the hacking activity. The decision to include an 
indirect measurement of the respondents’ skill level at the beginning of their hacking ca-
reers rather than a direct measurement was made in an attempt to avoid the potential 
self-perception and social-desirability biases introduced by a direct measurement. While 
suited to avoid such biases, conclusions about the skill-level of the attacker have to be 
drawn cautiously from this indirect assessment because the selection of a particular me-
thod is not solely dependent on the skill-level of the attacker. The decision to use a par-
ticular method is also influenced by the type of target and the specific vulnerabilities of a 
particular target. Directory traversals, for instance, are attack methods that are used 
primarily for website attacks, but not for attacks on computer systems or networks. Fur-
thermore, conclusions about the skill-level of the attacker have to be drawn with caution, 
because some of the attack methods denote categories that can subsume different at-
tacks of varying difficulty. 
The next set of questions on the questionnaire asked hackers about their hacking 
career in general. The questions in this part were broken down into three different hack-
ing activities that were measured separately. The questionnaire distinguished between 
technical intrusions, so-called “Wetware” social methods, and the distribution of mali-
cious code. Wetware is a term commonly used among hackers and computer pro-
grammers. It is an analogy to software, but refers to the act of programming a brain, as 
opposed to computer code. Six common wetware methods were listed as answer op-
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tions: “Social Engineering,” “Deception,” “Bribery,” “Shoulder surfing,” “Impersonation,” 
and “Dumpster diving.” The six methods are briefly introduced below. 
Social engineering basically denotes all attempts of hackers to establish and 
subvert trust relationships with victims or to predict their behavior. Once a trust relation-
ship is established, the attacker tricks the victim into revealing information or performing 
an action, such as a password reset, for example, that can then be used in the attack. A 
subcategory of social engineering methods are so-called reversed social engineering 
methods, in which attackers use their expertise to induce their victims to reveal sensitive 
information when seeking their help and advice. Deception is a method similar to imper-
sonation, but demands a higher commitment than the latter. Whereas an impersonation 
can be as simple as sending an email pretending to be somebody else, deception typi-
cally refers to attempts to gain inside access to a network in order to be able to launch 
an attack from behind its firewall. Shoulder surfing and dumpster diving are two other 
popular social methods that directly exploit the oftentimes careless behavior of targets. 
Shoulder surfing describes an attack method in which the hacker simply monitors the 
moment the victim types passwords or other sensitive information on their keyboard. 
Once the login information is known, the hacker can exploit the user account without 
having to worry about any counter measures such as firewalls or intrusion detection 
systems because they can no longer distinguish between the legitimate user and the 
attacker. Similarly, dumpster diving, a slang term for searching through the target’s gar-
bage, is a simple and oftentimes legal method to gain valuable information because 
many people dispose of sensitive information without destroying it first. Bribery is prob-
ably the easiest way to hack wetware, but it is not as common in developed western na-
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tions as it is in developing countries. More profound bribery attempts than simple direct 
cash payments usually align the financial interests of the target with those of the hacker. 
Whereas technical intrusions and social engineering methods are the two attack 
methods typically associated with hackers, a third category of attacks, the distribution of 
malicious code, was also included in the questionnaire. This method of attacking com-
puter systems is not necessarily limited to only hackers, but is oftentimes also used by 
other cyber-criminals such as email phishers or spammers. Nevertheless, it was in-
cluded in the questionnaire to measure hacker attempts of gaining control over target 
computers by distributing malicious code. The answer categories given for the question 
“Have you ever distributed?” were “Trojan Horses,” “Adware/Spyware,” “Virus-
es/Worms,” “Spam/Phishing mails,” “None of the above,” and “Other.” Readers unfami-
liar with these types of malicious codes can find brief descriptions in the glossary ac-
companying this text.  
The engagement in each of the three types of hacking methods was measured 
with three items asking respondents to: (1) estimate how often they had attempted 
these types of hacking methods in their life, (2) indicate the frequency with which they 
engaged in those types of methods, and (3) provide an approximation of their success 
with these methods. The answer categories provided for the frequency measurement 
were attempts per weeks, months, or years. All answers were later recoded into days to 
obtain a unified interval-scaled variable. The estimated success rates of technical intru-
sions and social methods were measured on scales of ten percent increments ranging 
from zero to 100 percent. The success rate of malware distributions was not measura-
ble this same way because the success of malicious code distributions primarily de-
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pends on how many computers become infected with that code. Thus, the success with 
malware distributions was measured with a seven-point Likert-type scale ranging from 
1”Not at all” to 4 “Somewhat” to 7 “Very” successful.   
Further examining the continuation of the respondents’ hacking careers as pro-
posed by the rational choice perspective, the next set of items asked respondents: (1) 
whether they changed friends and peers since their first hack to include other hackers; 
(2) whether they believe they improved their skills since their first hacking attempts; (3) 
whether their hacking activity has become more frequent since their first hacking at-
tempts; and (4) whether their motivations had changed since their first hacking at-
tempts. The three answer options given for these items were “Yes, very much,” “Yes, 
somewhat,” and “No.” The item measuring the frequency of hacking attempts further 
distinguished between the two answer options “No, it’s the same” and “No, it’s less fre-
quent.” A last item in this set asked respondents to specify their currently predominant 
motivation for hacking in an open format.   
The respondents’ selection decisions of targets for hacking attacks were meas-
ured with five items. The first two items asked whether respondents had changed tar-
gets since their first attacks and whether their targets had become higher profile targets. 
Again, the answer options “Yes, very much,” “Yes, somewhat,” and “No” were given. 
The third item then detailed the type of currently preferred targets. Like the answer op-
tions given for the question about the target of the first hacking attempt, the answer cat-
egories provided for this item distinguished between single hosts, networks, and web-
sites, and between private, corporate, non-profit, and governmental entities. Again, an 
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open answer category was provided to allow respondents to specify any other types of 
targets.  
The last two target-related items asked about the criteria influencing the selection 
or rejection of a particular target. The criteria provided for the question “What are your 
current selection criteria for targets?” were the same as for the item measuring the se-
lection of the target in the first hacking attack: “Easy access,” “Interesting information,” 
“Profitable information,” “Reputation gain,” “Antipathy,” and “Other (specify).” The crite-
ria listed for the question “What might be a reason for you to reject a potential target?” 
were “Unfamiliarity with architecture,” “No interesting information,” “No profitable infor-
mation,” “Sympathy with host,” “None of the above,” and again “Other (specify).” 
The set of questions following the target-related items interviewed participants 
about various aspects of their hacking attacks. Respondents were asked whether they 
had changed their methods and tactics since their first hack and what their currently 
preferred methods and tools are for the different stages of a hack. For the item measur-
ing the currently preferred methods, the six main stages of a hack “Reconnaissance,” 
“Gaining access,” “Persisting,” “Propagating,” “Paralyzing,” and “Covering up” were 
listed and respondents were instructed to enter their preferred methods and tools for 
each of the main phases. They were then asked whether they follow a persistent pattern 
in all their hacks or vary their methods and software tools between hacks. The answers 
to both questions about the variability in methods and tools were recorded on seven-
point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 “Very persistent pattern” and “Always same 
tools” to 7 “Vary a lot.”  
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The section detailing the aspects of the respondents’ current hacking activity 
then ended with an item measuring the methods they employed to remain anonymous. 
The answer options provided for this question were “Spoofing,” “Bouncing,” “Source 
routing,” “Proxies,” “TOR, I2P, etc.,” “Tunnels, Covert channels,” “War driving,” “Public 
access points (e.g. Internet cafes),” and “Other (specify).” All eight anonymizing me-
thods utilize different techniques to hide the offender’s true identity. Spoofing is a tactic 
hackers commonly use to pretend they are somebody else. The disguise is accom-
plished by entering the wrong source IP addresses in the TCP/IP headers of data pack-
ets. Bouncing is a method that is similar to spoofing. In the case of bouncing, the hacker 
uses proxy servers or computers to relay, or bounce, their requests to the attacked ma-
chines. Thereby, the impression is evoked that the attack originated from the proxy, 
when in fact it was only channeled through it. In the context of computer networks, prox-
ies denote gateways that relay one Internet session to another. Proxies cannot only be 
used for bouncing techniques, but some proxy servers are even specifically designed 
for anonymizing purposes. The use of such proxies makes the real source of data 
packet untraceable. Source routing denotes a technique that allows a sender of data 
packets to specify the route these packets take through a network. Source routing can 
be used in hacking attacks to reach otherwise unreachable targets through intermediate 
computers that are connected to the target. TOR (The Onion Router) and I2P (Invisible 
Internet Project) are both open source projects that are similar in that they enable their 
users to communicate anonymously on the Internet. Tunnels and covert channels, on 
the other hand, are methods used by hackers to circumvent firewall protections and 
evade intrusion detection systems. Lastly, war driving and public access points are two 
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methods to access the Internet anonymously through other persons’ private or public 
networks. In the case of war driving, the hacker drives through an area in a moving ve-
hicle with a WiFi-equipped computer and searches for open or weakly secured wireless 
networks that are then used as Internet access points.  
The last set of questions in this first part of the questionnaire examined possible 
doubts the respondents had about their hacking activity and their readiness to desist 
and end their hacking careers. The first item in this last set of questions asked respon-
dents whether hacking is a source of income for them. The answer options given for this 
item were “Yes, the main,” “Yes, but not the main,” and “No.” In addition to providing an 
explicit measure of financial considerations, this item also enabled the researcher to 
compare the relevance of financial considerations during the onset and the later stages 
of the hacking activity. The item was followed by the direct question about whether the 
respondent had ever thought about quitting hacking. The three answer options for this 
item were "Yes, often,” “Yes, a few times,” and “Never.” An additional item was included 
to measure the reasons for thoughts about quitting. The reasons listed for this item were 
“Involved risk,” “Involved effort,” “Income too irregular,” “Fear of detection,” “Fear of ap-
prehension,” “Fear of prosecution,” “Legal alternatives,” and “Other (specify).”  
The first part of the questionnaire ended with seven items measuring the respon-
dents’ estimation of risks involved in their hacking activity. The first risk-related item 
asked them whether they are more or less afraid of being traced, tracked, or appre-
hended now than when they began to hack. The four answer options for this item were 
“More afraid,” “Less afraid,” “Unchanged,” and “I was never afraid.” Respondents were 
then asked to estimate the time they usually invested in preparation, planning, consid-
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eration of routes of action, and the selection of techniques and tools. The answers were 
recorded in hours, days, weeks, and months and were entered in the dataset in hours 
with one day equating to eight hours. An additional measure of the development of 
carefulness was provided by the item “Do you spend more or less time for planning to-
day than when you started to hack?” The three answer options for this item were “More 
time today,” “About the same time,” and “Less time today.” 
The next risk-related items then asked respondents to estimate the risk they run 
of being detected and of being apprehended during or after a hack. Both items were 
recorded on seven-point Likert-type scales ranging from 1 “No risk at all” to 4 “Some 
risk,” to 7 “Very high risk.” The second to last item in this section measured the percen-
tage of attacks the respondents had aborted because they were afraid of being de-
tected. The percentage of aborted attacks was again measured on a scale of ten per-
cent increments between zero and 100 percent. The first section of the questionnaire 
concluded with asking respondents whether they were more focused on potential re-
wards or potential risks during their hacks. The risk versus rewards focus question was 
measured on a seven-point Likert scale ranging from 1 “Only on rewards” to 4 “Balance 
both” to 7 “Only on risks.” 
The Measurements of Risk Propensity and Rationality 
The second part of the questionnaire consisted of items from different scales de-
signed to assess the influence of three personality factors. In particular, the three scales 
measured the respondents’ risk propensity as well as their preference for rational ver-
sus heuristic or experiential-based thinking styles. In an attempt to limit the overall 
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length of the survey, each of the three scales was abbreviated to five items. All items in 
this second section were worded as general statements, and respondents were in-
structed to indicate how much they agree or disagree with these statements on seven-
point scales ranging from 1 “Strongly disagree” to 7 “Strongly agree.” 
The decision to measure general risk propensity with a scale instead of a single 
item was based on findings by  MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1990), who reported that 
the concept of risk propensity is too broad to be accurately captured with a single item. 
The five items measuring risk propensity were taken from different scales and slightly 
modified for best thematic fit. The first item “I always try to avoid situations involving a 
risk of getting into trouble” was modified from a scale developed by Dahlback (1990). 
The second item, “I always play it safe even when it means occasionally losing out on a 
good opportunity,” was adapted from Gomez-Mejia and Balkin’s (1989) “willingness to 
take risks” scale, which is an advancement of the original scale developed by Slovic 
(1972) and the modifications introduced by Gupta and Govindarajan (1984). The re-
maining three items were taken from Dulebohn (2002), who developed them to measure 
general risk propensity and who reported a Cronbach alpha of .73 for this three-item 
scale. The second item “I am rather bold and fearless in my actions” was reversed to 
prevent biases introduced by “acquiescence” response strategies of participants who 
give superficial answers because they want to get through questions quickly (Krosnick & 
Fabrigar, 1997).  
Two other scales were included to assess the degree to which respondents gen-
erally rely on their rationality versus their intuition when making decisions. All items in 
the rationality and the faith in intuition scales were taken from the latest version of the 
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Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI) scale (Pacini & Epstein, 1999). The REI is a well 
established and supported measurement instrument for rational versus heuristic think-
ing styles. Today, considerable evidence exists in the social psychological literature for 
its construct validity (Epstein, 2003; Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, & Heier, 1996; Hand-
ley, Newstead, & Wright, 2000; Pacini & Epstein, 1999).  
The full version of the REI consists of 40 items in two main scales measuring the 
preference for analytical-rational or intuitive-experiential information processing. Each of 
the main scales is further divided into subscales of self-assessed effectiveness and of 
engagement in both thinking styles. More precisely, rational effectiveness refers to the 
confidence persons have in their logical reasoning, whereas rational frequency or en-
gagement refers to the pleasure derived from rational thinking (Handley et al., 2000). 
Conversely, experiential ability measures the confidence in relying on personal intuitions 
and experiential engagement measures the enjoyment of using intuition as the basis of 
one’s decision making. The internal consistency reliabilities are reported with .87-.90 for 
the two REI scales and .79-.84 for the four subscales (Epstein, 2003). The full version of 
the REI scale was abbreviated in the survey. The questionnaire contained five items 
from each of the two REI scales. Three of the five items in each scale were taken from 
the ability subscales and two from the engagement subscale. The selection of items fol-
lowed the criteria that were outlined earlier in this chapter.  
The Measurements of Sociodemographics 
The questionnaire concluded with some measurements of basic sociodemo-
graphic characteristics in the third section. Respondents were first asked to indicate 
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their sex and to enter their year of birth. They were then asked to identify the last grade 
they completed. The answer categories provided for this question were “None, or 
grades 1-8,” “High school incomplete (grades 9-11),” “High school graduate (grade 12 
or GED certificate,” “Business, technical, or vocational school AFTER high school,” 
“Some college, no 4-year degree,” “College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year de-
gree) ,” and “Post-graduate training/professional school after college (Master’s degree 
or Ph.D.).”  
The racial and ethnic background of the participants was assessed with two 
items. The first item asked whether the respondents are “of Hispanic or Latino origin or 
descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or some other Spanish background.” 
The second item then asked them to indicate their race. The answer categories pro-
vided for this item were “White,” “Black,” “Asian,” and “Other mixed race: (specify).” The 
marital status of respondents was measured with the question “Are you married, living 
as married, divorced, separated, widowed, or never been married.” The last two ques-
tions on the survey asked “Are you now employed full-time, part-time, retired, or not 
employed for pay?” and “Are you also a full- or part-time student.” The survey con-
cluded with thanking the respondents for their participation and wishing them a nice day 
at the conference. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: 
METHODS AND RESULTS 
 
The analysis conducted in this research project addressed all the study goals 
that were outlined in the previous chapters. Aside from examining the distributions of 
sociodemographic characteristics within the hacking community, it also specified the ra-
tional choice perspective models for the continued involvement in hacking by measuring 
the shifting importance of various motives as well as several other hacking-related as-
pects. Furthermore, it tested all hypotheses raised in Chapter 5 by investigating the ef-
fects of varying degrees of rationality and risk propensity on hacking-related decisions.  
Given the exploratory nature of the research project, the first section describes 
the distributions of sociodemographic characteristics in a univariate analysis. Descrip-
tive statistics are also used to identify the relative importance of several hacking-related 
factors. In the second section, the validity and reliability of the three personality scales 
are briefly examined, and the scales are transformed into indices. These indices are 
then used to test the hypotheses from Chapter 5 in several additive multivariate linear 
regressions.   
The Sociodemographic Composition of the Sample 
The sociodemographic characteristics displayed in Table 1 show a vastly skewed 
gender distribution among hackers. Only seven of the 124 participants (5.6 percent) 
were females. The wide gender gap revealed in this study confirms other reports that 
describe hacker communities as being predominantly male (Adam, 2004; Taylor, 1999).  
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Table 1: Sociodemographic Characteristics of Sample Respondents 
  Variable      N1   %2 
 
Sex 
Male 117 94.4 
Female 7 5.6   
 
Age3 120 30.6 (6.7) 
 
Education 
None, or grades 1-8 0 0.0 
High school incomplete 4 3.2 
High school graduate 7 5.6 
Vocational school 2 1.6 
Some college 30 24.2 
College graduate 47 37.9 
Post-graduate Master’s or Ph.D. 34 27.4 
 
Race 
Hispanic descent 3 2.4 
White  116 93.5  
Black 2 1.6 
Asian 5 4.0 
Other 1 0.8 
 
Marriage status4  
Never married 63 50.8 
Living as married 17 13.7 
Married  43 34.7 
Divorced 1 0.8 
 
Employment 
Full-time 92 74.2  
Part-time 22 17.7 
Unemployed 10 8.1 
 
Student status 
Yes, full-time 14 11.3 
Yes, part-time 31 25.0 
Not a student 79 63.7 
 
Actively hacking 
Yes 97 78.2 
No 27 21.8 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
3 Measured in years, means reported (std. dev. in parentheses). 
4 Some categories were excluded because they yielded no results. 
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The general underrepresentation of women in all areas related to computing and 
information technology—except in office or administrative positions—has already re-
ceived considerable scrutiny in the literature (Webster, 1996). Against this background, 
the vast domination of males in the hacking community is not surprising. However, the 
gender difference in this study exceeded even the discrepancies found in other areas of 
computing and information technology, in which women are estimated to account for 10 
to 30 percent of participants (Zarrett & Malanchuk, 2005).  
Taylor traces the absence of women in the hacking community, which he finds to 
be an “unexplained statistic,” (Taylor, 1999, p. 32) back to what he sees as the funda-
mentally masculine nature of hacking. He describes the hacking culture as young, male, 
technology-oriented, and laden with factors that discourage women from joining. Among 
the factors listed by Taylor are social stereotyping, a masculine “locker room” environ-
ment, and a gender biased computing language (Taylor, 1999, p. 36). Adam goes one 
step further by describing the hacker culture as one that, despite the explicit egalitarian-
ism expressed in the Hacker Ethic, is nevertheless characterized by a “frontier mascu-
linity,” a “Wild West brand of masculinity,” and a deeply rooted misogyny displayed by 
men who hide behind the anonymity of the Internet and associate “technology with de-
sire, eroticism and artificial creation” (Adam, 2004, p. 6). The data collected in the 
present study confirmed the existence of a substantial gender gap, but it did not include 
any additional attitude measurements with regard to gender. Hence, it is not possible to 
confirm or reject any of the explanations mentioned above. Nevertheless, some of the 
elements identified by Adam and Taylor were clearly visible during the convention. For 
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example, some attendees wore T-Shirts with labels such as “Penetration Expert” or oth-
er print designs that connected technology with expressions of male sexuality.  
Aside from the large gender gap, the data also displays a heavily skewed race 
distribution. Over 93 percent of the hackers in the sample were White, a fraction that 
vastly exceeded the percentage of Whites in the U.S. population. Another noteworthy 
finding in the race distribution is the fact that Asians were the largest minority in the 
sample. While the low cell count of all minorities in the present study did not permit ac-
curate generalizations of this finding, this result again reflects the racial distributions in 
most IT professions (Zarrett & Malanchuk, 2005). A common explanation for this finding 
is the particular prevalence of positive attitudes toward math, science, and computer-
related occupations among Whites and many Asian cultures (Bement, Ward, Carlson, 
Frase, & Fecso, 2004).  
The age distribution of the convention attendees shows a much higher mean val-
ue than the one suggested by the common notion of the prototypical hacker as a juve-
nile delinquent teenager (Yar, 2005a). It is reasonable to assume that the higher aver-
age age in this study of ShmooCon convention attendees was caused by the sampling 
frame of this particular research project. The profile of the ShmooCon convention was 
geared more toward security experts and computer professionals than to teenagers who 
pursue their hacking interests merely as a leisure-time hobby. Thus, while the distribu-
tion in this particular sample is certainly not enough evidence to falsify any claims that 
the majority of hackers are teenagers, nevertheless, it indicates that the hacking com-
munity is by no means limited to only teenagers. To the contrary, it involves many ma-
ture security experts and many seasoned hackers who pursue their hacking activity in a 
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professional manner. The data clearly show that hacking is not just a ‘young man’s 
game.’ The oldest active hacker in the sample was 52 years old and reported to have 
been hacking for close to three decades.  
The professionalism of most respondents was also reflected in their educational 
attainments. Ninety percent of the hackers in the present sample had at least some col-
lege education, and about one-fourth of them reported to have obtained a Master’s or 
Ph.D. degree. Moreover, about one-third of all respondents were enrolled either as full-
time or part-time students. An examination of the four cases with an incomplete high 
school education revealed that most of them were young participants (between 18 and 
19 years old) who also reported to be full-time students. These four cases were most 
likely high school students who had not yet graduated.  
The high fraction of students in the survey sample is particularly surprising when 
considering the fact that over 90 percent of all respondents were also employed. About 
three-fourth reported to be employed full-time and an additional 18 percent were part-
time employees. The high employment rate was probably part of the reason why more 
than double as many respondents indicated to be part-time students than full-time stu-
dents. When asked about their marital status, about half of all respondents said that 
they were never married. A significantly smaller fraction, only about one-third of all par-
ticipants, reported to be married.  
In short, the sociodemographic characteristics that were sampled in this study 
paint the picture of a hacking community that is predominantly male, White, and com-
prised of highly educated members. They also work regular jobs and are oftentimes al-
so studying but appear to be hesitant to engage in serious relationship commitments.  
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The Descriptive Statistics of Continued Involvement 
The control item at the beginning of the questionnaire asked participants whether 
they “are currently actively hacking.” Almost 80 percent of the respondents answered 
this question with “yes.” A brief examination of the remaining 20 percent revealed that 
most of them were very active former hackers who had given up their hacking activities 
in the meantime. The result obtained from this control item allows the conclusion that 
the goal of the present study, which was to sample persons with actual hacking expe-
riences and not just persons who are merely interested in computer-security related is-
sues, was indeed accomplished. 
The Initiation Phase 
Some of the most interesting questions about the initiation phase of hacking are 
(1) what exactly sparked the initial interest in hacking, (2) what led hackers to commit 
their first actual hacking attempt, and (3) at what age did they do so. All three questions 
relate to main components of the initiation model as proposed by the rational choice 
perspective, and all three questions were addressed in the present study. The results 
show that many hackers became interested in hacking even before their early teenage 
years. One person reported that he was only nine years old when he first became inter-
ested in hacking. While this respondent was the youngest, he was no exception. Table 
2 shows that the first peak in the initial interest distribution was as early as 12 years. 
Twenty percent of all respondents reported to have already been interested in hacking 
by that age. The median of the distribution was at 15 years, and the mean at 16 years.  
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Table 2: Motivations for Interest in Hacking and First Hack 
  Variable      N1   %2 
 
Age interested in hacking3 124 16.0 (4.3) 
 
Motive for initial interest4  
Intellectual curiosity 118 95.2 
Experimentation 105 84.7 
Excitement, thrill, fun 82 66.1 
Feeling of power 26 21.0 
Peer recognition 23 18.5 
Self-concept boost 22 17.7 
Status and prestige 19 15.3 
Personal revenge 12 9.7 
Other 7 5.6 
Political ideology 6 4.8 
Protest against corporations 4 3.2 
Financial gain 3 2.4 
Media attention 2 1.6 
 
Primary motive for interest4 
Intellectual curiosity 74 59.7 
Experimentation 21 16.9 
Excitement, thrill, fun 15 12.1 
Feeling of power 4 3.2 
Other  4 3.2 
Self-concept boost 2 1.6 
Political ideology 2 1.6 
Peer recognition 1 0.8 
Personal revenge 1 0.8 
     
Motive for first hack4  
Intellectual curiosity 91 73.4 
Experimentation 84 67.7 
Excitement, thrill, fun 56 45.2 
Feeling of power 13 10.5 
Peer recognition 10 8.1 
Self-concept boost 10 8.1 
Status and prestige 4 3.2 
Personal revenge 6 4.8 
Other 3 2.4 
Protest against corporations 2 1.6 
Financial gain 2 1.6 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
3 Measured in years, means reported (std. dev. in parentheses). 
4 For better readability, the motives are rank ordered by importance. 
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The self-reported motives for the initial interest in hacking show that the majority 
of participants became interested in hacking because of “intellectual curiosity” (95 per-
cent), “experimentation” (85 percent), and “excitement, thrill, or fun” (66 percent). A 
second set of motives revolving around self-expression and peer-recognition turned out 
to be of significantly lesser importance. Among these motives were “feeling of power” 
(21 percent), “peer recognition” (19 percent), “self-concept boost” (18 percent), “status 
and prestige” (15 percent), and “personal revenge” (10 percent). 
Some of the motives that are oftentimes associated with hackers in media re-
ports (Alexander, 2005) as well as scientific (Grabosky & Smith, 1998; Kilger, Arkin, & 
Stutzman, 2004) and governmental publications (Krone, 2005), on the other hand, 
played only a marginal role as initial interests. Among these motives were “political ide-
ology” (5 percent), “protest against corporations” (3 percent), “financial gain” (2 percent), 
and “media attention” (2 percent). The results clearly demonstrate that motives asso-
ciated with youth, boredom, frivolity, mischief, or curiosity are the main reasons for 
young persons to become initially interested in hacking. In contrast, only a very few res-
pondents became interested in hacking because of political or financial considerations, 
or other motives with a stronger criminal intent.  
A similar pattern emerged from the question about the single most important mo-
tive for the initial interest. Here, roughly four times more respondents (60 percent) ans-
wered with “intellectual curiosity” than with the next popular answer option “experimen-
tation” (17 percent). “Media attention”, “financial gain”, “protest against corporations”, 
and “status and prestige,” on the other hand, were not mentioned at all and were ex-
cluded from Table 2. 
111 
 
Only five “Other” reasons were specified. Out of those, the desire to spy on a 
girlfriend, who the respondent believed to be cheating, was named twice. The other 
reasons were independence, learning of security, and playing pranks on friends. Over-
all, the few individual reasons that were given in addition to the list of standard answer 
options suggest that the list was comprehensive. The only item that should probably be 
included in the theoretical model and future measurements was spying.  
The separate measure of the motives for the first actual hack produced roughly 
the same results as the item measuring the motives for the initial interest. The main dif-
ference between the two items was that the reasons for the first actual hack were more 
specific than for the initial interest. Accordingly, most respondents marked fewer mo-
tives, which resulted in lower percentages for all motives. The patterns between the dif-
ferent motives, however, were very similar to the ones emerging from the question 
about initial interests. Two noteworthy findings in the distribution of motives for the first 
hack were that “political ideology” was not mentioned by any respondent and that “fi-
nancial gain” was a motive for only two respondents.  
Aside from the motivations for the initial interest and the first actual hack, the sur-
vey also measured the length of the time span between these two events. The time 
measure was recorded in days in the dataset but is presented in more meaningful cate-
gories in Table 3. Interestingly, about one-third of all respondents committed their first 
hacking attempt already within the first week of becoming interested in hacking. Also, an 
additional 20 percent committed their first hack within the first month of becoming inter-
ested. This finding suggests that the initial interest of many hackers is not an abstract, 
intellectual enterprise, but a preparation for their first hack. It indicates that the initial in-
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terest is guided by the intent to actually launch hacking attacks. Less than 50 percent 
were interested in hacking longer than a month before they actually attempted a hack. 
The longest reported time span in the sample was clearly an outlier (10 years). Table 3 
displays the recorded time spans between initial interests and first hacks. 
 
Table 3: Details of the First Hacking Attempt 
 
  Variable      N
1   %2 
 
Time span between interest and hack3 
Up to 1 week 45 36.3 
Up to 1 month 23 18.5 
Up to 1 year 31 25.0 
2 to 10 years 25 20.2 
 
1st target owner / type N (%) N (%) N (%) 
 
 Single host  Network  Website 
Private 50 (40.3) 29 (23.4) 4 (3.2) 
Corporate 5 (4.0) 7 (5.6) 3  (2.4) 
Non-profit 0  4 (3.2) 1  (0.8) 
Government 1 (0.8) 1 (0.8) 0 
 
1st target selection criteria 
Easy access 70 56.5 
Interesting information 36 29.0 
Profitable information 0 
Reputation gain 0 
Antipathy 7 5.6 
Other 11 8.9 
 
Employed when 1st hacked 
Yes, full-time 28 22.6 
Yes, part-time 28 22.6 
No 68 54.8 
 
Economic profit a motive at all 
Yes, an important one 0  
Yes, but not very important 5 4.0 
No 119 96.0 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
3 Categories are not cumulative. 
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Table 3 further shows that the most popular targets of the first hack were single 
private computer hosts (40 percent) and private networks (23 percent). Corporate com-
puters and networks were the second-most popular targets (4 percent and 6 percent). 
With regard to corporate targets, the relationship between single hosts and networks 
was reversed. More corporate networks were attacked than single computers. This dif-
ference is probably due to accessibility reasons. While many single private hosts can be 
located in unprotected wireless networks or public networks, an attack on corporate 
computers typically requires a preceding attack on the network in which the computer is 
located. Only one hacker selected a government host and network as the targets for his 
first attack. For all others, these targets were probably too risky and too high profile to 
be considered as a first target. 
Most hackers selected their first target based on practical considerations. The 
majority of participants (57 percent) reported that the ease of gaining access was their 
primary selection criteria. About half as many chose a particular target because it of-
fered interesting information (29 percent). Revenge or antipathy with the host played 
only a minor role as selection criteria. Only seven respondents attacked their targets 
because of personal dislike (6 percent). Some specifications of answers in the “Other” 
category (9 percent) revealed that some respondents counted attempts to hack their 
own computer system or network as their first hacking attempt. Future survey designs 
will need to be more explicit to rule out this interpretation of the question.  
The answers to the selection criteria question again confirmed the irrelevance of 
commonly assumed motives in the initiation phase. None of the respondents attacked 
their targets in search for profitable information or because they were particularly suited 
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for gaining a reputation as a hacker. The finding that financial interests played hardly 
any role during the onset of hacking activity was also confirmed by the answers to the 
explicit question asking whether economic profits were a motive at all. Only five respon-
dents (4 percent) said it played a minor role. The vast majority (94 percent), on the other 
hand, indicated that economic considerations or potential financial gains had nothing to 
do with their decision to start hacking. 
The finding that a majority of respondents (55 percent) were unemployed when 
they first hacked is not surprising given the young age of most respondents when they 
started to hack. During their first hacks, most of them were still dependent teenagers 
with little or no income of their own. Despite little or no income, however, it is important 
to note that economic interests hardly played any role in the decision to engage in hack-
ing activities. 
The Popularity of Different Hacking Methods 
Table 4 shows the popularity of the 24 different hacking attacks that were listed 
in the questionnaire. When interpreting the results, it is important to bear in mind that 
the corresponding item asked respondents only about attacks they had used in their first 
hack. Hence, the frequencies in Table 4 relate to only one single hacking event, not all 
hacking attempts over the course of a career. Despite the fact that the question referred 
to merely one single event, some of the attack methods were used by almost half of all 
respondents. The most popular methods were packet sniffing (49 percent), port scan-
ning (47 percent), buffer overflows (47 percent), and network mapping (44 percent). Of 
the 24 answer options, bouncing was the only method that had not been applied by an-
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ybody in the sample. The high frequency turnout of most items in the list, however, was 
a strong indication that the listing of methods in this study was appropriate.  
The fact that only a few specialized methods were specified as answers in the 
“Other” category further suggests that the list was close to being exhaustive. Most of the 
methods specified in the “Other” category were antique methods that were popular in 
the 1980s and 1990s but have since become obsolete. The implication that the provi-
sion of standard answer options for this question had the disadvantage of systematically 
excluding outdated methods that older hackers used in their first attacks was reaffirmed 
by the verbal feedback from some of the older hackers. Nevertheless, the provision of 
standard answer categories for this question produced much better results than the 
relatively unsuccessful open-ended measurement technique that was used for the ques-
tion about currently preferred methods and tools. Most respondents were hesitant to re-
veal their methods or tools and either skipped the question, or gave nondescript an-
swers such as “custom tools.” By way of comparison, they were much more willing to 
mark already provided answer categories. The differential success of the two measure-
ment techniques suggests that future surveys should operate with standard answer cat-
egories for questions about preferred hacking methods because this question format 
minimizes the reluctance of many respondents to reveal this information. 
The results shown in Table 4 further suggest that the description of most hacks 
as complex events with different phases is correct. Many hackers combined different 
reconnaissance methods with different intrusion and cover-up techniques. Two of the 
most popular reconnaissance methods were network mapping and port scanning. Of-
tentimes, these two methods were used in combination. After hackers had created a 
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map of the network and had located the target computer within that network, they then 
searched for vulnerable open ports as entry points to that computer system. Of the dif-
ferent methods to gain access to a system, the various techniques to obtain passwords 
were the most frequently used. These results suggest that the classic exploitation of 
password weaknesses remains popular among many hackers.  
 
Table 4: Methods Used in First Hacking Attack 
 
 
 
  
Variable      N1   %2 
 
Methods used in 1st technical intrusion 
Footprinting 34 27.6 
Ping sweeping 29 23.2 
DNS zone transfer 7 5.8 
Whois 36 29.0 
Network mapping 54 43.5 
Port scanning 58 46.5 
Versatile scanning tools    29 23.2 
Vulnerability scanning 45 36.3 
RPC port/end-point dump 2 1.5 
Packet sniffing 61 49.4 
Session hijacking 18 14.5 
Grinding Passwords 14 11.6 
Password cracking 38 30.5 
Password theft 36 29.0 
Directory traversal/climbing 14 11.6 
Buffer overflow 58 46.5 
Format string 5 4.4 
Resource mismatch 2 1.5 
CGI 4 2.9 
Root shell/kits 9 7.3 
Keylogger 29 23.2 
Spoofing 14 11.6 
Bouncing 0  
Source routing 4 2.9 
Other 26 21.0 
 
Average number of methods (std. dev.)          5.0  (19.5) 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
3 Categories are not cumulative. 
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The Prevalence and Success Rates of Different Kinds of Attack Methods 
Table 5, 6, and 7 list the prevalence and success rates for three different types of 
hacking attacks. While many persons think of hacking attacks as performed solely 
through technical means and exploits, they are in fact more diverse and oftentimes in-
volve a combination of technical methods, social methods, and circulations of different 
kinds of malicious code (J. Erickson, 2008). To gain a clearer picture of the prevalence 
of each of the three types of attacks and to obtain a better understanding of the compo-
sition of typical hacking attacks, all three types of attacks were assessed independently. 
 
Table 5: Measurements of Hacking Activity – Technical Intrusions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 shows a bimodal distribution for the number of technical intrusions. Most 
hackers were either very engaged or hardly active at all. The four most active hackers in 
Variable      N1   %2 
 
Total number of technical intrusions 
Up to 5 27 21.8 
6-10 16 12.9 
11-50 20 16.1 
51-100 11 8.9 
101-500 25 20.2 
501-20,000 25 20.2 
 
Frequency of technical intrusions (per year) 
1 26 21.0 
2-6 30 24.2 
7-12 12 9.7 
13-36 17 13.7 
37-156 22 17.7 
157-2,500 17 13.7 
 
Success rate in % (st. dev.) 124 48.1 (2.5) 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
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the sample each reported to have committed an estimated total of 20,000 hacking at-
tacks over the course of their careers. A total of 20 percent of all respondents in the 
sample indicated having hacked between 500 and 20,000 times and another 20 percent 
said they had hacked between 100 and 500 times. The results in Table 5 clearly show 
that the convention was attended by many veteran hackers.  
The frequency measure of technical intrusions per year further confirmed that 
many of the interviewed hackers were regularly hacking at the time the survey was con-
ducted. A total of 30 percent of all respondents reported having attempted from three 
hacks per month to an astonishing seven hacks per day. Obviously, a number of seven 
hacking attempts per day can only be achieved when the single hacking attempts are 
committed through highly automated attack routines and without any sophisticated 
preparation routines. An investigation into the cases with extremely high frequencies 
and numbers of total hacks revealed that they did indeed report very short preparation 
times and many of them also reported low to moderate success rates. Overall, the suc-
cess rate reported by all respondents showed that they considered about half (48 per-
cent) of all technical intrusions to have been successful. 
A 50 percent success rate of all technical intrusions was already very high, but, 
as Table 6 shows, the success rate of social methods was even higher (62 percent). 
The very high success rate of social methods was one of the most surprising findings in 
this study. It demonstrates that the popular image of hackers as social hermits who 
launch their hacking attacks solely through remote computer and network technology, or 
even do so mainly to compensate for social deficits, has to be revised. The opposite 
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seems to be the case. Hackers seem to be very socially intelligent persons who know 
how to successfully manipulate and trick other persons. 
Table 6: Measurements of Hacking Activity – Social Methods 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
More detailed case examinations of the hackers who reported the highest suc-
cess rates with their social hacks revealed that they were the same hackers who also 
reported to have the most success with their technical intrusions. Moreover, most of 
these very successful hackers gave almost identical numbers and frequencies for the 
Variable      N1   %2 
 
Types of social methods 
Social engineering 94 75.8  
Shoulder surfing 81 65.3 
Dumpster diving 51 41.1 
Impersonation 46 37.1 
Deception 36 29.0 
Bribery 18 14.5 
 
Total number of social methods 
0 17 13.7 
1-5 24 19.4 
6-10 20 16.1 
11-50 14 11.3 
51-100 11 8.9 
101-500 21 16.9 
501-5,000 17 13.7 
 
Frequency of social methods (per year) 
0 18 14.5 
1 31 25.0 
2-6 23 18.5 
7-12 7 5.6 
13-36 9 7.3 
37-156 25 20.2 
157-365 11 8.9 
 
Success rate in % (st. dev.) 107 71.8(2.4) 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
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two methods. Based on these observations, one can conclude that the most successful 
hackers are the ones who combine social and technical approaches in their hacks. 
All six of the listed social attack methods shown in Table 6 were used by an un-
expectedly high number of hackers. The most popular type of the social attack methods 
was social engineering. Three-fourth of all respondents reported to have used social 
engineering methods in their hacks. Surprisingly, shoulder surfing was the second-most, 
and dumpster diving the third-most popular method. The large popularity of these two 
simple methods (65 and 41 percent) shows that hacking attacks do not always have to 
be sophisticated attacks and require a lot of knowledge, preparation, and expertise. 
They can be as simple as watching other computer users type in their login passwords 
or searching their garbage for sensitive information that can then be exploited. The two 
more sophisticated social methods, impersonation and deception, were used by fewer 
hackers than the more simple methods, but they were still considerably popular. Thirty-
seven percent of all respondents reported to have used impersonations, and 29 percent 
indicated that they have engaged in deceptions to trick persons for hacking purposes. 
Bribery was the least common technique of all social methods. Still, a total of 15 percent 
of all respondents had employed this method for their hacks. 
The unexpected popularity of social methods was corroborated by the two items 
measuring the total number of social hacks and the frequency with which they were 
employed. Even though the highest total number of social hacks was considerably lower 
than that for technical intrusions, 30 percent of all respondents still reported to have 
conducted more than 100 such attacks over the course of their careers. Only 14 percent 
of all participants said that they had never engaged in any such methods. Another sur-
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prising finding was that, even though the highest frequency with which social methods 
were applied (1 per day) was again lower than the highest frequency of technical intru-
sions (7 per day), the percentage of hackers who reported to engage in three social at-
tacks per month or more was roughly the same as for technical intrusions (29 versus 30 
percent).  
 
Table 7: Measurements of Hacking Activity – Malware Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable      N1   %2 
 
Types of distributed malware 
Trojan Horses 20 16.1  
Adware/Spyware 0  
Viruses/Worms 11 8.9 
Spam/Phishing mails 9 7.3 
Other 15 12.1 
None 87 70.2 
 
Total number of distributed malware 
0 87 70.2 
1-5 22 19.4 
6-10 4 3.2 
11-50 2 1.6 
51-100 5 4.0 
101-1,000 4 3.2 
 
Frequency of distributed malware (per year) 
0 87 70.2 
1 24 18.5 
2-6 3 2.4 
7-12 8 6.4 
13-36 0  
37-200 2 1.6 
 
Success rate scale 1-7 (std. dev.) 37  =3.6 (0.9) 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
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In addition to technical intrusions and social methods, the survey also asked res-
pondents about types of malicious code that they had ever distributed. Table 7 shows 
the descriptive statistics for the distribution of malicious code. Different from the large 
popularity of the first two methods, distributions of malicious code were relatively un-
common, and the type of malicious codes that had been distributed was highly diversi-
fied. Seventy percent of all hackers in the sample reported never having distributed any 
type of malicious codes. The types of malware that were most often used were Trojan 
horses (16 percent) and viruses (11 percent). The 15 persons who marked “Other” 
forms of malware most often specified that they designed their own scripts and were 
circulating custom-made program codes or other forms of highly specialized code such 
as SQL injections.  
A noteworthy finding was the unpopularity of spam or phishing emails (7 percent) 
and adware or spyware (0 percent). The results in Table 7 suggest that hackers and 
phishers or spammers are two separate types of cyber-criminals. This conjecture was 
reaffirmed by additional case analyses of active distributors of malware. The respon-
dents who most often circulated malicious code rarely engaged in technical or social 
hacking methods. Thus, while classic hackers oftentimes combined technical intrusions 
and social engineering methods, or at least engaged frequently in both of them, they 
were distinctively different from the persons who circulated the most malicious code. 
The latter appeared to have a hacking profile that is distinctively different from the for-
mer two.  
Since the success rate of malware distributions is not simply determined by any 
definite success versus failure ratio but by the total numbers of infected computers, the 
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success rate of malware distributions was measured on a seven-point Likert type scale. 
The results of this measure suggest that hackers who distributed malware were esti-
mated to have a medium level of success with their efforts ( =3.6).  
The Developments During the Habituation of Hacking 
The lengths of hacking careers in Table 8 reaffirmed the considerable experience 
of most hackers in the present sample. The normal-shaped distribution of hacking expe-
riences ranged from less than a year to 28 years and averaged at ten years. The length 
of most hacking careers in the present sample was a clear indication that the majority of 
respondents were not beginners, but had already habitualized their hacking activities.  
As was predicted by the rational choice perspective, most respondents be-
friended other hackers during their time as active hackers. Seventy-five percent of all 
respondents said they had changed their social networks to include other hackers, and 
23 percent did so “very much.” Alongside the changes in their networks, most hackers 
also reported changes in their motives, their engagement in hacking, and their skills. 
Only one respondent said that he had not improved his hacking skills since he began 
hacking. As expected, this particular hacker was one of the least experienced in the 
sample. He had less than one year of hacking experience and had committed only one 
single hack. All other respondents claimed to have improved their skills over the course 
of their careers, and 72 percent said they did so “very much.”  
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Table 8: Developments during Hacking Career 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable      N1   %2 
 
Time hacking (in years) 
Up to 1 8 6.5  
2-5 30 24.2 
6-10 47 37.9 
10-15 20 16.1 
16-20 10 8.1 
20-28 9 7.3 
 
Change friends (more hackers) 
Yes, very much 28 22.6 
Yes, somewhat 66 53.2 
No 30 24.2 
 
Improved skills 
Yes, very much 89 71.8 
Yes, somewhat 34 27.4 
No 1 0.8 
 
Hacking more frequent 
Yes, very much 37 29.8 
Yes, somewhat 39 31.5 
No, it’s the same 18 14.5 
No, it’s less frequent 30 24.2 
 
Motives changed 
Yes, very much 38 30.6 
Yes, somewhat 37 29.8 
No 49 39.5 
 
Current primary motive (initial interest)   
Intellectual curiosity 37 (74) 29.8 (59.7) 
Financial gain 28 (0) 22.6 
Experimentation 22 (21) 17.7 (16.9) 
Other  21 (4) 16.9 (3.2) 
Excitement, thrill, fun 14 (15) 11.3 (12.1) 
Self-concept boost 2 (2) 1.6 (1.6) 
Feeling of power 0 (4)  (3.2) 
Political ideology 0 (2)  (1.6) 
Peer recognition 0 (1)  (0.8) 
Personal revenge 0 (1)  (0.8) 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
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A majority of respondents reported that their hacking activities had intensified 
over the course of their careers. Of all hackers in the sample, 30 percent said they are 
hacking much more frequently now than when they started, and 32 percent reported 
that their hacking activities have somewhat increased. Only 30 respondents (24 per-
cent) said their hacking activities had become less frequent. Of those, 27 also said that 
they are no longer actively hacking. Thus, only 3 active hackers had decreased their 
hacking frequency and 60 percent of the still active hackers had increased it. The data 
shows an apparent trend toward an intensification of hacking activities over time. 
Sixty percent of respondents further indicated that their motives had changed 
since their initial interest in hacking. Indeed, the comparison of initial motives with cur-
rent ones revealed three dramatic changes that had occurred between the two meas-
ures. First, the importance of intellectual curiosity as the primary motive had decreased 
by 50 percent over time (from 60 to 30 percent). Second, financial gain, a motive of no 
importance for the initial interest, had become the second-most important motive for 
hacking. Twenty-three percent of all subjects said that their main motives for continuing 
to hack were financial gains. The sharp increase of financial gains as motives for hack-
ing is an intriguing finding. It means that, while most hackers set out to become hackers 
because they are curious about the technology and keen to experiment with it, along the 
way some of them realize the financial possibilities that are achievable through their en-
gagement in hacking. The third main difference between the two measures is the reduc-
tion of motives. While the list of initial motives included ten different motives, this list 
was reduced to only six persistent motives. Feelings of power, political ideology, peer 
recognition, and personal revenge no longer played a role for the continued engage-
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ment in hacking. The changes in motives demonstrate that for many, hacking efforts 
evolved into a professional business. This trend was also reflected in the “Other” cate-
gory. Most entries in this category pertained to the gathering of sensitive and security-
related information. 
The changes in motives were mirrored in the changes that occurred in the prefe-
rences for certain targets. As Table 9 illustrates, 71 percent of all respondents reported 
to have changed their targets over the course of their careers. Also, 50 percent said 
they are now attacking higher profile targets and 86 percent reported to have changed 
their methods and tools to attack the different kinds of targets. 
The increased preference of many hackers for higher profile targets was visibly 
reflected in their preferred types of targets. Both corporate and governmental targets 
were attacked much more frequently. The preference for corporate computers qua-
drupled (from 4 to 17 percent), the preference for corporate networks septupled (from 6 
to 40 percent), and the preference for corporate websites increased twelvefold (from 2.4 
to 28 percent). Similarly, governmental targets, which were virtually not targeted during 
the onset of the hacking activity, were much more popular among experienced hackers. 
Fifteen percent reported having attacked governmental hosts, 25 percent attacked go-
vernmental networks, and 20 percent targeted governmental websites. 
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Table 9: Target Preferences 
 
 
 
 
  
Variable      N1   %2 
 
Targets changed since 1st hack 
Yes, very much 52 41.9 
Yes, somewhat 36 29.0 
No 36 29.0 
 
Higher profile targets 
Yes, very much 29 23.4 
Yes, somewhat 34 27.4 
No 61 49.2 
 
Current target owner / typeN (%)3 N (%)3 N (%)3 
 
 Single host  Network  Website 
Private 49 (39.5) 56 (45.2) 23 (18.5) 
Corporate 21 (16.9) 49 (39.5) 35 (28.2) 
Non-profit 4 (3.2) 4 (3.2) 7 (5.6) 
Government 18 (14.5) 31 (25.0) 25 (20.2) 
 
Current target selection criteria (initial criteria) 
Easy access 58 (70) 46.8 (56.5) 
Interesting information 87 (36) 70.2 (29.0) 
Profitable information 31 (0) 25.0  
Reputation gain 2 (0) 1.6  
Antipathy 2 (7) 1.6 (5.6) 
Other 11 (11) 8.9 (8.9) 
 
Rejection reasons 
No interesting information 60 48.4 
Unfamiliarity with architecture 48 38.7 
Sympathy with host 23 18.5 
No profitable information 19 15.3 
Other 9 7.3 
None of the above 30 24.2 
 
Change in methods and tactics   
Yes, very much 51 50.0 
Yes, somewhat 37 36.3 
No 14 13.7 
 
Variability of methods (scale 1-7) 123 4.7 (1.7)  
 
Variability of tools (scale 1-7) 123 3.9 (1.7) 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
3 Multiple answers were possible. % values refer to complete sample. 
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The selection criteria for targets changed in accordance with the motives and the 
targets. The prospect of obtaining profitable information, initially irrelevant during the 
onset of hacking activities, had become the third-most important criterion. Twenty-five 
percent of all respondents said this criterion was relevant for their selection of targets. 
The significantly increased importance of profitable information further confirmed the 
trend toward a professionalization of illegal activities. Easy access remained the most 
important criterion, but its significance was notably reduced (from 57 to 47 percent). Fol-
lowing an opposite trend, the prospect of interesting information had vastly gained im-
portance. More than double as many hackers listed interesting information as one of 
their selection criteria (from 29 to 70 percent).  
Among rejection criteria, the absence of interesting information was the most fre-
quent one. Almost half of all participants (48 percent) listed it as a reason to refrain from 
an attack. Unfamiliarity with the architecture of a computer system or network was the 
second-most common reason for a rejection (39 percent), followed by sympathy with 
the host of that system or network (19 percent). Analogous to its importance as a selec-
tion criterion, 15 percent of all hackers in the sample marked the absence of profitable 
information as a reason for rejecting a particular target. This result underlines the pro-
found change many hackers undergo over the course of their hacking careers. Hackers 
apparently become more professional and many of them begin to see hacking not only 
as an intellectual challenge, but as a potential source of income.  
Table 10 illustrates that the question asking respondents whether hacking for 
them is a source of income was positively confirmed by 41 percent. Fifteen percent 
even identified hacking as their main source of income. An additional case analysis 
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found that these 15 percent were mostly the same hackers that also reported to reject a 
target if it has no profitable information to offer. 
The Risk-Avoidance Efforts and Desistance Considerations 
The last section of hacking-activity related questions in the survey asked respon-
dents about their efforts to minimize risks, their risk estimates, and their readiness to 
desist from hacking. The results of these items are displayed in Tables 10 and 11. The 
results in Table 10 confirm the appropriateness of the anonymizing tactics that were 
provided as answer categories. Only 5 percent said they used methods other than the 
ones provided for this item. In contrast, the least popular method on the list (source 
routing) was used by 15 percent of the respondents in the sample. More than 50 per-
cent of all participants used the three most common methods. Proxies (60 percent), war 
driving (57 percent), and spoofing (54 percent) all share in common that they are rela-
tively simple and effortless methods. As Table 10 shows, an inverse correlation seemed 
to exist between the technical difficulty of anonymizing methods and their popularity. 
The explanation for this inverse correlation is simple. The multitude of relatively simple 
methods that already grant a high degree of anonymity in cyberspace made using more 
strenuous tactics unnecessary. 
When asked whether they had ever considered desisting from hacking, a total of 
45 percent of all respondents answered “yes.” However, only six hackers (5 percent) 
said they had done so often. An examination of these six cases showed that all of them 
also reported to no longer be actively hacking. Unfortunately, the small case number in 
the present sample renders this dataset unsuitable for further investigations of signifi-
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cant differences between those cases and the ones that had not considered quitting or 
those who considered quitting a few times.  
    
Table 10: Anonymizing Methods and Desistance Considerations 
 
 
  
Variable      N1   %2 
 
Anonymizing methods3 
Proxies 74 59.7 
War driving 71 57.3 
Spoofing 67 54.0 
Public access points  55 44.4 
Tunnels, Covert channels 54 43.5 
TOR, I2P, etc. 49 39.5 
Bouncing 33 26.6 
Source routing 19 15.3 
Other 6 4.8 
 
Hacking source of income   
Yes, the main 18 14.5 
Yes, but not the main 33 26.6 
No 73 58.9 
 
Considering quitting 
Yes, often 6 4.8 
Yes, a few times 50 40.3 
Never 68 54.8 
 
Reason for considering quitting3 
Involved risk 27 21.8 
Fear of prosecution 21 16.9 
Fear of apprehension 15 12.1 
Involved effort 11 8.9 
Fear of detection 9 7.3 
Other 8 6.5 
Income too irregular 6 4.8 
Legal alternatives 5 4.0 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
3 For better readability, categories are rank ordered by importance. 
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The hackers who had considered quitting reported to have done so mainly be-
cause they were worried about the involved risk in general (22 percent). Seventeen per-
cent considered quitting because they were afraid of being prosecuted, 12 percent did 
so because they were afraid of being apprehended, and 7 percent thought about quit-
ting because they were afraid of being detected. The lesser importance of the fear of 
detection and apprehension might be initially counter intuitive, given that a prosecution 
implies a prior detection and apprehension. However, the greater fear of prosecution 
simply illustrates the fact that the prospect of being prosecuted is a greater deterrent 
than the prospects of being detected or apprehended. 
Compared to the fears of getting caught, a relatively small number of hackers (18 
percent) also reported having considered quitting because of various practical reasons. 
For 9 percent, the involved effort was a reason to contemplate giving up hacking. 
Another 5 percent said that the income yielded by hacking was just too irregular, and 4 
percent considered switching to legal alternatives.  
Table 11 shows that, when asked whether they were more or less afraid of being 
tracked and apprehended now than when they started to hack, slightly more than one-
third of all respondents reported to be more afraid today (37 percent). Thirty-four per-
cent said their level of being afraid had not changed, and another 30 percent said they 
were less afraid today (15 percent) or had never been afraid (15 percent). The slightly 
higher percentage of hackers who report to be more afraid today suggests that the in-
creased efforts of law enforcement agencies in combating cyber-criminals has not gone 
unrecognized in the hacking community. However, they also indicate that many hackers 
are well aware of the continuing slim chances of becoming tracked and apprehended. 
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Many hackers further rated the risk of becoming apprehended significantly lower than 
that of being detected. Thus, they demonstrated awareness of the fact that, due to the 
various difficulties involved in the prosecution of cybercrimes, detection does not neces-
sarily imply apprehension. Nevertheless, the popularity of the various anonymizing me-
thods and the high fraction of aborted hacking attacks (about 20 percent) were clear in-
dicators of the efforts many hackers undergo to avoid detection. 
Table 11: Risk Estimates and Carefulness 
  Variable      N1   %2  (sd) 
 
Afraid of being tracked and apprehended 
More afraid 46 37.1 
Unchanged 42 33.9 
Less afraid 18 14.5 
I was never afraid 18 14.5 
 
Preparation and planning time   
Less than 2 hrs 10 8.1 
2 hrs 20 16.1 
3 hrs – 1 day 30 24.2 
2 days 24 19.4 
3 – 5 days 24 19.4 
2 – 3 weeks 13 10.5 
Over 3 weeks 3 2.4 
 
Change in preparation time 
More time today 63 50.8 
About the same time 44 35.5 
Less time today 17 13.7 
 
Risk of detection estimate (scale 1-7) 124  3.6 (1.1) 
 
Risk of apprehension estimate (scale 1-7) 124  2.5 (1.4) 
 
Focus on rewards (1) vs. risks (7)  124  3.7 (1.2) 
 
Rational (1) vs. emotional (7) during hacks 124  2.4 (1.4) 
 
% of aborted attacks   124  20.4 (2.0) 
 
1 The total sample size is n=124. 
2 Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
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In concordance with the changes found in motives, targets, and methods, the in-
creasing professionalism of many hackers was also manifested in their more careful 
preparations. About half of all respondents reported to invest more time in their prepara-
tions today than when they started, a significantly higher number than the 14 percent 
who prepare less today. On average, hackers dedicated between three to eight hours to 
preparing their hacks. The length of preparation distribution, however, shows great va-
riability and ranges from less than two hours to several weeks in some extreme cases. 
The Assessment of Scale Validity and Reliability 
The regression models used for the testing of the research hypotheses operated 
with two of the personality constructs (risk propensity and rationality) as independent 
variables. To ensure the appropriate operationalization of all personality variables in the 
regression models, the validity and reliability of the personality constructs was assessed 
prior to the calculation of the regression models. When estimating the validity of a theo-
retical construct, two aspects are of particular importance: discriminant and convergent 
validity (Schnell, Hill, & Esser, 1999; Trochim, 2002). Discriminant validity is achieved 
when a construct is empirically distinguishable from other constructs (Straub, 1989), 
and convergent validity is confirmed when all items comprising the construct are mea-
suring only aspects of the intended construct. At the same time, a construct also has to 
be reliable, i.e. internally consistent. Internal consistency is achieved when all items 
comprising the construct are highly inter-correlated. Since the scales used to measure 
the personality constructs were abbreviated and partially modified, the validity and relia-
bility of these scales was analyzed in an exploratory validation phase.  
134 
 
The Exploratory Factor Analysis 
 According to Thompson (2004), an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) should be 
conducted when the relationships between individual items and underlying factors are 
not exactly known. Since the risk propensity scale consisted of items from different 
scales and the Rational-Experiential Inventory scale was heavily abbreviated, EFA was 
used for a confirmation of the convergent and discriminant validity of the measures. The 
particular type of EFA was a principal component analysis with promax rotation and 
Kaiser normalization (calculated with SPSS 16.0). As Hair and his colleagues sug-
gested, the selection of an orthogonal or oblique rotation should be made according to 
the specific demands of a particular research problem (Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & 
Black, 1998). According to Hair et al., orthogonal rotation methods are most appropriate 
when the research goal is to reduce the number of items in a construct, regardless of 
how meaningful the resulting underlying factors are. On the other hand, if the intent is to 
create or verify theoretically meaningful constructs, oblique rotation methods are better 
suited. Since the purpose of this factor analysis was to reveal the appropriateness of the 
scales used in this study, promax rotation, an oblique rotation method, was chosen over 
orthogonal rotation. All 15 items were entered into the EFA and three factors were ex-
tracted. Table 12 presents the EFA results for all three personality variables.   
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Table 12: Personality Scales, Item, Factor, and Index Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 Item to 
 total     Factors1  
Items correlation 1 2 3 
 
Risk propensity scale (α=.83) 
I always try to avoid situations involving  .65 .81 
 a risk of getting into trouble.  
I always play it safe even when it means  .69 .88 
occasionally losing out on a good opportunity.  
I am a cautious person who generally avoids risks. .71 .83 
I am rather bold and fearless in my actions.2 .52 .63 
I am generally cautious when trying something new. .53 .65 
 
Rationality items (α=.75) 
I usually have clear, explainable reasons  .62  .79 
for my decisions.  
I don’t reason well under pressure.2 .55  .81 
Thinking hard and for a long time about  .44  .57 
something gives me little satisfaction.2  
I prefer complex to simple problems. .42  .57 
I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. .63  .82 
 
Intuition-experience items (α=.86) 
Using my gut-feelings usually works well  .57   .73 
for me in working out problems in my life. 
I trust my initial feelings about situations. .66   .82 
I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. .79   .87 
I often go by my instincts when deciding on a  .79   .86 
course of action.   
I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s  .61   .86 
intuition for important decisions.2  
 
Eigenvalue  2.71 2.21 4.31 
Variance explained (%)  18.1 14.8 28.7 
Cumulative variance (%)  18.1 32.9 61.6 
 
Indices α N Range   (sd) 
 
Summative risk propensity index .83 124 5-35 22.1 6.1 
Summative rationality index .75 124 11-35 27.2 5.0 
Summative intuition index .86 124 10-35 23.6 5.3 
 
1 Principal Component Analysis with Promax Rotation Method and Kaiser Normalization. 
Loadings less than .4 not shown. 
2 Items were reversed. 
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Table 12 shows that the EFA produced three factors with eigenvalues greater 
than 2.0, a level that confirms the independence of the concepts. The high eigenvalues 
of all three factors also indicated that the factors explained large fractions of the va-
riance within their respective set of variables. The three factor solution accounted for 
63.4 percent of the total variance, a value above the generally accepted 60 percent lev-
el in social research (Hair et al., 1998; Thompson, 2004). To assess the factor loadings 
in the individual item analysis, guidelines from Kim and Mueller (1978) were used. Ac-
cording to these guidelines, loadings of 0.4 to 0.54 are considered fair; 0.55 to 0.62 are 
considered good; 0.63 to 0.70 are considered very good; and over 0.71 are considered 
excellent.  
As Table 12 shows, all of the 15 items loaded higher than 0.55 on their respec-
tive factors, and none of the items loaded higher than 0.4 on any other factors. Thus, all 
three constructs were extracted “cleanly” as factors. The fact that none of the items 
loaded on multiple factors was a strong sign that all three personality constructs had 
high levels of discriminant validity. Similarly, the high to excellent loadings of all individ-
ual items on their respective factors further suggested that all three constructs also had 
high levels of convergent validity. Based on the positive EFA results, all of the 15 items 
were retained in the analysis  
All 15 items also correlated highly with their respective scales. The lowest item to 
total correlation of any item was 0.42, which shows that all items contributed in a mea-
ningful way to the scale scores. The high internal consistency of all three scales is fur-
ther reflected in their high Cronbach’s alpha values. The risk propensity scale reached 
an alpha level of 0.83, the rationality scale a level of 0.75, and the experience scale a 
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level of 0.86. All three values were within 0.70 and 0.90, the range that is typically con-
sidered to be ideal for internal consistency measures (Hair et al., 1998).  
Overall, the loading patterns of the REI items in this factor analysis compared fa-
vorably to the factor analysis findings for the complete scales that were reported by 
Handley and colleagues (Handley et al., 2000). The similarity between the patterns of 
both factor analyses confirms the appropriateness of the item selections that were used 
to create the abbreviated scales. The comparison to Handley’s results further reveals an 
interesting finding. When compared to the general public sampled in Handley’s study, 
the sample of hackers yielded a considerably higher average rationality value (5.4 com-
pared to 3.4 in Handley’s analysis). Hackers also reported to have a higher confidence 
in their experience-based decision making (4.7 compared to 3.4), even though this dif-
ference was not as large as the one found between the two rationality measures. These 
comparisons suggest two important differences between hackers and the general pub-
lic: (1) hackers prefer a more analytical and rational thinking style than the average per-
son, and they (2) display a generally higher confidence in their ability to make decisions, 
regardless of whether these decisions are based on rational considerations or on intui-
tion and experience. 
The Test of the Study Hypotheses 
All of the hypotheses tested in this study were assessed using additive multiva-
riate linear regression models. The personality scales were recoded into summative in-
dices and included as independent variables in the regression models. For the creation 
of the indices, all negative items were reversed so that higher values in all variables re-
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flected more pronounced personality characteristics. The calculation of the summative 
indices was unproblematic because none of the scale items had any missing values and 
none of the indices contained any extreme outliers. Table 12 provides detailed statistical 
descriptions of all three indices. 
In addition to the two variables testing the predictions derived from RCP, seven 
main sociodemographic variables were included in the saturated models to control for 
potential effects of external factors. The seven variables included in the analysis were 
age, gender, race, educational attainment, employment status and student status. The 
age variable was calculated by subtracting the respondents’ year of birth from 2008, 
and included as a continuous variable. Given that the conference took place in Febru-
ary, this calculation method yielded the correct age of most participants. Sex (1 indicat-
ing females), race (1 indicating Non-Whites), marital status (reference category never 
been married), employment status (1 indicating unemployed), and student status (1 in-
dicating students) were coded as indicator variables. The decision to collapse some of 
the subcategories in these variables was made in order to avoid problems that might 
result from the low cell counts of some of these variables. Black, Asian, Hispanic, and 
Other respondents, which together had a cell count of 11 cases, were collapsed into 
one single category Non-Whites. The reference category “never been married” was 
chosen for marital status because most respondents fell in this group. The one respon-
dent who reported to be divorced was included in the next closest category “married.” 
The variable measuring educational attainment was included in the models in its original 
coding. The inclusion of ordinal scaled variables in linear regression models, even 
though debated by some researchers since the early 1970s (Hawkes, 1971; Morris, 
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1970), has become a common practice and has repeatedly been proven to produce vi-
able results (Allan, 1976; Kim, 1978; O'Brian, 1979).  
Before the regression models were run, the conformity of the present data with 
several assumptions of these models was verified to avoid any potential violations. First, 
all variables were screened for outliers. Given the small number of cases in some of the 
subgroups (7 females, 11 Non-Whites, 10 unemployed), this step was particularly im-
portant. As a result of this screening process, three cases were excluded from the third 
regression analysis because their values on the dependent variable were four to ten 
times higher than the next highest values. If included in the regression model, these 
cases would have exerted a disproportional influence on the results. Next, all variables 
were screened for multicollinearity. With the tolerance levels of all independent va-
riables over 0.9, no linear inter-correlation was detected among them. The results of the 
various regression models are displayed in Tables 13, 14, 15, and 16. 
The Test of Hypotheses H1 and H2 
Table 13 shows the influence of the two personality characteristics, risk propensi-
ty and rationality, on the overall success of hacking activities. To reflect the overall suc-
cess of all hacking activities most accurately, the success rates of the three different at-
tack methods (technical intrusions, social methods, and malicious code distributions) 
were weighed with the proportion of total hacking attempts that was accounted for by 
the respective attack method, and all three products were then summarized into the to-
tal success rate for all methods. For example, if a hacker reported having undertaken a 
total of 100 hacking attempts, out of which 70 were technical intrusions, 20 were social 
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engineering attacks, and 10 were distributions of malicious code, the total success rate 
for this hacker was calculated as the sum of the success rate of technical intrusions 
multiplied by 0.7, the success rate of social methods multiplied by 0.2, and the success 
rate of malicious code distributions multiplied by 0.1. 
The regression results presented in Table 13 clearly support the predictions that 
were derived from the propositions of the rational choice perspective. Despite the low 
number of cases in the models (n=124), a circumstance that usually causes high in-
group variances, both models were highly significant (Model 1 and 2 p<.001).  
 
Table 13: OLS Regression Coefficients for Estimated Effects of Rationality and Risk 
Propensity on Hacking Success 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B β B β 
 
Hypothesized characteristics 
Rationality index .14 ** .29 (.04) .14 ** .30 (.04) 
Risk propensity index -.09 ** -.23 (.04) -.09 * -.23 (.04) 
 
Sociodemographic controls 
Age    .00 .00 (.04) 
Female    .13 .01 (.97) 
Non-White    -1.66 * -.19 (.77) 
Education    -.12 -.06 (.22) 
Marital status 
Living as married    -.41 -.06 (.64) 
Married     .20 .04 (.57) 
Unemployed    -1.30  -.15 (.97) 
Student    -1.03 * -.20 (.97) 
 
Constant 4.09 ** (1.27) 5.03 ** (2.00) 
R-squared .11   .21 
 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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In the first model, the two personality characteristics alone explained 11 percent 
of the variance in the success of hacking attacks. In this model, both variables exerted a 
highly significant influence on the dependent variable (p<.01). Moreover, rationality 
turned out to be the most influential variable in both models. As was predicted in the hy-
potheses, the effect of rationality on the success of hacking attacks was positive and the 
effect of risk propensity negative. The results confirm the predictions made in hypothes-
es H1 and H2 in Chapter 5: The higher the preference for an analytic-rational approach 
to thinking and the lower the risk propensity of a hacker, the more successful this hack-
er is in his or her hacking activities. 
The inclusion of the sociodemographic control variables in the second, saturated 
model had only a slight impact on the effect of both personality variables. While the 
standardized coefficients for both variables remained roughly the same, the inclusion of 
the control variables reduced the effect of risk propensity to a p<.05 significance level. 
Overall, the inclusion of the additional variables raised the amount of explained variance 
to 21 percent in the second model. Nevertheless, the impact of the individual sociode-
mographic variables was surprisingly small. Only two of the variables reached a signifi-
cant level. The variables age and sex had virtually no impact on the dependent variable. 
Particularly for the age variable, this finding was surprising because it implies that, de-
spite the fact that virtually all hackers in the sample reported to have increased their 
hacking skills over the course of their hacking careers, hackers of all ages report rough-
ly the same success rates. One possible explanation for this finding is that more sea-
soned hackers also report to seek out higher profile targets and that this change in tar-
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get preference countervails the improvements of hacking skills. This explanation, how-
ever, remains speculative and requires further testing to be confirmed. 
 Different from the surprising finding with regard to age, the complete absence of 
a gender effect in the data is unfortunately not very meaningful because only seven of 
the respondents were females. Since seven respondents are not enough cases to allow 
a confident generalization of the results, future studies with more female hackers are 
needed to confirm this finding. The only two sociodemographic variables in the second 
model to reach a significant level were race and student status. Students report signifi-
cantly lower success rates than persons who are not or no longer studying. Also, when 
compared to White hackers, hackers belonging to minority groups report a significantly 
lower success rate (I<.05). However, this finding also has to be interpreted with caution, 
given the small number of minority hackers in the present sample.  
The Test of Hypotheses H3 and H4 
The predictions of hypotheses H3 and H4—that hackers with a higher preference 
for analytic-rational thinking and a lower risk propensity will also perceive their hacking 
activity as riskier—were tested with a second regression analysis. For the assessment 
of the overall risk estimation in the dependent variable, the two items measuring the es-
timated risks of (1) being detected and (2) being apprehended during or after a hack 
were combined into one summative index. As did the other indices, this index had no 
missing values and showed no significant deviation from a normal distribution.  
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Table 14: OLS Regression Coefficients for Estimated Effects of Rationality and Risk 
Propensity on Perceived Risk Involved in Hacking 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results of the regression models corroborated the predictions stated in the 
theoretical hypotheses. Both models were highly significant (Model 1 and 2 p<.001), 
and the two personality characteristics exerted highly significant effects on the depen-
dent variable in Model 1 (p<.01) and Model 2 (p<.001). Thus, hackers with a preference 
for an analytic-rational thinking style estimate the risks involved in their hacking activi-
ties to be significantly higher, as do hackers with a lower risk propensity. While this re-
sult is little surprising for the risk propensity variable, the finding that the standard coeffi-
cient of the rationality variable is almost as high as that of the risk propensity variable 
implies that hackers with higher rationality scores weigh the potentially involved risks 
considerably more in their decision-making processes. In combination with the results of 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B β B β 
 
Hypothesized characteristics 
Rationality index .11 ** .25 (.04) .13 *** .30 (.04) 
Risk propensity index -.10 ** -.27 (.03) -.11 *** -.30 (.03) 
 
Sociodemographic controls 
Age    -.11 ** -.32 (.04) 
Female    1.67 * .17 (.86) 
Non-White    -1.99 ** -.25 (.67) 
Education    -.09 -.05 (.19) 
Marital status 
Living as married    .16 .02 (.57) 
Married     .22 .05 (.50) 
Unemployed    -1.27 -.16 (.86) 
Student    -1.43 *** -.30 (.44) 
 
Constant 5.32 *** (1.17) 9.37 *** (1.76) 
R-squared .11   .29 
 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
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the first regression analysis, this finding suggests that it is the most successful hackers 
who are also most susceptible to changes in the estimated risks. Together, these two 
findings hold important policy implications because they indicate that successful mani-
pulations of risk estimations might be a suited tactic to deter especially higher skilled 
hackers.  
 The circumstance that the significance level of both personality characteristics 
increased with the inclusion of the control variables in the saturated model hints at a 
slight suppression effect. The one sociodemographic variable that was identified to ex-
ert this suppression effect was student status, a variable that had a highly significant ef-
fect itself (p<.001). Aside from the student status variable, age (p<.01), gender (p<.05), 
and race (p<.01) also exerted a significant effect on the risk perception. The findings 
that student hackers have significantly lower risk estimates, whereas female hackers 
estimate risks to be significantly higher are consistent with many other studies in the li-
terature (Bouffard, 2007; Earnest, 2003; Paternoster, 1989; Wright, Caspi, Moffit, & Pa-
ternoster, 2004). Contrariwise, the findings that older hackers have lower risk percep-
tions, while minority hackers have higher ones, appear to be counterintuitive at first. The 
effect measured with regard to age, however, is consistent with the predictions of RCP. 
Rational choice perspective assumes that the awareness of involved risks decreases 
during the habituation of the activity. During this phase, the criminal activity becomes a 
routine exercise and the absence of any negative consequences diminishes the aware-
ness of involved risks over the years. 
The finding that minority hackers report higher risk estimates, while interesting, 
has to be interpreted with caution because the number of minority hackers included in 
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the sample was too small to allow meaningful generalizations. Future studies with larger 
samples of minority hackers are again required to confirm this finding. 
The Test of Hypotheses H5 and H6 
As was mentioned earlier, three cases were excluded from the third regression 
analysis due to their extreme values on the dependent variable. The third analysis re-
gressed the time that hackers reported to use for the preparation of their attacks on per-
sonality traits and sociodemographic characteristics. Three of the respondents reported 
preparation times that were four to ten times longer than the next longest time intervals. 
Two of the cases reported to prepare their attacks for three months, and one respon-
dent indicated it takes him a whole year to prepare a single hack. An examination of the 
three cases revealed that all three cases engaged in hardly any hacking activity and 
probably counted the time intervals between hacks as preparation time. Based on the 
results of this examination, all three cases were excluded. After the exclusion of the 
three outliers, the dependent variable was no longer significantly skewed. The results of 
the third regression analysis are shown in Table 15. 
The results shown in Table 15 corroborate hypothesis H5, but they lend only par-
tial support to hypothesis H6. As was the case in the other regression analyses, both 
models in the third regression analysis were significant (p<.01). The rationality variable 
was again the strongest predictor variable in both models (p<.01 in Model 1 and p<.05 
in Model 2). The effect of the risk propensity variable pointed in the predicted direction 
in both models, but the effect reached a significant level only in the second, saturated 
model (p<.05). Again, the student variable was identified as responsible for the slight 
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suppression effect (Cramer, 2003). Despite the fact that none of the sociodemographic 
variables reached a significant level, the proportion of explained variance in the depen-
dent variable increased from 11 percent in the first model to 21 percent in the second 
model.  
 
Table 15: OLS Regression Coefficients for estimated Effects of Rationality and Risk 
Propensity on Preparation Time 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The analysis demonstrates that hackers with a higher preference for a rational 
thinking style prepare for their hacking attacks longer. The longer time period used for 
preparation is an indication for an overall more thorough preparation process. The long-
er preparation phase reduces the involved risks and it probably also contributes to the 
 Model 11 Model 21 
Variable B β B β 
 
Hypothesized characteristics 
Rationality index 1.3 ** .25 (.50) 1.2 * .22 (.53) 
Risk propensity index -.76  -.17 (.41) -.87 * -.20 (.44) 
 
Sociodemographic controls 
Age    .20  .05 (.51) 
Female    -1.40  -.11(13.0) 
Non-White    -1.57  -.16 (9.1) 
Education    1.97 .09 (2.6) 
Marital status 
Living as married    -3.04 -.04 (7.6) 
Married     -6.40 -.11 (7.0) 
Unemployed    6.18 .06(11.7) 
Student    1.12  .02 (5.9) 
 
Constant 2.61  (14.6) -4.54  (23.8) 
R-squared .11   .21 
 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001 
1 n=121. 3 outliers were excluded. 
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overall higher success rate of more rational-acting hackers and hackers with a lower 
risk propensity.  
The Test of Hypotheses H7  
The last hypotheses H7 stated that risk propensity also exerts an influence on 
the total number of hacking attempts. The dependent variable total number of hacking 
attempts was calculated as a summative index of the total number of technical intru-
sions, social methods, and malware distributions a person had attempted. The wide 
range of the index (it ranged from 1 to 23,000) and the rounded estimates many res-
pondents gave to the questions about the total number of attacks caused the dependent 
variable to have a platykurtic shape with a multimodal, rounded peak and wide shoul-
ders. Despite the significant deviation from the mesokurtic shape of a normal distribu-
tion, the distribution of the dependent variable was not significantly skewed, and was 
therefore included in the regression.  
Different from the other three regression analyses, the effect of the risk propensi-
ty variable (p<.001 in both models) was stronger in this analysis than the effect of the 
rationality variable. Nevertheless, an unpredicted significant effect was also found for 
the rationality variable (p<.05 in Model 1 and p<.01 in Model 2). The effects of both va-
riables are shown in Table 16.  
The risk propensity of respondents influenced the number of total hacking at-
tempts as predicted in hypothesis H7. Persons with a higher risk propensity engaged in 
significantly more hacking attempts. Surprisingly, the level of rationality also exerted a 
significant influence on the number of total hacks. Hackers with a preference for analyt-
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ic-rational thinking styles also committed significantly more attacks. One possible expla-
nation for this finding is that, despite the higher risk awareness and the longer prepara-
tion times, hackers with a preference for analytic-rational thinking styles engage in more 
hacks simply because they are more successful in their hacks.   
 
Table 16: OLS Regression Coefficients for estimated Effects of Rationality and Risk 
Propensity on Total Amount of Hacking Attacks 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Two of the sociodemographic control variables entered in the saturated model 
also exerted a significant effect on the number of hacks. Unemployed hackers reported 
a significantly higher number of hacking attacks than hackers who were employed 
(p<.01). One possible explanation for this finding could be related to the circumstance 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Variable B β B β 
 
Hypothesized characteristics 
Rationality index 174.60 * .21 (74.72) 192.51 ** .23 (74.23) 
Risk propensity index 228.44 *** .33 (61.96) 243.44 *** .35 (61.26) 
 
Sociodemographic controls 
Age     -19.42  -.03 (68.87) 
Female     16.69  .00 (1613.7) 
Non-White     -17.10  -.00 (1279.4) 
Education     -539.06 -.16 (368.80) 
Marital status 
Living as married     1940.18 .16 (1073.5) 
Married      510.49 .06 (956.86) 
Unemployed     4110.45 ** .27 (1623.2) 
Student    -2226.61 ** -.25 (829.90) 
 
Constant 1981.59  (2215.30) 5438.62 (3345.22) 
R-squared .12    .29 
 
Note. Standard errors are listed in parenthesis. 
*p<.05. **p<.01. ***p<.001. 
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that hacking is a time-consuming activity. Unemployed hackers simply have more time 
at their hands that they can dedicate to hacking. Time considerations could also be the 
reason why student hackers report to commit significantly fewer attacks (p<.01), since 
most of the students in the sample were part-time students who also had full-time jobs. 
Overall, the regression analyses corroborated the hypotheses that were derived 
from the propositions of the rational choice perspective. With the exception of hypothe-
sis H6, all predicted effects were found to be strongly significant and in the predicted 
direction in all models. The implications of these findings are discussed in the next 
chapter.  
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CHAPTER NINE: 
DISCUSSION, IMPLICATIONS, AND LIMITATIONS 
 
In the first section of the final chapter of this study, some of the main findings 
about hackers and the hacking community are summarized and briefly discussed. The 
chapter continues with a succinct discussion of the implications that the findings of this 
study hold for the application of the rational choice perspective to hackers. Next, some 
of the implications of this study for policy efforts to combat cybercrimes are discussed. 
The chapter concludes with a list of suggestions for future cyber-criminological research 
studies. 
The (In)Accuracy of the Common Hacker Stereotype 
The present study showed that the common hacker stereotype as a clever, lone-
some deviant male adolescent whose computer proficiency compensates social short-
comings is barely beginning to tell the whole story of who hackers are. That is not to say 
that this stereotypical portrayal of hackers is completely mistaken. Several aspects of 
this characterization were indeed confirmed by the study results as well as the re-
searcher’s personal observations during the conference. First, the participants in this 
study were indeed highly educated, intelligent persons who had their inquiring minds set 
on technological developments. Many of these technophiles also seemed to be equally 
inventive, creative, and determined.  
Second, the convention attendees were also predominantly males, and minority 
hackers were rare exceptions. The near uniformity with regard to the sex and race dis-
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tributions, however, stood in sharp contrast to the strong emphasis of many attendees 
on an individualistic appearance. Many hackers conveyed their individualistic nature in 
conversations with the researcher as well as through their physical appearance. The 
physical expressions of individualism ranged from extravagant haircuts and hair colors, 
to unusual clothing styles, to large tattoos on various body parts, sometimes even on 
faces.  
The two most important inadequacies of the hacker stereotype seem to be the 
notions that hackers are invariably young and that they are socially inept. The study 
found that hacking is by no means only a young man’s game as Yar suggested (Yar, 
2005a). It remains to be seen what fraction of hackers is actually comprised by teenag-
ers, but the findings of this study clearly showed that persons of various age groups en-
gage in hacking activities. More importantly, the data also revealed that hackers under-
go a maturation process over the course of their hacking careers and that the more ex-
perienced and seasoned hackers tend to be the most dangerous ones. They are more 
likely to attack higher profile targets and some of them even engage in their illegal hack-
ing activities with the stronger criminal intent of making financial profits.  
Young and inexperienced hackers can certainly cause damage with their mi-
schief, but the study showed that these hackers attack primarily private targets and do 
so out of intellectual curiosity, love for knowledge, experimentation, boredom, or youth-
ful tomfoolery. Many hackers first became interested in hacking very early in their lives, 
and, typically, they were not driven by a pronounced initial criminal intent. As their hack-
ing activities continued to become habitualized, however, many of them developed into 
more professional and ambitious hackers. Over the course of their hacking careers, 
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many intensified their hacking activities and began to also attack higher profile targets 
such as governmental and corporate information systems. Some hackers even reported 
having turned their once merely deviant juvenile behavior into a criminal business activi-
ty. A total of 15 percent of all respondents said that hacking had become their main 
source of income and that they would reject a target unless it was profitable. Undoub-
tedly, these experienced veteran hackers are the ones with whom law enforcement 
agencies should be most concerned about and to whom they should direct their atten-
tion. 
Although the comparatively high fraction of unmarried hackers showed that many 
of them are indeed hesitant to engage in serious relationships and commitments, the 
vast popularity of social hacking methods and their high success rates also indicated 
that the commonly presumed social incompetence of hackers is wrong and misleading. 
The falseness of this assumption was further reaffirmed by some of the observations 
the researcher made during the convention. Most attendees appeared to be outgoing 
and sociable. Many attended the convention together with their friends, and most of the 
attendees seemed to share a distinct sense of humor and mingled quickly. Certainly, 
the informal observations during the convention and the findings that hackers are skilled 
in manipulating and ‘programming’ other persons and oftentimes manage to exploit the 
trust or carelessness of other computer users for their hacking purposes are not enough 
evidence for a strong rebuttal of the notion that hackers are social hermits. It might be 
the case that the sociability of hackers is limited to interactions with other, like-minded 
technophiles and that, although many appear to be skilled manipulators, genuine and 
affectionate social relations are of lesser importance to them. Additional examinations of 
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the social networks of hackers, their amount, frequency, and quality of interactions with 
close contacts, the types of contacts they engage in (face-to-face or online), and the 
importance they attribute to these social contacts are needed before a conclusion about 
the appropriateness of the assumption that hackers are recluses can be reached.  
The debate about the sociability of hackers aside, one of the most important find-
ings of the present study was the significant role of social hacking methods. The com-
mon perception of hacking attacks as being executed solely through technical means 
and the perception of hackers as socially incompetent are probably part of the reason 
why the danger posed by social engineering attacks is oftentimes underestimated. Un-
less these perceptions are revised and the awareness of social hacks is raised, social 
engineering methods will continue to be very successful and will pose a serious threat 
for many organizations.  
The separate analysis of the three main hacking techniques in this study showed 
that many hackers combine social and technical methods and launch attacks that are 
comprised of both tactics. The examination of respondents who reported using both 
techniques in roughly equal amounts further revealed that they were the most success-
ful hackers. Different from social and technical means and strategies, which appear to 
be commonly combined, the surveyed hackers largely refrained from distributing and 
spreading malicious code. Thereby, they demonstrated having a strong preference for 
directed attacks on selected targets over widely dispersed and randomly distributed at-
tacks without specific targets. It appears that phishers, spammers, and virus coders are 
a group of cybercriminals that is distinctively different from ‘traditional’ hackers. Unfortu-
nately, the limited amount of persons who distributed large amounts of malicious code 
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in the present study did not permit the analysis of whether these persons also exhibit 
other distinctive differences. More studies with larger subgroups of malware distributors 
are needed to draw such comparisons.  
The Suitability of the Rational Choice Perspective 
The discussion of the various theoretical difficulties facing the newly developing 
field of cyber-criminology in the fourth chapter expounded the main problems of trans-
posing traditional, ‘terrestrial’ criminological theories to the online environment. The dis-
cussion established that the irrelevance of central assumptions of many traditional theo-
ries precludes their meaningful application to cybercrimes and cyber-criminals, and the 
violation of some traditional assumptions about offenders or other criminogenically rele-
vant environmental aspects even renders some of them inapplicable to cybercrimes. As 
a result, the selection of potential theories is severely limited. The rational choice pers-
pective was selected for the present study because it does not rest on any environment-
specific assumptions and its main offender-related propositions are applicable to cyber-
criminals. The results of this study suggest that the rational choice perspective is indeed 
a viable theory for the explanation and description of their behavior.  
With only one exception, the hypotheses that were derived from the rational 
choice perspective were corroborated in the present study. The only hypothesis that re-
ceived only partial support was the assumed effect of risk propensity on the length of 
preparations for hacking attacks. Nonetheless, the effect was found in the predicted di-
rection and also reached a significant level in the second, saturated model. The analysis 
demonstrated the importance of the personality traits, rationality and risk propensity, for 
155 
 
various hacking-related decision-making processes and outcomes. Both traits were 
found to be influential factors on the overall success as a hacker, the length hackers 
take to prepare for their hacking attacks, the risk assessments of hackers, and the 
overall number of hacking attacks. The importance of rationality as a factor was further 
underlined by the finding that it was the most important factor in almost all regression 
models. The study established both factors as essential dimensions of cybercrime of-
fender typologies.  
The three involvement decision models of the rational choice perspective that 
were modified and transposed to fit the involvement in hacking proved to be suitable 
guidelines for the assessment of hacking-related decisions. While the study was not 
able to test all of the many factors thought to be influential for involvement in hacking, 
most of the examined factors were indeed found to be accurate. Some factors, howev-
er, deviated from the way they were proposed in the models. Most importantly, financial 
considerations were found to be irrelevant for the initiation phase. The model that was 
suggested in Chapter 3 emphasized financial needs, motives, opportunities, and in-
ducements and it also considered employment to be relevant to the decision to engage 
in hacking activities. The results of this study, on the other hand, proved this assumption 
to be false. Different from other criminal activities, hackers seem to not be driven by fi-
nancial considerations when they decide to begin to hack. Instead, the data docu-
mented that the importance of financial motivations as a driving motive for the continued 
involvement in hacking develops over time. Therefore, it should be included in the 
second model as one aspect of increased professionalism. With regard to considera-
tions to desist from hacking, the study found risk-related deliberations to be most in-
156 
 
fluential. Practical reasons were found to be of generally lower importance. The lower 
importance of practical reasons suggests that even if hackers find their hacking activi-
ties unsuited to yield a sustained income, they seem to continue to hack on a hobby ba-
sis. The decision to completely give up hacking, on the other hand, is most often made 
because hackers are afraid that their hacking activities could get them into trouble and 
jeopardize their careers in legitimate jobs and their lives.  
Despite the general support for the theory that was found in this study, some of 
its drawbacks also became apparent. First, the generality of the principal propositions of 
the rational choice perspective rendered the deduction of precise hypotheses difficult. 
Only one of the six main propositions lent itself to meaningful and testable hypotheses. 
Furthermore, the testing of these hypotheses itself was found to be principally compli-
cated because it had to resort either to psychological personality traits or to fictional 
scenarios. Second, the models that can be derived from propositions four to six, while 
evidently helpful in clarifying and structuring influential factors of the continued involve-
ment in criminal activities, rest on many different causal assumptions that are excee-
dingly difficult to operationalize. Consequently, in order to account for the empirical spe-
cification of these models for the different types of crimes and offenders, the operationa-
lization had to resort to univariate descriptions to determine the relative importance of 
the theoretically proposed factors and developments. 
Rational choice perspective emphasizes the importance of two particular perso-
nality traits—the ability of offenders to deliberately weigh the outcomes of alternative 
actions and their willingness to take risks. Both factors, while corroborated as influential 
in the present study, do not lend exclusive support to the rational choice perspective. 
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The general theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990) considers both personality 
traits as two of the six components that comprise low self-control. Future studies should 
examine all six dimensions of low self-control and investigate the influence of this per-
sonality construct on hacking activities. Furthermore, Jaishankar recently proposed the 
so-called space transition theory, the first criminological theory that was explicitly de-
signed for the application to crimes committed in cyberspace (Jaishankar, 2008). Space 
transition theory provides an explanation for why otherwise law-abiding persons, who do 
not commit crimes in the terrestrial world, engage in cyber-criminal activities. It argues 
that people behave differently when they move from one space to another. Future cy-
ber-criminological studies should devote special attention to this first exclusively cyber-
crime-related theory and test whether it is indeed better suited for the explanation of cy-
bercrimes than traditional criminological theories. 
The Policy Implications of the Study Findings 
The conclusions that can be derived from this study are not limited to contribu-
tions to the scientific discourse about cybercrime offenders. They also hold some impor-
tant implications for the efforts to combat cybercrimes. Experts agree that present ef-
forts to combat cybercrimes are facing a multitude of challenges that have to be ad-
dressed. Aside from the resource shortages and other practical difficulties that were out-
lined in Chapter 3, law enforcement efforts to combat cyber-criminals are also ham-
pered by a shortage of substantive and reliable information that can be used for the 
creation of cybercrime-offender profiles. Detailed profiles of the different types of cyber-
criminals, their skill levels, and their motivations are critical because they provide helpful 
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guidance for the investigation of cybercrimes and, thereby, increase the effectiveness of 
current prosecution efforts. A more effective response by the criminal justice system is 
urgently needed—not only because it would increase the number of convicted cyber-
criminals but, most importantly, because it would also have a preventive deterrence ef-
fect on the larger hacking community.  
The findings of this study suggest that the creation of a deterrence effect has to 
become an essential component of efforts to combat cybercrimes. Unfortunately, 
present efforts to curb cybercrimes are hardly suited to exert a pronounced deterrence 
effect. Despite the annually increasing number of cybercrimes, only a relatively few high 
profile cybercrime cases are presently successfully tried, and many of them do not lead 
to swift or severe punishments (Brenner, 2006). The continuing unlikeliness of punish-
ments is particularly problematic because it severely undermines any efforts to deter 
criminal behavior in cyberspace. Indeed, the findings of the present study demonstrate 
that many hackers are aware of the slim chances of being detected and punished. The 
current improbability of becoming prosecuted even led some hackers to report that they 
have never been afraid of being apprehended or prosecuted. Furthermore, the risk 
awareness of most hackers seems to decrease over time as they repeatedly learn that 
their actions have no negative consequences for them.  
Nevertheless, several measures in this study also signify that deterrence can be 
a successful strategy to prevent cybercrimes. The study showed that many hackers 
have a nuanced risk awareness. For example, the majority of hackers report having be-
come more concerned about risks in recent years, a finding that suggests that in-
creased efforts to combat cybercrimes do not go unnoticed in the hacking community. 
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Furthermore, many hackers evidently distinguish between the chances of becoming de-
tected and apprehended and the consequences of these two events. Most importantly, 
the data also indicate that the most successful hackers are the ones that also have the 
highest risk awareness. Thus, these hackers seem to be the ones that are most sus-
ceptible to changes in risk estimates. 
Deterrence undoubtedly is an indispensable component in the control of all dif-
ferent types of criminal behaviors, but is seems to be particularly suited to prevent cy-
bercrimes. Unlike other, less deliberately acting types of criminals, hackers plan their 
hacking attacks, and they oftentimes do so in an explicitly rational manner. Consequent-
ly, they should be more easily dissuaded than criminals who commit their crimes spon-
taneously whenever opportunities arise.  
Taken together, the findings of this study suggest that a more pronounced deter-
rence perspective needs to become a central addition to the existing technical ap-
proaches to cybercrime prevention. However, merely adding deterrence as one sepa-
rate component will not suffice. To be effective, a deterrence perspective has to be inte-
grated into all currently existing national policy efforts to prevent computer crimes, rang-
ing from legislation and regulation to law enforcement strategies. Moreover, it would al-
so have to be implemented outside of national or state policies. One promising ap-
proach to establish deterrence policies in the private sector could be directed at busi-
nesses and organizations. The present study showed that most hackers pursue legal 
careers in legitimate jobs and companies. Organizations and companies that offer IT 
security services or are otherwise attractive to hackers should be encouraged to pro-
mote awareness of the potential consequences of committing cybercrimes. For exam-
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ple, they could distribute information about punishments that have been given to con-
victed computer criminals as well as other informational materials that directly highlight 
what constitutes a crime under legal as well as ethical perspectives. Other informal con-
trol mechanisms, such as extra-legal social stigmata or the systematic introduction of 
negative effects on job opportunities might also be strong incentives to prevent particu-
larly young middle-class computer experts from becoming involved in computer crime 
activities. 
Unquestionably, the establishment of effective deterrence efforts as an integral 
part of cybercrime prevention strategies will not be an easy undertaking. The vast range 
of cybercrime activities and the multitude of different offenders considerably complicate 
the selections of the most appropriate deterrence policies. Strategies that are most ef-
fective for leisure-time juvenile hackers will most likely be unfit to deter destructive com-
puter-security experts or other seasoned hackers from attacking computer systems for 
monetary gains. Nonetheless, deterrence should be pursued as a mitigation strategy, 
because even limited accomplishments can prevent some crime incidents and provide 
some protection from an increasingly serious problem.  
Companies in branches that typically employ hackers can certainly be particularly 
helpful in deterring computer crimes, but the results of this study also indicate that all 
companies and organizations need to do more to actively prevent victimization, regard-
less of their branch. The analysis of the different hacking methods showed that, of all 
three main types of attack methods, social engineering attacks are the most successful 
ones. It also revealed that the various methods to obtain user passwords, be it the sys-
tematic guessing of weak or standard passwords or the theft of user logins remain the 
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most common ways hackers gain access to their targets. Moreover, the most successful 
hackers seem to launch combined hacking attacks that utilize both technical intrusion 
methods and information they obtained through social inquiries and deceptions of their 
victims. Thus, it seems that the weakest points of companies and organizations are their 
employees and members. Corporations have to educate their employees about social 
hacking methods. They need to raise awareness of the seriousness and frequency of 
the problem, educate their staff about the wetware tactics commonly used by hackers, 
and give them instructions of how to avoid becoming victimized. 
The education of employers, while definitely an important protective measure, is 
not the only contribution that will be required from organizations. They also need to start 
reporting all their victimization incidents to the authorities. The current situation, in which 
individual organizations refrain from reporting incidents to protect their own interests 
and thereby harm the interest of all businesses, needs to be changed because, unless 
more incidents are reported, computer crimes are unlikely to become controllable. The 
benefits and detriments of a mandatory reporting system are debatable, but a reporting 
requirement would certainly benefit efforts to manage cybercrimes. It would put law en-
forcement agents in the position to decide which cases to devote their attention to rather 
than be dependent on the willingness of organizations to submit their cases in order to 
press charges.  
The Limitations of the Present Study and Suggestions for Future Research 
Even though it produced valuable insights into the sociodemographic composi-
tion of the hacking underground and the various developments hackers undergo over 
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the course of their hacking careers, the present study was limited in certain ways. One 
set of potential shortcomings relates to the sampling frame and the sample size of the 
study. The study analyzed only data from one particular convention, a circumstance that 
constricts the confidence with which the present findings can be generalized to larger 
populations. Although the ShmooCon convention attracted a diverse clientele, it re-
mains unclear how general the profile of this particular convention really was. It also 
remains uncertain whether there are significant differences between the attendees of 
different conventions. More datasets from different conventions are needed to enable 
researchers to draw comparisons between them and to assess the reliability and validity 
of the present data. Once multiple studies from different conventions exist, meta-studies 
will eventually be able to compare the results of these studies and extract highly reliable 
and valid findings. 
Although repeated studies from different conventions will eventually be able to 
generate valid and generalizable results, these results will, to a certain degree, be gene-
ralizable only to the subset of hackers who consider attending hacker conventions or, 
more narrowly, have already attended them. It remains to be seen whether there are 
systematic and consistent differences between hackers who potentially attend conven-
tions and those who do not. The average age of respondents in this study, for example, 
was considerably higher than the typical age of hackers that other authors have sug-
gested (Yar, 2005a). This finding indicates that studies operating with conventions as 
their sampling frames are indeed suffering from some systematic selection biases. An 
assessment of the exact areas in which such systematic differences exist and the de-
gree to which they render the results of convention studies distinctively different from 
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other studies with different sampling frames can only be achieved by comparative stu-
dies. Until other sampling frames, such as message boards, have been utilized and until 
their results have been compared with the ones produced by convention studies, re-
searchers have to remain cautious when generalizing convention-based study findings 
to all hackers. 
Second, studies with larger sample sizes are needed to confirm some of the find-
ings in the present study. The overall small sample size of this survey reduced the case 
numbers in some subgroups beneath commonly accepted margins of statistical genera-
lizability. The regression results with regard to female hackers, minority hackers, and 
unemployed hackers, for example, have to be interpreted with the utmost caution and 
their validity should be reassessed with larger samples to verify their accuracy.  
One important sample-size related aspect that has to be considered in this con-
text is that, while larger sample sizes are certainly desirable, their creation bears prac-
tical problems. Despite the fact that the ShmooCon conference is one of the largest in-
ternational hacker conventions, it was attended by ‘only’ about 800 persons, many of 
whom were not eligible for participation in the study. Accordingly, even though it 
achieved a relatively high response rate among eligible attendees, the present study 
yielded less than 130 cases. Two possible solutions for this problem come to mind.  
First, researchers could solve this problem by collecting data from the world’s 
largest hacking convention DefCon. DefCon is attended by over 7,000 persons and it 
also has a reputation for attracting many black hat hackers. The large size of this con-
vention makes it the ideal candidate for studies that seek to obtain larger sample sizes. 
Researchers attempting to utilize the DefCon convention for their research purposes, 
164 
 
however, are most likely facing a different kind of challenge. DefCon has a reputation of 
being a less professional convention and a convention that is attended by many hackers 
mainly to enjoy a fun weekend in Las Vegas with like-minded people. The resulting 
challenge for potential research projects is to conduct the study before attendees be-
come intoxicated and no longer take the research project seriously.  
An alternative solution for the sample-size problem would be to combine the da-
tasets from different conventions. The results from different studies of various conven-
tions could be merged into one larger dataset. Although this approach promises to pro-
vide larger case numbers and will likely yield generalizable results, it is not without dis-
advantages. The individual surveys would have to repeatedly ask the same item sub-
sets to be comparable, thus hindering and delaying the assessment of different hacking-
related aspects and the development of more advanced survey instruments. 
Aside from potential biases resulting from the sampling frame and the problems 
associated with the small sample size, it is reasonable to assume that the present re-
search project was also confronted with the problem of social-desirability biases. Social-
desirability biases are introduced through the propensity of respondents to give socially 
desirable responses. They are a common problem of studies that rely on indirect, sub-
jective information provided by respondents rather than objective or direct measures, or 
a combination of the two (Fisher, 1993). In the case of cyber-criminals, social-
desirability biases are extremely difficult to overcome because objective measures of 
cybercriminal activities are difficult to obtain. One possible assessment of social-
desirability biases could be achieved by conducting a research study that combines a 
survey section with a direct measurement of hacking skills and expertise. For example, 
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a honeypot could be used as one possibility to obtain a direct measurement. In comput-
er terminology, the term ‘honeypot’ refers to a forensic software trap which can, among 
other things, be used to log and analyze hacking activities. This honeypot environment 
could be utilized to verify the skill levels respondents claim to have. The inclusion of 
such a direct measurement, however, complicates the study and the obtainment of IRB 
approval and significantly increases the effort for respondents. For that reason, the con-
duction of such a combined study during a convention is highly unfeasible.   
The present study was a first attempt to generate quantifiable information about 
the hacking underground, and, as such, it was also naturally limited with regard to how 
many aspects of this community were assessable. As does every extension of our 
knowledge, the current study provided some answers but also raised many more ques-
tions. Future studies need to include other measurements of attitudes, social networks, 
personal background information, and many other aspects to refine and extend our un-
derstanding of hackers. Such studies could specify and detail many additional characte-
ristics in a more precise way. The large fraction of college-educated hackers in this 
study, for example, rendered the educational achievement variable close to a constant. 
To better assess the impact of varying educational backgrounds, future studies could 
ask respondents what their study subject is or was and what type of college they at-
tend(ed). The same is true for the measures of employment, to name but a second as-
pect. It would be interesting to know the exact profession of respondents and whether 
and how their occupations are related to their hacking activities. 
Although the paper-pencil format was, for several practical reasons, the only via-
ble design of the present study, this format was not ideally suited for the assessment of 
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the great diversity of different types of hackers. Electronic computer-based surveys 
should be designed for future studies because they allow more complex path depen-
dencies and, thus, are better able to capture the wide range of different types of hack-
ers. For example, such surveys could begin by asking respondents whether they identi-
fy themselves as white or as black hat hackers and then ask different sets of questions 
for each type of hacker. Studies operating with such measurement techniques would be 
geared more specifically to the different types of hackers and would yield more detailed 
and more encompassing results without systematically excluding any type of hackers. 
Thereby, they could provide answers to pressing questions such as what exactly the 
ratio between white hat and black hat hackers is, and what fraction of the hacking com-
munity is comprised by law-abiding white hat hackers and penetration testers. They 
could also assess tensions within the hacking community by revealing the attitudes and 
opinion white hat and black hat hackers have about each other. Our understanding of 
the hacking underground is just beginning to evolve and such studies could add much 
needed details.  
 While the survey format of the present study was appropriate to address the 
main components and factors of the involvement decisions as proposed by rational 
choice perspective, its ability to capture the intricacies of event decisions was limited. 
Thus, aside from the various types of surveys suggested above, cybercrime research-
ers should also conduct more event specific studies or analyze forensic crime science 
protocols to better capture and reconstruct the intricate decision-making processes that 
are involved in such complex events. 
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Parallel to analyzing the various personality traits that influence the behavior of 
hackers, cybercrime researchers should further begin to construct typologies of different 
hacker profiles. The multitude of motives and skills that were confirmed by this study 
suggests that a variety of different types of hackers exist. Researchers should attempt 
to isolate prototypical types of hackers, construct typologies of the various types, collect 
empirical evidence to ensure the included types of hackers are exhaustive and mutually 
exclusive, and examine how exactly the various types of hackers differ from and relate 
to each other.  
The long list of future studies that were suggested in this last section calls to 
mind that cyber-criminology is only just beginning to develop and that our knowledge 
about cybercrime offenders remains fragmentary at best. The present study yielded 
some important insights into the composition of the hacking underground and it shed 
some light on the motivations and maturation processes of hackers. Nevertheless, it 
was but one step toward the establishment of cyber-criminology as a distinct subfield of 
criminological research. A long and difficult road is still ahead for this young field of cri-
minological research.    
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THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE 
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Hacking Questionnaire 2008        
 
Hello and thank you for your willingness to participate in this survey!  
My name is Michael Bachmann and I am a student at University of Central Florida doing a study 
about hackers and their hacking activities.  
 
First, let me assure you that:  
- The survey is strictly noncommercial and for my private dissertation research only.  
- There are no institutions or organizations involved in or affiliated with this project.  
- All information is completely anonymous, confidential and your participation is voluntary.  
- Completion of this survey takes about 15 minutes.  
- It is for research purposes only.  
 
OK, let’s begin: 
 
First, let me ask you some questions about your hacking activity in general. 
 
01  Are you currently actively hacking? 
□ Yes □ No 
If you answered this question with no, please think back to when you were still hacking 
when answering the questions below. 
 
 
02 At approximately what age did you begin to become interested in hacking?  ______ 
 
03 What were your initial motivations to become interested in hacking? (Mark all that apply) 
□ Intellectual curiosity □ Excitement, thrill, fun □ Experimentation  
□ Status and prestige □ Financial gain □ Peer recognition 
□ Political Ideology    □ Media attention □ Protest against corporations  
□ Self-concept boost □ Feeling of power  □ Personal revenge 
□ Other (specify) ___________________________________________________________ 
 
04 What would you say was your primary motivation? (select one answer from question 3) 
 
______________________________________________ 
 
05 How long was the timeframe between your initial interest and your first actual hack?  
 
______ Days ______ Weeks ______ Months ______ Years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
170 
 
06 What were the initial motivations for your first hack? (Please mark all that apply) 
□ Intellectual curiosity □ Excitement, thrill, fun □ Experimentation  
□ Status and prestige □ Financial gain □ Peer recognition 
□ Political Ideology    □ Media attention □ Protest against corporations  
□ Self-concept boost □ Feeling of power  □ Personal revenge 
□ Other (specify) ___________________________________________________________ 
 
07 What was the type of target of your first hack?  
□ Private single host □ Private network □ Private website  
□ Corporate single host □ Corporate network □ Corporate website 
□ Non-profit single host □ Non-profit network □ Non-profit website  
□ Government single host □ Government network □ Government website 
□ Other (specify) __________________________________________________________ 
 
08 Based on which criteria did you select your first target?  
□ Easy access □ Interesting information □ Profitable information 
□ Reputation gain □ Antipathy □ Other (specify) _____________ 
 
09 Were you employed when you first started to hack? 
□ Yes, full-time □ Yes, part-time □ No 
 
10 Was economic profit a motivation at all? 
□ Yes, an important one □ Yes, but not very important □ No 
 
11 What methods did you use in your first technical intrusion? (Please mark all that apply)  
□ Footprinting □ Ping sweeping □ DNS zone transfer  
□ Whois □ Network mapping □ Port scanning 
□ Versatile scanning tools    □ Vulnerability scanning □ RPC port/end-point dump  
□ Packet sniffing □ Session hijacking  □ Grinding Passwords 
□ Password cracking □ Password theft □ Directory traversal/climbing  
□ Buffer overflow □ Format string □ Resource mismatch 
□ CGI □ Root shell/kits □ Keylogger 
□ Spoofing  □ Bouncing □ Source routing   
□ Other (specify) ___________________________________________________________ 
 
 
12 Approximately how often have you attempted technical intrusions in your life? ______ times 
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13 How frequently do you attempt technical intrusions? 
 
______ Per Week   or ______ Per Month   or ______ Per Year 
 
14 Approximately how many of them are successful?  
□ 0% □ 10% □ 20% □ 30% □ 40% □ 50% □ 60% □ 70% □ 80% □ 90% □ 100% 
 
15 Have you ever used “WetWare” social methods? (Please mark all that apply) 
□ Social Engineering □ Deception □ Bribery  
□ Shoulder Surfing □ Impersonation □ Dumpster diving 
 
 
16 Approximately how often have you attempted social methods in your life? ______ times 
 
17 How frequently do you attempt social methods? 
 
______ Per Week   or ______ Per Month   or ______ Per Year 
 
18 Approximately how many of them are successful?  
□ 0% □ 10% □ 20% □ 30% □ 40% □ 50% □ 60% □ 70% □ 80% □ 90% □ 100% 
 
19 Have you ever distributed? (Please mark all that apply) 
□ Trojan Horses □ Adware/Spyware   
□ Viruses/Worms □ Spam/Phishing mails  
□ None of the above □ Other (specify) __________________________ 
 
 
20 Approximately how often have you distributed malware in your life? ______ times 
 
21 How frequently do you distribute malware? 
 
______ Per Week   or ______ Per Month   or ______ Per Year 
 
22 How successful would you say you were with your distributions?  
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Not at all Somewhat Very 
 
 
23 Approximately how long have you been hacking now?  ______ Months ______ Years 
 
24 Did you change friends and peers since your first hack to include more other hackers? 
□ Yes, very much □ Yes, somewhat □ No 
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25 Would you say you have improved your skills since your first hacking attempts? 
□ Yes, very much □ Yes, somewhat □ No 
 
26 Has your hacking activity become more frequent since your first hacking attempts? 
□ Yes, very much □ Yes, somewhat  
□ No, it’s the same □ No, it’s less frequent 
 
27 Have your motivations changed since your first hacking attempts? 
□ Yes, very much □ Yes, somewhat □ No 
 
 
28 Currently, what is your main motivation for hacking? (specify): _______________________ 
 
29 Have your targets changed since your first hacks? 
□ Yes, very much □ Yes, somewhat □ No 
 
30 Would you say your targets have become higher profile targets? 
□ Yes, very much □ Yes, somewhat □ No 
 
31 What is the type of target you currently prefer?  
□ Private single host □ Private network □ Private website  
□ Corporate single host □ Corporate network □ Corporate website 
□ Non-profit single host □ Non-profit network □ Non-profit website  
□ Government single host □ Government network □ Government website 
□ Other (specify) __________________________________________________________
 
32 What are your current selection criteria for targets? 
□ Easy access □ Interesting information □ Profitable information 
□ Reputation □ Antipathy □ Other (specify) _____________ 
 
33 What might be a reason for you to reject a potential target? (Please mark all that apply) 
□ Unfamiliarity with architecture □ No interesting information   
□ No profitable information □ Sympathy with host 
□ None of the above □ Other (specify) __________________________  
 
34 Have your methods and tactics changed since your first hack? 
□ Yes, very much □ Yes, somewhat □ No 
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35 What is your currently preferred method and tool for the different stages of a hack? 
(Please write in what you prefer to use for each of the following stages)  
 
Reconnaissance: __________________________________________________________ 
Gaining access: __________________________________________________________ 
Persisting:  __________________________________________________________ 
Propagating:  __________________________________________________________ 
Paralyzing: __________________________________________________________ 
Covering up: __________________________________________________________ 
 
36 Do you follow a persistent pattern in all your hacks or do you vary or change your methods? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Very persistent pattern  Vary a lot 
 
37 Do you have preferred tools you use in all your hacks or do you vary your software tools? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Always same tools  Vary tools a lot 
 
38 Which methods do you employ to remain anonymous? (Please mark all that apply) 
□ Spoofing  □ Bouncing □ Source routing   
□ Proxies  □ TOR, I2P, etc. □ Tunnels, Covert channels 
□ War driving □ Public access points (e.g. Internet cafes) 
□ Other (specify) __________________________________________________________ 
 
39 Is hacking a source of any income for you? 
□ Yes, the main □ Yes, but not the main □ No 
 
40 Have you ever thought about quitting hacking? 
□ Yes, often □ Yes, a few times □ Never 
 
41 If yes, what caused you to question continuing to hack? (Please mark all that apply) 
□ Involved risk □ Involved effort □ Income too irregular 
□ Fear of detection □ Fear of apprehension □ Fear of prosecution 
□ Legal alternatives □ Other (specify) __________________________________ 
 
42 Are you more/less afraid of being traced, tracked, or apprehended then when you started? 
□ More afraid □ Less afraid □ Unchanged  □ I was never afraid 
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43 How much time do you usually invest in preparation, planning, considering routes of action, 
selection of techniques and tools? 
 
______ Hours ______ Days ______ Weeks ______ Months 
 
44 Do you spend more or less time for planning today than when you started to hack? 
□ More time today □ About the same time □ Less time today 
 
45 Please estimate the risk you run of being detected during/after a hack. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
No risk at all Some risk Very high risk 
 
46 Please estimate the risk you run of being apprehended during/after a hack. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
No risk at all Some risk Very high risk 
 
47 Approximately what percentage of attacks have you aborted because you were afraid of de-
tection? 
□ 0% □ 10% □ 20% □ 30% □ 40% □ 50% □ 60% □ 70% □ 80% □ 90% □ 100%
 
48 During the hacks, do you tend to focus more on the potential rewards or the potential risks? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Only on rewards Balance both Only on risks 
 
49 Would you say you act rational and deliberate during your hacks or do you sometimes get 
caught-up in the moment and act emotionally? 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Very rational  Very emotional 
 
 
Now, please indicate how much you agree or disagree to the following statements 
(you are almost finished): 
 
50 I always try to avoid situations involving a risk of getting into trouble. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
51 I always play it safe even when it means occasionally losing out on a good opportunity. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
52 I am a cautious person who generally avoids risks. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
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53 I am rather bold and fearless in my actions. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
54 I am generally cautious when trying something new. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
55 I usually have clear, explainable reasons for my decisions. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
56 I don’t reason well under pressure. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
57 Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
58 I prefer complex to simple problems. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
59 I enjoy solving problems that require hard thinking. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
60 Using my gut-feelings usually works well for me in working out problems in my life. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
61 I trust my initial feelings about situations. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
62 I like to rely on my intuitive impressions. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
63 I often go by my instincts when deciding on a course of action. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
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64 I don’t think it is a good idea to rely on one’s intuition for important decisions. 
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ 
Strongly disagree Strongly agree 
 
Finally, let me ask you some general questions about yourself. 
 
65 What is your gender? 
□ Male □ Female 
 
 
66 What year were you born? 19__ 
 
67 What is the last grade or class you completed in school? 
□ None, or grades 1-8 
□ High school incomplete (grades 9-11) 
□ High school graduate (grade 12 or GED certificate) 
□ Business, Technical, or vocational school AFTER high school 
□ Some college, no 4-year degree 
□ College graduate (B.S., B.A., or other 4-year degree) 
□ Post-graduate training/professional school after college (Master's degree or Ph.D.) 
 
68 Are you, yourself, of Hispanic or Latino origin or descent, such as Mexican, Puerto Rican, 
Cuban, or some other Spanish background? 
□ Yes □ No 
 
69 What is your race? 
□ White □ Black □ Asian □ Other mixed race: (specify) ___________________  
 
70 Are you married, living as married, divorced, separated, widowed, or never been married? 
□ Never been married □ Living as married □ Married 
□ Divorced □ Separated □ Widowed 
 
71 Are you now employed full-time, part-time, retired, or not employed for pay? 
□ Employed full-time □ Employed part-time 
□ Not employed for pay  □ Retired 
 
72 Are you also a full- or part-time student? 
□ Yes, full-time □ Yes, part-time □ No 
 
 
Thank you very much for your time! Have a nice day and enjoy the rest of the conference. 
177 
 
APPENDIX B: 
THE SURVEY CONSENT FORM 
 
178 
 
What Makes Them Click? Hacking Experiences and the  
Decisions Involved in Hacking 
 
Michael Bachmann, Principal Investigator 
 
Informed Consent Form 
 
I am a sociology Ph.D. student at the University of Central Florida (UCF). This 
survey is part of my dissertation research which explores general hacking experiences 
and the involved decision-making processes. Your participation will address these is-
sues and involves you and other consenting attendees of this conference. 
 
You will be asked questions about your hacking experiences, your motivations, 
methods, and decision-making processes. Altogether, the survey takes only around fif-
teen minutes.  
 
The primary purpose of this study is to further our understanding and knowledge 
of hackers and the hacking community, a group that has so far been largely ignored by 
sociological researchers.  The study does not include any potential risk for participants 
because it contains no identifiers, is completely anonymous, and asks only general 
questions about hacking activity. It does not collect any specific illegal or self-
incriminating information.  
 
You are free not to answer any question you choose not to answer. You are free 
to end the survey at any time. Deciding not to answer questions or to end the survey 
altogether will not affect your status as an attendant of this conference in any way. Your 
participation in this research is completely voluntary.  
 
This research is governed by a privacy certification that prohibits the researcher 
from disclosing any individual information to any outside party, including other attendees 
of this conference. All information you provide in the survey is completely anonymous 
and will be kept in the strictest confidence by the researcher. The researcher cannot di-
vulge any information and no information can be linked specifically to you.   
 
 
Questions 
 
Please feel free to ask any questions you want before you fill out the survey or at any 
time during the survey. If you feel that I have not adequately answered all your ques-
tions, contact my faculty supervisor Dr. Harold J. Corzine (407) 823-2202. You may call 
that number but be sure to identify yourself as a participant in the hacking study. 
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Your consent 
 
I understand the basic procedure of this study and am aware that I may discontinue par-
ticipation at any time. I hereby consent to participate in a survey of about fifteen minutes 
that focuses on general hacking experiences.  
 
I understand that this study is anonymous, confidential, strictly non-commercial, and for 
dissertation research purposes only. Only the researchers will have access to the ques-
tionnaire. No other person or organization, including other attendees at this conference 
will have access to my questionnaire.  I understand that I must be at least 18 years old 
to participate in this research project. I understand that my participation or non-
participation in this study has no bearing one way or the other on my status as an atten-
dee of this conference. I understand that no compensation can be provided for my par-
ticipation in this study. 
 
If you believe you have been injured during participation in this research project, you 
may file a claim against the State of Florida by filing a claim with the University of Cen-
tral Florida’s Insurance Coordinator, Purchasing Department, 4000 Central Florida Bou-
levard, Suite 360, Orlando, FL 32816, (407) 823-2661.  University of Central Florida is 
an agency of the State of Florida and the university’s and the state’s liability for personal 
injury or property damage is extremely limited under Florida law. Accordingly, the uni-
versity’s and the state’s ability to compensate you for any personal injury or property 
damage suffered during this research project is very limited. 
 
Information regarding your rights as a research volunteer may be obtained from: 
 
Barbara Ward, CIM 
Institutional Review Board (IRB) Coordinator 
University of Central Florida (UCF) 
Office of Research & Commercialization 
12201 Research Parkway, Suite 501 
Orlando, Florida 32826-3246 
Telephone:  (407) 823-2901 
 
 
You do not need to sign this consent form. Submission of a completed questionnaire 
constitutes your consent to participate in this research project. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
ARPANET 
A network created in 1969 by the US Defense Department's Advanced Projects 
Research Agency (ARPA) to develop a system of data communications for scien-
tific and military operations. ARPANET adopted the TCP/IP communications 
standard, which defines data transfer on the Internet today. 
Black Hats 
Hackers (more correctly called crackers) who engage in destructive computer 
exploits, motivated by greed, revenge, sabotage, blackmail, that can result in 
harm to property and/or to people. 
Bouncing 
Bouncing is a method similar to spoofing. The attacker uses proxy servers or 
computers to relay, or bounce, their requests to the attacked machines and to 
evoke the impression the attack originated from the address it was channeled 
through.  
Buffer 
A region of memory set aside to temporarily store output or input data waiting to 
be directed to a device. 
Buffer Overflow 
In computer security and programming, a buffer overflow, or buffer overrun, is a 
programming error which may result in a memory access exception and program 
termination, or in the event of a malicious attack, a breach of system security. 
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CGI 
CGI (Common Gateway Interface) denotes an interface program that enables an 
Internet server to run external programs to perform specific functions, such as 
creating “dynamic” content. Several broad-spectrum scanners exist that detect 
known vulnerabilities in CGI programs. CGI attacks are among the most popular 
attack methods on Internet servers. Most website defacements exploit the CG In-
terface. 
Cracking 
Gaining unauthorized access to computer systems to do harm or commit a crime. 
Cracker 
 Cracker is a label for a malicious black hat hacker who breaks into remote com-
puter systems without authorization in order to commit crimes.  
Cybercrime 
A crime related to technology, computers, and the Internet, resulting in harm to 
property and/or persons.   
Cyberspace 
Composed of millions of interconnected computers, servers, routers, switches, 
and fiber optic cables, cyberspace allows critical infrastructures to work. Today, it 
is the nervous system of the global economy. 
Directory Traversal/Climbing 
Directory traversal or directory climbing, sometimes also referred to as backtrack-
ing, denotes one of the most common exploits on the Internet. By altering the 
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path of an URL, the attacker is reading files from a website that are not intended 
to be shared over the Internet.  
DNS 
DNS stands for Domain Name System, a computer program running on web 
servers that translates URL domain names into IP addresses in order to direct 
easy-to-remember domain name requests (e.g. http://www.google.com) to the 
respective binary IP address (216.239.39.99) of the domain host. 
DNS Zone Transfer 
DNS, or Domain Name System, is a program that is used by DNS servers to 
translate user-friendly Uniform Resource Locator (URL) domain names (e.g. 
http://www.google.com) into the respective binary IP address (in the case of 
http://www.google.com the number 216.239.39.99) of the domain host. When re-
ceiving such a request, DNS servers look for the domain name in their database 
and direct the request to the IP address associated with that domain name. Most 
of the queries that are received by Domain Name Systems request translations 
of URL domain names into IP addresses. The functionality of the Domain Name 
System, however, is not limited to such translations. One additional feature of 
DNS servers is the so-called “Zone Transfer”. The Zone Transfer feature allows 
downloading the entire table of names and IP addresses contained within a net-
work from the DNS database. Downloading this table enables the hacker to ef-
fectively map a network. Typically, the information contained in the database re-
veals the IP addresses of hosts that are likely to be active as well as the location 
of important servers and sometimes even user names. DNS Zone Transfers are 
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typically used to spy out lower profile and lesser-secured target networks be-
cause many professional network administrators disable the Zone Transfer func-
tions of their DNS servers or ensure that no compromising information is sent out 
through such transfers. 
Dumpster Diving 
Dumpster diving is a slang term for searching through somebody’s garbage. For 
attackers, this search can be a legal and powerful source of information because 
many people do not destroy sensitive information before their disposal due to so-
cial taboos. 
Footprinting 
Sometimes also referred to as fingerprinting, is a term that can have two mean-
ings. Sometimes footprinting is equated with reconnaissance tactics. In this un-
derstanding, all different kinds of activities aimed at gathering information about 
computer systems, networks, or websites, and the entities they belong to are 
subsumed under this term. When equated with the reconnaissance phase, foot-
printing commonly involves a range of technical methods, such as ping sweeps, 
port scans, operation system identifications, network enumerations, registrar 
queries, and many others. The second, more common understanding of the term 
is of a much more narrow scope and denotes one specific activity, namely, the 
identification of a particular operation system through the interpretation of specific 
responses of a computer system that reveal the identity of that particular system. 
In order to trigger the system to reveal identifying responses, the attacker sub-
mits unexpected combinations of code to the target. While most systems respond 
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in the same way to correct response requests, they rarely respond the same way 
to requests that the programmers could not anticipate. A Windows Vista opera-
tion system, for instance, responds to faulty data requests in a way that is distinc-
tively different from a Mac OS, a UNIX OS, a prior Windows OS, or any other 
kind or operation system. Thus, footprinting techniques allow the hacker to identi-
fy the exact host computer system or platform he or she is targeting and allows 
him or her to gear the attack towards the specific vulnerabilities of that particular 
system. Footprinting techniques allow the hacker to identify the exact host com-
puter system or platform he or she is targeting and allows him or her to gear the 
attack towards the specific vulnerabilities of that particular system. The method is 
used for attacks on individual hosts and networks as well as websites, because it 
also allows the hacker to identify weaknesses and points-of-entry in the operation 
system of a server that hosts the targeted website. Footprinting is used by hack-
ers of different skill levels. Whereas lesser skilled attackers will resort to readily 
available footprinting tools, attackers having the necessary programming know-
ledge typically prefer to use their own, custom-made footprinting requests. 
Format String 
Format strings denote an attack method similar to buffer overflows. By program-
ming input with special formatting codes, attackers can override memory areas 
on a target host and use this memory for crashing the program, get access to in-
formation from different locations in the computer’s memory, or even for breaking 
into the host system. 
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Grinding Passwords 
The act of remotely guessing login passwords is oftentimes referred to as grind-
ing passwords. The attacker continually logs on remote machines and guesses a 
different password each time. Alternatively, the hacker can attempt to log onto 
many different machines with the same commonly used password. 
Hacker 
A person who enjoys learning the details of computer systems and how to stretch 
their capabilities. In the public discourse, hacker is often used synonymously with 
the term cracker. 
Honeypot 
In computer terminology, a honeypot is a trap set to detect, deflect, or in some 
way counteract attempts of unauthorized intrusions. 
I2P 
I2P, originally also termed the Invisible Internet Project, is an anonymous net-
work that can be used for anonymous surfing and to transfer files anonymously. 
ICMP 
ICMP stands for “Internet Control Message Protocol”, an integral part of the In-
ternet Protocol that handles error and control messages. Routers and hosts use 
ICMP to send reports of problems about data packets back to the originating 
source. 
IP address 
Internet Protocol, or IP, addresses uniquely identify a computer accessible over a 
TCP/IP-based network or the internet in a four-part numerical format. 
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Keylogger 
Once an attacker has successfully gained access to a target system, he typically 
installs packet sniffers to record network communications and keyloggers to 
record all keystrokes users of that system enter on the keyboard. Several ver-
sions of keyloggers exist for special purposes such as, for example, recording 
only passwords. 
LAN 
Local Area Network: A user-owned and operated data transmission network that 
typically connects a number of communicating devices such as computers, rou-
ters, gateways, terminals, or printers located within a small geographical area. 
LANs are typically distinguished from WANs, Wide Area Networks such as the 
Internet, which span very large geographical areas or even the entire world. 
Network Mapping 
While ping sweeps provide the attacker with the addresses of active remote 
hosts, they do not provide any information about the networks these hosts are lo-
cated in. In order to explore and document the layout of a network, its topology, 
traffic paths, structures, services, and its performance between nodes, attackers 
typically use additional tools. Among the oldest and simplest of these tools is tra-
ceroute, a utility that displays the times and locations of intermediate stops along 
the route data packets travel to reach their destination. Modern network mappers 
oftentimes combine a vast array of powerful and versatile utilities that allow users 
to identify a multitude of network details, among them active hosts and open 
ports, running applications and services, the rules of firewalls within the network, 
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and even the contents of data packets sent within the network. While network 
scanning is often done with such versatile scanning tools, it is not limited to only 
such utilities. Typically network mapping tools are used in attacks against net-
works or specific hosts located within those networks. The basic skill level re-
quired to perform a network scan is not high, but network scans of more expe-
rienced hackers can be sophisticated and performed with advanced and custo-
mized tools. Three main subcategories of network scans exist that were asked 
separately in the questionnaire: port scanners, versatile scanning tools, and vul-
nerability scanners. 
Packet 
A piece of data of fixed or variable size that is sent through a communication 
network like the Internet. A message is typically broken up into packets before it 
is sent over a network. 
Packet Sniffing 
Packet sniffing is the computer equivalent of wire-tapping a telephone communi-
cation. Sniffing programs disable the filter of Ethernet cards, thus allowing them 
to monitor all communication within a network. 
Password Cracking 
Password cracking is the act of decrypting and recovering the passwords stored 
on a computer system. Every system has to store passwords to be able to au-
thenticate users. Password crack utilities are used to decipher the encryption and 
reveal the account passwords to the attacker.  
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Password Theft 
Password theft is one of the simplest and oldest hacking methods. Once the legi-
timate username and password are known, the attacker can exploit the user ac-
count without having to worry about any countermeasures such as firewalls or in-
trusion detection systems because they cannot distinguish between the legiti-
mate user and the attacker.  
Phreaking 
Phreaking is a slang term coined to describe the activity of a subculture of people 
who study, experiment with, or explore telephone systems, the equipment of tel-
ephone companies, and systems connected to public telephone networks. Often-
times, phreaking denotes the act of breaking into a telephone network for the 
purpose of making free calls or to charge calls to another person's account. 
Ping 
Ping is the short version for Packet Internet Groper, a utility that sends out data 
packets to check whether a remote host is currently connected to a LAN network 
or the Internet and to test the quality of the connection to that remote host. The 
utility sends out ICMP “echo request” packets to the target host and listens for 
ICMP “echo response” replies. The tool then estimates the round-trip time be-
tween sending the request and receiving the response and records any packet 
loss in a statistical summary. 
Ping Sweeping 
The term “ping sweeping,” sometimes also referred to as Internet Control Mes-
sage Protocol (ICMP) sweep, denotes a basic network scanning technique used 
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to determine the IP addresses of active, or live, hosts within a network. Whereas 
single ping commands are used to determine the network location and availability 
of one particular remote computer host, a ping sweep consists of ICMP “echo re-
quest” packets that are send to multiple hosts within one IP address range or en-
tire network. All currently available hosts within the scanned range will reveal 
their availability through returned “echo replies”, which are typically summarized 
by the ping sweeping tool in a list of all active IP addresses within the specified 
address range. Ping sweeps are typically used in attacks against networks, but 
they can also be used to identify one specific target host within a network. They 
do not require a high level of sophistication, are among the dated and slower 
network scanning methods, and suffer from two main drawbacks. Ping sweeps 
are detectable and will alert professional network technicians of an imminent at-
tack. Also, many network administrators sometimes simply block ICMP echo re-
quests being sent from their networks, in which cases the attacker then has to 
resort to scanning open TCP ports. Since they bear some danger of compromis-
ing the attack and reveal only limited amounts of information, ping sweeps are 
commonly used by lesser skilled hackers and in combination with other network 
scanning methods. They are contained in many popular network scanners such 
as nmap, nessus, and others, and their execution does not require a high level of 
sophistication. To the contrary, the execution of a ping sweep is relatively simple 
and merely requires the attacker to know the range of the targeted IP addresses. 
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Port 
In the context of TCP/IP and UDP based computer networks, the term port refers 
to an end point of a logical service connection that is numerically identified be-
tween 0 and 65536. For example, port 80 is used for HTTP traffic. 
Port Scanning 
Just as network scanners, port scanners are commonly used by network admin-
istrators to test the security of their networks and by hackers to compromise it. In 
order to understand how exactly a port scan works and why many hacking ex-
ploits rely on open ports, it is import to know what a port is. Ports are one of the 
main two components of the common Internet protocol TCP/IP. Within the 
TCP/IP protocol, the destination of a data packet is determined by two compo-
nents, the destination address of the computer the packet is sent to and the des-
tination port for the particular type of data packet. Even though firewalls close the 
majority of ports on most computers, specific ports or ranges of ports have to re-
main open for services and applications that are running on a host to be able to 
receive incoming information. Two vulnerabilities, in particular, are associated 
with open ports: security concerns associated with the program responsible for 
delivering the service and with the operating system running on the host. Port 
scanners allow an attacker to scan a range of listening ports on a target host for 
ports that are open and can be used as entry points to this host. Port scanners 
are commonly used in a variety of different hacking attacks, and they do not re-
quire a high level of sophistication. The successful exploitation of open ports is a 
more difficult undertaking than their mere detection in a scan. 
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Proxy 
In the context of computer networks, proxies are gateways that relay one Internet 
session to another. Many proxies can be used for anonymizing purposes. 
Reconnaissance 
Reconnaissance in the context of a hacking attack usually consists of several 
pre-test phases that are performed prior to the actual attack. The purpose of 
these pre-tests is to gather as much information about the target computer host, 
network, or website and its owners and administrating technicians as possible. 
During the reconnaissance phase, the hacker attempts to gather initial informa-
tion, determine the network range, identify active hosts and clients, discover ac-
tive ports and access points, fingerprint the operating systems in use, uncover 
the active services on ports, and combine all gathered intelligence into a map of 
the network. 
Resource Mismatch 
Resource mismatches are one of the most common Denial of Service attacks. 
They utilize the circumstance that some connections use significant more re-
sources on one side of the connection than on the other. An attacker can exploit 
such a connection to effectively shut down the target host.  
Root shell/kits 
On UNIX systems, only the “root” user, the equivalent to a Windows “Administra-
tor,” has complete control over the machine. Several root shell or root kit exploits 
exist that attempt to obtain a shell prompt with root privileges so as to allow the 
attacker to enter and execute any command on the target system. 
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RPC 
Remote Procedure Calls are application-to-application network requests de-
signed to execute commands on remote host computers. 
RPC port/end-point dump 
RPC port/end-point dump scans typically supplement port scans by listing all 
RPC (Remote Procedure Calls) services running on a system.  
Session Hijacking 
The term session hijacking refers to the exploitation of a valid computer session 
to gain unauthorized access to information or services on a computer system. 
The attacker commandeers a TCP session from a legitimate user after this user 
has achieved authentication, thereby removing the need for the attacker to au-
thenticate himself.  
Shoulder Surfing 
A slang word used among hackers to describe an attack method in which the at-
tacker simply monitors the moment the victim enters passwords or other sensi-
tive information on their keyboard.  
Social Engineering 
The term social engineering encompasses all attempts of attackers to establish 
and subvert trust relationships with their victims or to predict the behavior of their 
victims. Once such a relationship is established, the attacker tricks the victim into 
revealing information or performing an action, such as a password reset, for ex-
ample, that can then be used in the attack. A subcategory of social engineering 
methods are so-called reversed social engineering methods, in which attackers 
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use their expertise to induce their victims to reveal sensitive information when 
seeking their help and advice. 
Source Routing 
Source routing denotes a technique that allows a sender of a data packet to spe-
cify the route this packet takes trough a network. Source routing can be used in 
hacking attacks to reach otherwise unreachable targets through intermediate 
computers that are connected to the target.  
Spoofing 
Spoofing is a method attackers use to pretend they are somebody else. This is 
accomplished by creating TCP/IP packets using somebody else’s IP address as 
the source IP address. 
TCP/IP 
Stands for “Transmission Control Protocol / Internet Protocol” and summarizes a 
collection of Internet communication protocols between computers that together 
form the basis for most communications on the Internet. 
TOR 
Tor (The Onion Router) is a free software implementation of so-called second-
generation onion routing. Tor is a system that is similar to I2P in that it enables its 
users to communicate anonymously on the Internet. 
Tunnel 
Methods used by hackers to circumvent firewalls and evade intrusion detection 
systems. 
196 
 
UDP 
Or “User Datagram Protocol,” denotes a connectionless information transport 
protocol that offers a limited amount of services when information is exchanged 
over the Internet Protocol (IP). It is a faster alternative to the TCP protocol. It 
does not guarantee delivery or provide sequencing of packets, but is favored for 
time-sensitive data such as video or audio streams.  
URL 
URL, or Uniform Resource Locator, is an address that can uniquely specify any 
Internet resource or file. It consists of the protocol, the domain, and the name of 
the file. 
Versatile Scanning Tools 
Versatile scanning tools are software tools that combine a variety of different 
scanning utilities in one application. A large number of free and commercial 
scanning tools are available today. As is the case with many other hacking tools, 
many of these applications are also used for legitimate purposes by system ad-
ministrators to verify the configurations of hosts in their networks. Versatile scan-
ning tools appeal to attackers because they conveniently combine several of the 
mapping and scanning functions mentioned earlier. One of the most popular ver-
satile scanning tools is Nmap, a software application that is more than a simple 
scanner. Nmap allows scanning for RPC (remote procedure calls) services on a 
target machine, sending decoy scans with fake source addresses, sending scans 
with different timing options to avoid detection, and identifying a computer’s op-
erating system via fingerprinting, to name but a few functions. Versatile scanning 
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tools are among the essential hacker tools and are used by hackers of all skill le-
vels.  
Vulnerability Scanning 
Vulnerability scanning denotes the act of searching for and mapping systems for 
weaknesses in an application, computer, or network. This search is typically per-
formed by automated vulnerability scanners that combine many functions, such 
as active network scanning functions and vulnerability scanning functions, in one 
application. Vulnerability scanners evaluate several types of vulnerabilities in-
cluding general system weaknesses such as faulty operating system code, faulty 
application code, or faulty configurations. 
War Driving 
War driving is the act of driving through an area in a moving vehicle with a WiFi-
equipped computer to detect wireless networks that permit the attacker to access 
the Internet anonymously.  
Wetware 
A slang word commonly used among hackers and computer experts to signify all 
methods of programming a brain, as opposed to software. It denotes all social 
engineering methods. 
Whois 
Another method for finding out general information about networks, hosts, and 
their owners are whois requests. Whois is both a searchable public database 
system of domain names and their registrars and a query utility that provides de-
tailed ownership information about the domain name holders. The whois data-
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base system contains information on how to contact the registrar and the tech-
nical administrators as well as information on the domain name servers, the reg-
istration and expiration date, and the dates the domain was updated. The system 
was originally developed as a method for system and network administrators to 
research contact information of other administrators, ISPs, and certified computer 
incident response teams, and to determine the availability of domain names. Law 
enforcement agencies also commonly utilize whois queries to lookup domain 
owners in their combat against online copyright infringements, racial discrimina-
tion, hatred, violence, and child pornography. Undoubtedly, the whois system has 
many positive uses that contribute to a higher user confidence in the Internet as 
a reliable and efficient communication medium, but it can also be abused to 
gather intelligence for hacking attacks, especially for attacks on websites. The 
whois system is not restricted to network administrators, but allows everybody to 
place queries, regardless of their motivations or intentions. In recent years, the 
unrestricted access to the whois system has led to increasing abuses by email 
spammers, who use the system to acquire email addresses for their spam data-
bases. This development that has caused many web site hosts to “lock” their 
domains in order to prevent spammers from accessing their email addresses, 
thereby rendering the system less useful than it used to be. 
199 
 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
 
Adam, A. E. (2004). Hacking into Hacking: Gender and the Hacker Phenomenon. Com-
puters and Society, 32(7), 3-18 
Aguila, N. (2008). The Fifteen Greatest Hacking Exploits: The Birth Of Hacking. Re-
trieved March 16, 2008, from 
http://www.tomshardware.com/2008/03/14/the_fifteen_greatest_hacking_exploits
/index.html 
Akers, R. L. (1990). Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory in Crimi-
nology: The Path Not Taken. The Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, 81(3), 
653-676 
Akers, R. L., & Sellers, C. S. (2004). Criminological Theories: Introduction, Evaluation, 
and Application (4 ed.). Los Angeles: Roxbury. 
Alaganandam, H., Mittal, P., Singh, A., & Fleizach, C. (2005). Cybercriminal Activity. 
Retrieved February 5, 2008, from http://www.cs.ucsd.edu/~cfleizac/WhiteTeam-
CyberCrime.pdf 
Alexander, S. (2005). Cyber hackers' motives shift to money. Retrieved May 20, 2008, 
from http://www.detnews.com/2005/technology/0509/20/A04-320608.htm 
Allan, G. J. B. (1976). Ordinal-scaled variables and multivariate analysis: comment on 
Hawkes. American Journal of Sociology, 81(6), 1498-15000 
Bachmann, M. (2008). Book Review: Clifford, R. D. (2006). Cybercrime: The Investiga-
tion, Prosecution, and Defense of a Computer-Related Crime. International Crim-
inal Justice Review, 18(2). DOI 10.1177/1057567708319404 
200 
 
Badham, J. (Writer) (1983). War Games. In H. Schneider (Producer). USA: MGM/UA 
Entertainment. 
Beccaria, C. (1764). Of Crimes and Punishments (D. Young, Trans.). Indianapolis, Ind: 
Hackett. 
Bednarz, A. (2004). Profiling Cybercriminals: A Promising but Immature Science. Re-
trieved May 03, 2008, from 
http://www.networkworld.com/supp/2004/cybercrime/112904profile.html 
Bement, A. L., Ward, W. E., Carlson, L. T., Frase, M. J., & Fecso, R. S. (2004). Women, 
Minorities, and Persons with Disabilities in Science and Engineering. Arlington, 
VA: National Science Foundation, Division of Science Resources Statistics,  
Document Number 04317) 
Bentham, J. (1789). An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London: 
T. Payne. 
Bequai, A. (1999). Cyber-Crime: the US Experience. Computers and Security, 18(1), 
16-18 
Blake, C. (2000). Casting the Runes. Paper presented at the British Computer Society 
Information Security Specialist Group seminar, London. 
Boudreau, M. C., Gefen, D., & Straub, D. W. (2001). Validation in Information Systems 
Research: A State-of-the-art Assessment. MIS Quarterly, 11(1), 1-16 
Bouffard, J. A. (2007). Predicting Differences in the Perceived Relevance of Crime's 
Costs and Benefits in a Test of Rational Choice Theory. International Journal of 
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology, 51(4), 461-485 
201 
 
Brenner, S. (2006). Defining Cybercrime: A Review of State and Federal Law. In R. D. 
Clifford (Ed.), Cybercrime: The Investigation, Prosecution, and Defense of a 
Computer-Related Crime  (pp. 13-94). Durham, NC: Carolina Academic Press. 
Cacioppo, J. T., & Petty, R. E. (1982). The need for cognition. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 42(1), 116-131 
Cacioppo, J. T., Petty, R. E., Kao, C. F., & Rodriguez, R. (1986). Central and peripheral 
routes to persuasion: An individual difference perspective. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 51(5), 1032-1043 
Cammell, D. (Writer) (1977). Demon Seed. In H. Jaffe (Producer). USA: United Artists. 
Capeller, W. (2001). Not Such a Neat Net: Some Comments on Virtual Criminality. So-
cial and Legal Studies, 10, 229-242 
Cartwright, T. (1618). A confutation of the Rhemists translation, glosses, and annota-
tions on the New Testament a 1603. 
Casey, E. (2004). Digital Evidence and Computer Crime: Forensic Science, Computers 
and the Internet (2 ed.). San Diego, CA & London: Academic Press. 
Castells, M. (2002). The internet galaxy: Reflections on the internet, business, and so-
ciety. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Chirillo, J. (2001). Hack Attacks Revealed: A Complete Reference with Custom Security 
Hacking Toolkit. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Clarke, R. V. (1992). Introduction. In R. V. Clarke (Ed.), Situational Crime Prevention: 
Successful Case Studies. Albany, NY: Narrow and Heston. 
Clarke, R. V. (1997). Situational Crime Prevention: Successful Case Studies (2 ed.). Al-
bany, NY: Harrow and Heston. 
202 
 
Clarke, R. V. (2004). New Challenges for Research: Technology, Criminology and 
Crime Science. In E. U. Savona (Ed.), Crime and Technology: New Frontiers for 
Regulation, Law Enforcement and Research (pp. 97-104). Dordrecht, Nether-
lands: Springer. 
Clarke, R. V., & Cornish, D. B. (1985). Modeling offender's decisions: A framework for 
research and policy. In T. M. & N. Morris (Eds.), Crime and Justice (Vol. 6). Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press. 
Clarke, R. V., & Cornish, D. B. (2001). Rational Choice. In R. Paternoster & R. Bach-
man (Eds.), Explaining Criminals and Crime: Essays in Contemporary Crimino-
logical Theory. Los Angeles: Roxbury. 
Clarke, R. V., & Felson, M. K. (1993). Routine Activity and Rational Choice. Advances in 
Criminological Theory (Vol. 5). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Press. 
Clifford, R. D. (2006). Introduction. In R. D. Clifford (Ed.), Cybercrime: The Investigation, 
Prosecution, and Defense of a Computer-Related Crime (2 ed.). Durham, NC: 
Carolina Academic Press. 
Cohen, L. E., & Felson, M. K. (1979). Social Change and Crime Rate Trends: A Routine 
Activity Approach American Sociological Review, 44(4), 588-608 
Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, C. D. (2002). Searching and seizing 
computers and obtaining electronic evidence in criminal investigations. Re-
trieved. from 
http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/websites/usdojgov/www.usdoj.gov/criminal/cyb
ercrime/s&smanual2002.htm#_VA_. 
203 
 
Cornish, D. B. (1994). The procedural analysis of offending and its relevance for situa-
tional prevention. In R. V. Clarke (Ed.), Crime Prevention Studies (Vol. 3). Mon-
sey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. 
Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1987). Understanding Crime Displacement: An Applica-
tion of Rational Choice Theory. Criminology, 25(4), 933-948 
Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (1989). Crime specialisation, crime displacement and ra-
tional choice theory. In H. Wegener, F. Losel & J. Haisch (Eds.), Criminal beha-
vior and the justice system: Psychological perspective (pp. 103-117). New York, 
NY: Springer. 
Cornish, D. B., & Clarke, R. V. (Eds.). (1986). The Reasoning Criminal. New York, NY: 
Springer. 
Cornish, D. B., & Smith, M., J. (2003). Theory for Practice in Situational Crime Preven-
tion (Vol. 16). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. 
Couper, M. P. (2000). Web Surveys: A Review of Issues and Approaches. Public Opi-
nion Quarterly, 64(4), 464-494 
Cramer, D. (2003). A cautionary tale of two statistics: Partial correlation and standar-
dized partial regression. Journal of Psychology, 137(5), 507-511 
Cronenberg, D. (Writer) (1999). eXistenZ. In D. Cronenberg, A. Hamori & R. Lantos 
(Producer). Canada: Alliance Atlantis. 
Curran, K., Morrissey, C., Fagan, C., Murphy, C., O'Donnell, B., Firzpatrick, G., et al. 
(2005). Monitoring hacker activity with a Honeynet. International Journal of Net-
work Management, 15(2), 123-134 
204 
 
D'Arcy, J. P. (2007). The Misuse of Information Systems: The Impact of Security Coun-
termeasures. New York, NY: Lfb Scholarly Pub. 
Dahlback, O. (1990). Personality and risk-taking. Personality and Individual Differences, 
11(12), 1235-1242 
Damsell, K. (2003). Ethical Hackers' Test for Weakness. The Globe and Mail, p. B1,  
De Hann, W., & Vos, J. (2003). A crying shame: The over-rationalized conception of 
man in the rational choice perspective. Theoretical Criminology, 7(1), 29-54 
Dinello, D. (2005). Technophobia!: Science Fiction Visions of Posthuman Technology. 
Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. 
Dowland, P., Furnell, S., Illingworth, H., & Reynolds, P. (1999). Computer Crime and 
Abuse: A Survey of Public Attitudes and Awareness. Computers and Security, 
18(8), 715-726 
Dulebohn, J. H. (2002). An investigationof the determinants of investment risk behavior 
in employer-sponsored retirement plans. Journal of Management 28(1), 3-26 
Earnest, T. L. (2003). Deterrence Dynamics and Gender: Extending the Deter-
rence/Rational Choice Model. Unpublished Dissertation, Mississippi State U, Ox-
ford, MI. 
Edgerton, D. (1995). Technophobia then and now. Nature, 376(6542), 653-654 
Epstein, S. (2003). Cognitive-experiential self-theory of personality. In T. Millon & M. J. 
Lerner (Eds.), Comprehensive Handbook of Psychology, Volume 5: Personality 
and Social Psychology (Vol. 5, pp. 159-184). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
205 
 
Epstein, S., Pacini, R., Denes-Raj, V., & Heier, H. (1996). Individual differences in intui-
tive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking styles. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 71(2), 390-405 
Erickson, J. (2008). Hacking: The Art of Exploitation (2 ed.). San Francisco, CA: No 
Starch Press. 
Erickson, K., & Howard, P. N. (2007). A Case of Mistaken Identity? News Accounts of 
Hacker, Consumer, and Organizational Responsibility for Compromised Digital 
Records. Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication, 12(4), 1229-1247 
Ericsson, K., & Simon, H. (1980). Verbal Reports as Data. Psychological Review, 87(3), 
215-251 
Ericsson, K., & Simon, H. (1984). Protocol Analysis: Verbal Reports as Data. Cam-
bridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Felson, M. K. (2000). The routine activity approach as a general social theory. In S. 
Simpson (Ed.), Of crime and criminality: The use of theory in everyday life. Thou-
sand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Evanston, IL: Row & Peterson. 
Finch, J. (1987). The Vignette Technique in Survey Research. Sociology, 21(1), 105-
114 
Fisher, R. J. (1993). Social desirability bias and the validity of indirect questioning. Jour-
nal of Consumer Research, 20(2), 303-315 
Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1984). Social cognition (1 ed.). Reading, MA: Addison-
Wesley. 
206 
 
Freaky. (2004). ShmooCon. Retrieved Mai 01, 2008, from 
http://www.hackwire.com/index.php?action=news&catid=11 
Furnell, S. (2002). Cybercrime: Vandalizing the information society. London: Addison 
Wesley. 
Gibson, W. (1988). Mona Lisa Overdrive. Toronto: Bantam Books, Spectra. 
Gomez-Mejia, L. R., & Balkin, D. B. (1989). Effectiveness of individual and aggregate 
compensation strategies Industrial Relations, 28(3), 431-445 
Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2005). Computer Crime 
and Security Survey: CSI & FBI 
Gordon, L. A., Loeb, M. P., Lucyshyn, W., & Richardson, R. (2006). Computer Crime 
and Security Survey: CSI & FBI 
Gordon, S., & Ford, R. (2006). On the definition and classification of cybercrime. Journal 
in Computer Virology, 2(1), 13-20 
Gosling, S. D., Vazier, S., Srivastava, S., & John, O. P. (2004). Should we Trust Web-
Based Studies? A Comparative Analysis of Six Preconceptions About Internet 
Questionnaires. American Psychologist, 59(2), 93-104 
Gottfredson, M., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A General Theory of Crime. Palo Alto, CA: Stan-
ford University Press. 
Grabosky, P. N. (2001). Virtual criminality: Old wine in new bottles? Social and Legal 
Studies, 10(2), 243-249 
Grabosky, P. N., & Smith, R. (1998). Crime in the digital age. Sydney: Federation Press. 
Graham, P. (2004). Hackers and Painters: Big Ideas from the Computer Age. Sebasto-
pol, CA: O'Reilly Media. 
207 
 
Grecs. (2008). ShmooCon 2008 Infosec Conference Event. Retrieved April 25, 2008, 
from http://www.novainfosecportal.com/2008/02/18/shmoocon-2008-infosec-
conference-event-saturday/ 
Groves, R. M., Fowler, F. J., Couper, M. P., Lepkowski, J., M., Singer, E., & Touran-
geau, R. (2004). Survey Methodology. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. 
Gupta, A. K., & Govindarajan, V. (1984). Business unit strategy, managerial characteris-
tics, and business unit effectiveness at strategy implementation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 27(1), 25-41 
Hafner, K., & Lyon, M. (1998). Where Wizards Stay Up Late: The Origins Of The Inter-
net. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster. 
Hair, J. F., Anderson, R. E., Tatham, R. L., & Black, W. C. (1998). Multivariate Data 
Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall. 
Handley, S. J., Newstead, S., E., & Wright, H. (2000). Rational and Experiential Think-
ing: A Study of the REI. In R. Riding & S. G. Rayner (Eds.), International Pers-
pectives on Individual Differences: Cognitive Styles (Vol. 1). Stamford, CT: Ablex 
Publishing. 
Harrington, S. J. (1996). The Effect of Codes of Ethics. and Personal Denial of Respon-
sibility on Computer Abuse Judgments and Intentions. MIS Quarterly, 20(3), 257-
278 
Harvey, D. (1989). The Condition of Postmodernity. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Hawkes, R. K. (1971). The multivariate analysis of ordinal measures. American Journal 
of Sociology, 76(5), 908-925 
208 
 
Hechter, M., & Kanazawa, S. (1997). Sociological rational choice theory. Annual Review 
of Sociology, 23, 191-214 
Heckathorn, D. D. (1997). Respondent-Driven Sampling: A New Approach to the Study 
of Hidden Populations. Social Problems, 44(2), 174-199 
Howell, B. A. (2007). Real-World Problems of Virtual Crime. In J. M. Balkin, J. Grim-
melmann, E. Katz, N. Kozlovski, S. Wagman & T. Zarsky (Eds.), Cybercrime: 
Digital Cops in a Networked Environment. New York, NY: New York University 
Press. 
Howitt, P. (Writer) (2001). AntiTrust. In D. Hoberman, A. Amritraj, C. O. Erickson & J. 
Chasman (Producer). USA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM). 
Jaishankar, K. (2007). Cyber Criminology: Evolving a Novel Discipline with a New Jour-
nal. International Journal of Cyber Criminology, 1(1), 1-6 
Jaishankar, K. (2008). Space Transition Theory of Cyber Crimes. In F. Schmalleger & 
M. Pittaro (Eds.), Crimes of the Internet (pp. 281-283). Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Pearson. 
Jewkes, Y. (2006). Comment on the book 'Cyber crime and Society by Majid Yar. Re-
trieved September 09, 2007, from 
http://www.sagepub.co.uk/booksProdDesc.nav?prodId=Book227351 
Johnson, B. (2008). Nato says cyber warfare poses as great a threat as a missile at-
tack. Retrieved May 02, 2008, from 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2008/mar/06/hitechcrime.uksecurity 
Johnston, P. (2008). Tories want new cybercrime police unit. Retrieved March 07, 2008, 
from http://www.crime-research.org/news/06.03.2008/3236/ 
209 
 
Jordan, T., & Taylor, P. A. (1998). A Sociology of Hackers. The Sociological Review, 
46(4), 757-780 
Joseph, J. (2003). Cyberstalking: An International Perspective. In Y. Jewkes (Ed.), 
Dot.cons: Crime, Deviance and Identity on the Internet. Cullompton: Willan. 
Kanellis, P., Kiountouzis, E., Kolokotronis, N., & Martakos, D. (2006). Digital Crime and 
Forensic Science in Cyberspace. Hershey, PA: Idea Group. 
Kerlinger, F. N. (1986). Foundations of Behavioral Research (3 ed.). New York, NY: Ri-
nehart & Winston. 
Kilger, M., Arkin, O., & Stutzman, J. (2004). Profiling. In Honeypotproject (Ed.), Know 
your enemy: learning about security threats (2 ed.). Boston: Addison Wesley. 
Kim, J.-O. (1978). Multivariate analysis of ordinal variables revisited. American Journal 
of Sociology, 84(2), 448-456 
Kim, J.-O., & Mueller, C. W. (1978). Introduction to Factor Analysis: What It Is and How 
To Do It (Quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences). Newbury Park, CA: 
Sage. 
Koops, B.-J., & Brenner, S. (2006). Cybercrime Jurisdiction - An Introduction. In B.-J. 
Koops & S. Brenner (Eds.), Cybercrime and Jurisdiction (pp. 1-9). The Hague: 
TMC Asser Press. 
Kovacich, G. (1999). Hackers: Freedom Fighters of the 21st Century. Computers and 
Security, 18(7), 573-576 
Koziol, J., Litchfield, D., Aitel, D., Anley, C., Eren, S., Neel, M., et al. (2004). The Shell-
coder's Handbook: Discovering and Exploiting Security Holes (2 ed.). Indianapo-
lis, IN: Wiley. 
210 
 
Kozlovic, A. K. (2003). Technophobic themes in pre-1990 computer films. Science as 
Culture, 12(3), 341-373 
Krone, T. (2005). Hacking motives. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology 
Krosnick, J., & Fabrigar, L. (1997). Designing Rating Scales for Effective Measurement 
in Surveys. In L. Lyberg, P. Biemer, M. Collins, E. de Leeuw, C. Dippo, N. 
Schwarz & D. Trewin (Eds.), Survey Measurement and Process Quality (pp. 141-
164). New York, NY: Wiley. 
Kubrick, S. (Writer) (1969). 2001: A Space Odyssey. In S. Kubrick (Producer). UK/USA: 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM). 
Kurzweil, R. (2005). The Law of Accelerating Returns. In C. Teuscher & D. Hofstadter 
(Eds.), Alan Turing: Life and Legacy of a Great Thinker. Berlin: Springer. 
Lakhani, K. R., & Wolf, R. G. (2003). Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding 
Motivation and Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects: SSRN. 
Landler, M., & Markoff, J. (2007). Digital Fears Emerge After Data Siege in Estonia. The 
New York Times. Retrieved August 25, 2007, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html?pagewanted=1&
ei=5070&en=15ee9940d96714da&ex=1188187200 
Lemos, R. (2006). Mass defacement puts Turkey on the map. SecurityFocus.   Re-
trieved August 29, 2007, from http://www.securityfocus.com/brief/212 
Lenk, K. (1997). The Challenge of Cyberspatial Forms of Human Interaction to Teritorri-
al Governance and Policing. In B. D. Loader (Ed.), The Governance of Cyber-
space: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring. London: Routledge. 
211 
 
Levitt, M. (2007). Worldwide Email Usage 2007–2011 Forecast: Resurgence of Spam 
Takes Its Toll. Retrieved August 25, 2007, from 
http://www.idc.com/getdoc.jsp?containerId=206038 
Levy, S. (1984). Hackers: Heroes of the Computer Revolution. New York: Doubleday. 
Leyshon, A., Webb, P., French, S., Thrift, N., & Crewe, L. (2005). On the Reproduction 
of the Musical Economy after the Internet. Media, Culture & Society, 27(2), 177-
209 
Li, F. (2006). What is e-business: How the Internet Transforms Organizations. Malden, 
MA: Wiley-Blackwell. 
Lisberger, S. (Writer) (1982). Tron. In D. Kushner (Producer). USA: Buena Vista Pic-
tures. 
Littlewood, A. (2003). Cyberporn and moral panic: an evaluation of press reactions to 
pornography on the internet. Library and Information Research, 27(86), 8-18 
Longo, R. (Writer) (1995). Johnny Mnemonic. In S. Ahrenberg, D. Carmody, V. Ham-
burg & R. Lantos (Producer). USA: Sony Pictures. 
MacCrimmon, K. R., & Wehrung, D. A. (1990). Characteristics of risk taking executives. 
Management Science, 36(4), 422-435 
Mann, D., & Sutton, M. (1998). NetCrime. More Change in the Organisation of Thieving. 
British Journal of Criminology, 38(2), 210-229 
Marshall, L. (2004). The Effects of Piracy upon the Music Industry: A Case Study of 
Bootlegging. Media, Culture & Society, 26(2), 163-181 
Matsuo, H., McIntyre, K. P., Taomazic, T., & Katz, B. (2004). The Online Survey: Its 
Contributions and Potential Problems [Electronic Version]. ASA Secion on Sur-
212 
 
vey Research Methods, 1, 3998-4000. Retrieved Mai, 01 2008, from 
http://www2.bc.edu/~mcintykc/files/Jsm2004OnlinePaper.pdf 
McClintock, R. (1999). Educating America for the 21st Century: A Strategic Plan for 
Educational Leadership January 2000 through December 2004 Version 2.1 
[Electronic Version], 1-25. Retrieved April 01, 2008, from 
http://www.ilt.columbia.edu/publications/docs/ILT_Plan_new.pdf 
Mitchell, W. (1995). City of Bits. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Mitnick, K. D., & Simon, W. L. (2005). The Art of Intrusion: The Real Stories Behind the 
Exploits of Hackers, Intruders & Deceivers. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Mitnick, K. D., Simon, W. L., & Wozniak, S. (2002). The Art of Deception: Controlling the 
Human Element of Security. New York, NY: Wiley. 
Morris, R. (1970). Multiple correlation and ordinally scaled data. Social Forces, 48(3), 
299-311 
Naughton, J. (2000). A Brief History of the Future: The Origins of the Internet. London: 
Phoenix. 
NCIRC. (2008). NATO opens new centre of excellence on cyber defense. Retrieved 
May 03, 2008, from http://www.nato.int/docu/update/2008/05-may/e0514a.html 
Negroponte, N. (1996). Being Digital (First Vintage Books ed.). New York, NY: Random 
House. 
Newman, G. R., & Clarke, R. V. (2003). Superhighway Robbery: Crime Prevention and 
E-commerce Crime. Cullompton: Willan Press. 
213 
 
Newsted, P. R., Chin, W., Ngwenyama, O., & Lee, A. (1996). Resolved: Surveys have 
Outlived their Usefulness in IS Research. Paper presented at the Seventeenth 
International Conference on Information Systems, Cleveland, OH. 
Nosek, B. A., Banaji, M. R., & Greenwald, A. G. (2002). E-Research: Ethics, Security, 
Design, and Control in Psychological Reseach on the Internet. Journal of Social 
Issues, 58(1), 161-176 
Nunnally, J. C. (1978). Psychometric Theory (2 ed.). New York, NY: McGraw-Hill. 
Nuwere, E., & Chanoff, D. (2003). Hacker Cracker: A Journey from the Mean Streets of 
Brooklyn to the Frontiers of Cyberspace. New York: HarperCollins Publishers. 
O'Brian. (1979). The use of Pearson's R with ordinal data. American Sociological Re-
view, 44(5), 851-857 
Opp, K.-D. (1997). Limited rationality and crime. In G. R. Newman, R. V. Clarke & S. S. 
Giora (Eds.), Rational Choice and Situational Crime Prevention: Theoretical 
Foundations (pp. 47-63). Dartmouth UK: Ashgate. 
Oxford English Dictionary (2008). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Pacini, R., & Epstein, S. (1999). The relation of rational and experiential processing 
styles to personality, basic beliefs, and the ratio-bias phenomenon. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 76(6), 972-987 
Painter, C. (2004). Threats to the Net: Trends and Law. In E. U. Savona (Ed.), Crime 
and Technology: New Frontiers for Regulation, Law Enforcement and Research. 
New York, NY: Springer. 
214 
 
Paternoster, R. (1989). Decisions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Com-
mon Delinquency: Deterrence and the Rational Choice Perspective. Law & So-
ciety Review, 23(1), 7-40 
Pease, K. (2001). Crime futures and foresight: Challenging criminal behaviour in the in-
formation age. In D. S. Wall (Ed.), Crime and the Internet. London: Routledge. 
Piquero, A. R., & Tibbets, S. G. (2002). Rational Choice and Criminal Behavior. Recent 
Research and Future Challenges. New York, NY & London: Routledge. 
Porter, S. R., & Whitcomb, M. E. (2003). The Impact of Contact Type on Web Survey 
Response Rates. Public Opinion Quarterly, 67(4), 579-588 
Reips, U. D. (2002). Standards for Internet-Based Experimenting. Experimental Psy-
chology, 49(4), 243-256 
Richtel, M., & Tedeschi, B. (2007). Online Sales Lose Steam. The New York Times. Re-
trieved September 09, 2007, from 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/06/17/technology/17ecom.html?ex=1339732800&e
n=60dbe8c0ab8fec6f&ei=5088 
Schell, B. H., Dodge, J. L., & Moutsatsos, S. (2002). The Hacking of America: Who's 
Doing It, Why, and How. New York, NY: Quorum. 
Schell, B. H., & Martin, C. (2004). Cybercrime: A Reference Handbook. Santa Barbara, 
CA: ABC-CLIO. 
Schlegel, K., & Cohen, C. (2007). The Impact of Technology on Criminality. In J. M. 
Byrne & D. J. Rebovich (Eds.), The New Technology of Crime, Law and Social 
Control (pp. 23-49). Monsey, NY: Criminal Justice Press. 
215 
 
Schnell, R., Hill, P. B., & Esser, E. (1999). Methoden der Empirischen Sozialforschung 
(6 ed.). Muenchen: Oldenbourg. 
Schrutzki, R. (1989). Die Hacker Ethik. In Das Chaos Computer Buch (pp. 166-180). 
Hamburg: Rowohlt. 
Shelley, M. W. (1995). Frankenstein. In P. J. Hunter (Ed.), Frankenstein (Norton Critical 
Editions ed.). New York, NY, London: W. W. Norton. 
Shields, R. (Ed.). (1996). Cultures of the Internet: Virtual Spaces, Real Histories, Living 
Bodies. London: Sage. 
Shinder, D. L., & Tittel, E. (2002). Scene of the Cybercrime: Computer Forensics Hand-
book. Rockland, MA: Syngress Publishing. 
Simon, L. (2004). Dark Light: Electricity and Anxiety from the Telegraph to the X-Ray. 
Orlando, FL: Harcourt. 
Slovic, P. (1972). Information processing, situation specificity and the generality of risk-
taking behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 22(2), 128-134 
Snyder, F. (2001). Sites of Criminality and Sites of Governance. Social and Legal Stu-
dies, 10, 251-256 
Softley, I. (Writer) (1995). Hackers: Boot Up or Shut Up! In M. Peyser (Producer). USA: 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (MGM). 
Sommer, R., & Sommer, B. (2002). A practical guide to behavioral research: Tools and 
techniques (5 ed.). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Straub, D. W. (1989). Validating instruments in MIS research. MIS Quarterly, 13(2), 
255-276 
216 
 
Sykes, G., & Matza, D. (1957). Techniques of neutralization: a theory of delinquency. 
American Sociological Review, 22, 664-670 
Taylor, P. A. (1999). Hackers: Crime in the digital sublime. London and New York, NY: 
Routledge. 
Taylor, P. A. (2000). Hackers - Cyberpunks or Microserfs. In D. Thomas & B. Loader 
(Eds.), Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, Security and Surveillance in the Informa-
tion Age. London: Routledge. 
Taylor, P. A. (2004). Hacktivism - Resistance is Fertile? In C. Sumner (Ed.), The Black-
well Companion to Criminology. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Thomas, D. (2002). Hacker Culture. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press. 
Thomas, D. (2002). Notes from the Underground: Hackers as Watchdogs of Industry. 
Online Journalism Review. Retrieved March 2, 2008, from 
www.ojr.org/ojr/business/1017969515.php 
Thomas, D., & Loader, B. D. (2000). Introduction - Cybercrime: law enforcement, securi-
ty and surveillance in the information age. In D. Thomas & B. Loader (Eds.), Cy-
bercrime: law enforcement, security and surveillance in the information age. Lon-
don: Routledge. 
Thompson, B. (2004). Exploratory and Confirmatory Factor Analysis: Understanding 
Concepts and Applications. Washington, DC: American Psychological Associa-
tion. 
Tourney, C. P. (1992). The Moral Character of Mad Scientists: A Cultural Critique of 
Science. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 17(4), 8 
217 
 
Trochim, W. M. K. (2002). The research methods knowledge base (2 ed.). Cincinnati, 
OH: Atomic Dog Publishing. 
Tudor, A. (1989). Monsters and Mad Scientists: A Cultural History of the Horror Film. 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Turkle, S. (1995). Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet. New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster. 
Turner, D., Fossi, M., Johnson, E., Mack, T., Blackbird, J., Entwisle, S., et al. (2008). 
Symantec Global Internet Security Threat Report: Trends for July - December 07.   
Retrieved May 08, 2008, from 
http://eval.symantec.com/mktginfo/enterprise/white_papers/b-
whitepaper_internet_security_threat_report_xiii_04-2008.en-us.pdf 
Twist, J. (2003). Cracking the hacker underground. Retrieved February 27, 2008, from 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/low/technology/3246375.stm 
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 1030 C.F.R.  (1986). 
Vallee, J. (2003). The Heart of the Internet: An Insider's View of the Origin and Promise 
of the On-Line Revolution. Charlottesville, VA: Hampton Roads. 
Voiskounsky, A., Babeva, J., & Smyslova, O. (2000). Attitudes towards Computer Hack-
ing in Russia. In D. Thomas & B. Loader (Eds.), Cybercrime: Law Enforcement, 
Security and Surveillance in the Information Age. London: Routledge. 
Wall, D. S. (2001). Cybercrimes and the Internet. In D. S. Wall (Ed.), Crime and the In-
ternet. London: Routledge. 
Warner, J. (2007). U.S. Online Banking Population Grew 9.5% In 2006. Online Media 
Daily. Retrieved September 20, 2007, from 
218 
 
http://publications.mediapost.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=Articles.showArticle&art
_aid=59070 
Webster, J. (1996). Shaping women's work: Gender, employment and information tech-
nology. London: Longmans. 
Wright, B. R. E., Caspi, A., Moffit, T. E., & Paternoster, R. (2004). Does the Perceived 
Risk of Punishment Deter Criminally Prone Individuals? Rational Choice, Self-
Control, and Crime. Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency, 41(2), 180-
213 
Yar, M. (2005a). Computer Hacking: Just Another Case of Juvenile Delinquency? The 
Howard Journal, 44(4), 378-399 
Yar, M. (2005b). The Novelty of 'Cybercrime': An Assessment in Light of Routine Activi-
ty Theory. European Journal of Criminology, 2(4), 407-427 
Yar, M. (2006). Cybercrime and Society. London: Sage. 
Zarrett, N. R., & Malanchuk, O. (2005). Who's computing? Gender and race differences 
in young adults' decisions to pursue an information technology career. New Di-
rections for Child and Adolescent Development, 2005(110), 65-84 
Zone-H. (2007). Attackers Top List. Digital Attacks Archive. Retrieved September 09, 
2007, from http://www.zone-h.org/component/option,com_topatt/Itemid,48/ 
 
 
